Managing Immigration and Social Cohesion for Everyone's Benefit?

Didier Ruedin
University of Neuchâtel
didier.ruedin@unine.ch

11th April 2012
Draft Version

Abstract

The increasingly global nature of migration brings into contact individuals from very different backgrounds. These differences in social, cultural, religious, and linguistic background are regarded as a challenge to receiving societies, not least with regard to social cohesion. Yet, immigration policies are increasingly guided by the notion that migration can be managed in a way beneficial to all actors involved. With a focus on social cohesion, the outcomes of management policies are of central interest, and the article critically discusses intended and unintended consequences of interventions. The complexity of the issue becomes apparent, caused in part by the multiple actors and multiple stakeholders who are involved. The international dimension of migration means that stakeholders may be outside the policy reach of individual countries, adding a further level of complexity. It is argued that there are aspects of social cohesion that are beyond the reach of social policy and migration management. The nature of migration and social cohesion means that not all areas of migration are sufficiently manageable to enable so-called triple-win situations. At the same time, it is argued that certain policy interventions can assist the integration of immigrants in receiving countries, with positive effects on social cohesion.

Introduction

It has become almost a cliché to begin articles on immigration with reference to advancing globalization and increasing numbers of immigrants. It is not the purpose of this article to reiterate this well-known argument and present the numbers yet another time. Instead, this article focuses on the consequences of policy interventions, for which raw numbers of increasing migration flows or growing diversity in receiving societies are perhaps not as relevant as the perception thereof. Since the two are probably related to some extent (Lahav 2004; Herda 2010), the argument developed in this article refers to trends of increasing migration flows. The starting point of the argument developed, however, is the global nature of migration, rather than raw numbers of immigrants. With that, the increasingly diverse character of immigration in most places of the world is highlighted (e.g. Wihtol de Wenden 2011). Immigrants come from increasingly diverse backgrounds: country of origin, language spoken, religion, class, and perhaps even with different motivation to migrate.

There is no doubt that technological advances in transportation and communication have facilitated this trend (Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011), but what is relevant here is that the increased levels of diversity are often regarded as linked to social cohesion in some way. Briefly, this article begins with a basic – one could say simplistic – argument: First, the global nature of migration leads to increased levels of diversity. Second, increased levels of diversity are perceived as a challenge to social cohesion.

This basic argument is simplistic for a number of reasons. First, it makes no distinction between different countries – very frequently referred to as sending and receiving countries (or any variation of equivalent vocabulary in use). It is clear that immigration does not affect all countries in the same way: in-flows and out-flows of migration differ significantly between countries. Second, there is diversity in migration. It is not enough to say that immigration has become more diverse, because there are different kinds of immigration affecting different countries. Third, the capacity of countries to absorb immigrants differs. The extent to which welfare states are developed is just one example of this difference in capacity. Similarly, programmes to manage and integrate immigrants differ from country to country.

Yet, this basic and simplistic argument is realistic for receiving countries in the so-called western world, because it reflects how immigration issues are commonly framed in the media and by vocal politicians (Transatlantic Council on Migration 2009; Ellinas 2010). Based on this common representation of the issue in the media, this article argues that the image presented here is indeed largely the image common in the population. In this image, differences between different kinds of immigrants are blurred, changes in immigration flows feel unprecedented, and the culture and traditions of the mainstream society appears to be under imminent threat. Indeed, survey evidence tends to support the argument that this view is commonplace (Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Ivarsflaten 2005; Kilpi 2008). Of course, there are also other views of immigration, but this article assumes the presented picture to be the predominant one. For this reason, the remainder of the article continues with the simple argument outlined above as the starting point. The implicit focus is therefore on receiving countries in the so-called west.

The diversity brought about by immigration can be perceived as a challenge to social cohesion. Before examining how diversity can be seen as a threat to social cohesion, however, the concept of social cohesion needs to be looked at in more detail. Social cohesion is one of these sociological concepts that are most commonly talked about when absent (Vertovec 1999; Ruedin and D'Amato 2011). The implication is that normally societies are socially cohesive, but that there are external threats that challenge this status. The cohesive state of a society is thus stable, and where it is not achieved, it is assumed that all societies aspire to socially cohesive stability. Indeed, a society is stable because of its cohesion.

It can be argued that social cohesion is necessary for many forms of collective action to take place. Such action is made possible because of the shared values that are found in society. Tönnies (1974) makes a distinction between community (*Gemeinschaft*) and association (*Gesellschaft*) as two types of society, and social cohesion is possible in both. In a community, there is a feeling of togetherness, close ties between members of the community and thus regular and intensive social interaction, a shared experience of time and space, and a shared identity that is the result of the other factors. In this case, social cohesion works through informal institutions and strong consensus in the community. Contrary to romanticizing accounts, it is important to note that social cohesion is also possible in an association. An association is characterized by superficial and fleeting interactions, individualization, a complex division of labour with co-dependence, and a relative lack of norms. This is a description of modern states as they are found in Europe and other advanced industrial societies. In this case, the state and formal institutions play an important role in organizing society and establishing social cohesion. There is a collective support of laws and support for markets: collective values that enable social cohesion (Durkheim 1964). Social cohesion in this case is institutionalized.

In modern societies, diversity can be regarded as a challenge to social cohesion, where different groups in society do not adhere to the same values, or interpret social rules and laws differently. Of concern are not only real differences, but also perceived differences that may be based on stereotypes. In other words, where the stereotype of immigrants is such that they do not fully adhere to the social rules of the mainstream society, the very presence of immigrants can be seen as a challenge to social cohesion.

If narratives of social cohesion and it being threatened by diversity draw on images of communities, the perceived threat can be more pronounced. In Durkheim's terms, this refers to images of mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1964). Put differently, if the predominant narrative regards social cohesion as something only found in small-scale communities, immigration-based diversity as such can be seen as a threat. In order to understand this step, it is important to bear in mind that mechanical solidarity is based on shared feeling of togetherness (shared identity), close ties between individuals, regular and intensive social interaction, and shared experience. As recent newcomers to society, immigrants may lack any of these. Based on perception alone, immigrants can then be blamed for feelings of social breakdown and loss of belonging (Eatwell 2003). Despite such perceptions, it is important to bear in mind that social cohesion is equally possible in modern societies described by Tönnies as associations, as it is possible in small-scale communities sometimes romanticized in accounts that see immigration-based diversity as inherently problematic in terms of social cohesion.

Reactions to Diversity

The (perceived) challenge to social cohesion brings about reactions of different kinds. This section considers in turn reactions in society, in politics, in the administrative parts of government, as well as in terms of social cohesion and integration programmes.

It is clear that in many western societies, immigration is high on the political agenda: Citizens consider immigration an important issue. As such, the high salience of the topic does not imply any particular reaction in society, but there are reports and allegations of increased xenophobia or even violence against immigrants as a result of the perceived challenges to social cohesion (Cholewinski and Taran 2010; Eatwell 2003). Some narratives in the media and politics associate immigration as such with a sense of crisis and an inherent threat to stability (Hollifield 2008). Certain individuals and political actors of the mainstream society blame immigrants for a range of problems, including unemployment and crime. Such actions and narratives against immigrants can be regarded as scapegoating: finding somebody to blame for the problems identified. These reactions can be observed particularly in times of economic restructuring and economic crisis (Norris 2005; D'Amato 2009).

Perhaps less radical but certainly linked is the increasing importance of nationality in public discourse (Schmitter Heisler 2008; Hellström and Hervik 2010; Ellinas 2010; but see Norris and Inglehart 2009). The reaction is one away from diversity, toward a single (allegedly true) understanding of nationality. Highlighted are in particular the culture linked to a nationality, and ideas like what it means for instance to *really* be German. Concepts like *Leitkultur* (guiding culture) are increasingly common currency. Some talk of neo-nationalism to describe the re-emerge of nationalism and the increasing importance of nationality in its widest sense. It is often suggested that the public want strict policies toward immigrants and their integration in society (Emmenegger and Careja 2012; Hollifield 2008), which can be understood as a reaction to protect such a single understanding of nationality.

The picture is not so gloomy if we consider different reactions that take place at the same time. In attitudinal surveys, we observe that attitudes become more liberal and less nationalistic as time passes (Ford 2008; Ford 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2009). It is in particular the younger generations who have grown up with a larger proportion of immigrants among their peers who are more liberal. Sceptics might point out the potential of social-desirability biases in attitudinal surveys. After all, the observed changes might simply reflect increased reluctance to admit that one is prejudiced. Other data are available without such pitfalls: data on inter-marriages. It can be observed that individuals from all ethnic groups are increasingly likely to marry across ethnic boundaries. There are significant differences between ethnic groups, but overall rates of inter-marriage are increasing (Muttarak and Heath 2010; Lucassen and Laarman 2009; Song 2009).

Combining reports on violence against immigrants, the rise of populist right-wing movements in many places, and neo-nationalism on the one hand, and increasingly liberal attitudes and inter-marriage may be difficult. It seems warranted to speak of ambivalent reactions in society.

The reaction in the media and in politics is perhaps clearer. Because immigration has become a salient topic, politicians and political parties can use issues related to

immigration and the perceived challenge to social cohesion as a topic to exploit. In other words, immigration has become an issue on which voters can be mobilized (Norris 2005; Hollifield 2008; Ellinas 2010; Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). In this regard, we can observe a rhetoric shift in politics that in many places is reflected in the media (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Immigration is reduced to a cultural challenge to the mainstream society, often even to a conflict between Islam and the (Christian) mainstream society in western countries. Differences are essentialized and stereotyped. Put differently, cultural differences are portrayed as if they were fixed and unchangeable attributes. Yet, at the same time as cultural differences are regarded as relatively fixed, the political discourse increasingly insists on cultural integration in addition to economic integration (Gerber 2003; Hollifield 2008). Moreover, a link between immigration and security is purported, drawing on the reduction of immigration to Islam, as well as a reduction of terrorism to so-called Islamic terrorism (Ettinger and Imhof 2011; Laitin 2010).

In political rhetoric, there is an increased focus on costs and benefits of immigration in Europe (Zincone 2011). Such considerations are not new, and were in fact an integral part of guestworker programmes that existed in many western countries. What has changed is that cultural aspects of immigration have entered the equation. Politically desired are highly qualified immigrants, and administrative practices are increasingly prioritizing highly qualified immigrants over others. The focus is generally on being highly qualified, and not necessarily on skills in short supply. With this focus on highly qualified immigrants, in most European countries a certain convergence of immigration policies toward the approaches in the US and Canada can be observed. Historical influences, however, mean that despite similar aims at present, policies remain noticeably different in many aspects (Hammar 1985; Schnapper 2007; Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011).

Convergence occurs mostly in technical details and implementation; for the big picture of how to approach challenges of immigration and how to ensure social cohesion, approaches remain noticeably different. Despite some convergence, so far the programmes in the US and Canada are more successful in attracting the highly skilled immigrants (Banting 2010; Fenna 2010). Part of this is due to the implementation of programmes, such as the *Blue Card* that requires constant renewing, and therefore may not be attractive enough. In programmes that focus on the management of immigration, and particularly in programmes that focus on highly qualified workers, the idea is commonplace that so-called triple-win situations are possible. Triple-win situations mean that benefits for the country of origin, for the receiving country, as well as the immigrants can be achieved at the same time. To reach such an outcome, governments have fundamentally two options: controlling who comes in – something not covered in this article –, and managing social cohesion and integration.

In terms of social cohesion and integration programmes, there are attempts to put into practice the tougher political rhetoric. For example, language requirements were introduced for family reunion in the Netherlands (Lægaard 2010; Berkhout, Butter, and de Lange 2012), or in the UK formal citizenship tests are required for naturalization since 2002 (Home Office 2011). Such policy changes tend to be of technical nature and relatively easily implemented: language programmes, citizenship courses of a multiple-choice nature, or explicit demands for cultural integration. At the same time, other aspects of policy seem unaffected by the increasing rhetoric pressure. This is the case for demands for increased cultural

integration. In this case it is unclear how cultural integration can be forced, or even what it is. Moreover, there are (still) clear legal limits to what can be done (Cholewinski and Taran 2010; Emmenegger and Careja 2010). Consequently, the tough rhetoric often stands in contrast with human rights, international labour-force rights, or the free movement of persons in the European Union. This means that changes in European policy and procedures might only apply to so-called third-country nationals, and even there we cannot observe a uniform trend toward more restrictive policies (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012; Vangoidsenhoven 2012; Cunningham 2012; Berkhout, Butter, and de Lange 2012).

Yet, in public discourse there is a fear that resources are transferred to immigrants (Emmenegger and Careja 2012; Hörisch and Weishaupt 2010). This fear stands in contrast with studies that enumerate the net contribution of immigrants to the economy and welfare system (e.g. Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011). Given that the topic is highly salient, and that immigrants are widely seen or portrayed as challenges to social cohesion, the argument that such transfers *could* take place in itself is politically explosive. In fact, such transfers in themselves can be seen as a threat to social cohesion: immigrants are presented as undeserving recipients of social welfare resources, or as actively exploiting the situation. The fear is that immigrants take more than they deserve, or that they take what others deserve. As a reaction, access to social security is made more difficult, that is more bureaucratic and formalized. There is a differentiation between deserving and undeserving increasingly linked to migration status, the degree of (perceived) integration. The rhetoric links desert and integration: only immigrants who are considered to be integrated may pass as deserving.

Impact of Social Cohesion and Integration Programmes

It is generally difficult to measure the outcomes of social cohesion and integration programmes. Given the large number of indicators and indices that exist, such a statement might be surprising. However, it should be noted that these indicators are largely created ad-hoc. In other words, the indicators that are used lack a clear theoretical base, and with that, the empirical base is unclear, which in turn means that the interpretation of the indicators becomes unclear (Haug 2006; Stolz 2010; D'Amato 2010).

This article is not going to provide a remedy to existing indicators that try to measure the outcomes or impact of social cohesion and integration programmes. Instead, it highlights the deficiencies of existing approaches to argue that these are unable to say much about outcomes. First, existing indicators lack theory in the sense that generally no positive description of social cohesion or integration is used. As a result, there is limited value in the numbers they produce: what does 80% on a specific item mean for the integration of immigrants and social cohesion in general? What is missing is theory of how different variables contribute to social cohesion (see Ruedin 2011). Recently, in many western countries clear political vision in this regard also seems to be missing (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Where politicians do not outline what kind of society is aspired to, it is impossible to measure the impact of individual policy interventions toward this goal that is not defined.

What appears to be done is that integration measures are developed based on the data that are available. Indicators are chosen based on researchers and practitioners considering them important, not because they are the best indicators given any theory (Heckmann et al. 2010; Alboim 2010). In fact, the relative absence of theory

means that current approaches are largely circular: integration is defined by the indicators that are used to measure the concept. Put differently, existing approaches often simply measure changes in a series of variables, which may or may not be related to social cohesion or the integration of immigrants into the mainstream society.

For example, it is unclear whether forcing immigrants to study the local language up to level B1 rather than A2 has any impact on integration or social cohesion.[1] Taking a step back and focusing on social cohesion rather than integration, there is theory and empirical evidence that can be applied in an objective manner. It would be an overstatement to claim that we have detailed knowledge of the factors that shape social cohesion, but we do not operate in a vacuum. The idea presented in this article is therefore to look at integration and social cohesion in their wider sense, and not focus exclusively on the position of immigrants. Social cohesion is useful as a concept here because it refers to the society as a whole – it is unusual to talk for instance only about the social cohesion of immigrant groups.

As we have seen at the beginning of the article, in modern societies, social cohesion is facilitated by shared adherence to universal laws and moral principles. What seems to work are for example universal human right, or international labour rights that define clear standards, as well welfare programmes that are in principle open to everyone in need (Cholewinski and Taran 2010). Such universal approaches are based on the equality of individuals, and geared toward those who need additional support to fully take part in society. The notion of what this taking part means differs across countries, but it may include access to regular paid work and healthcare, having adequate housing and social contact with others, feeling part of society, or participation in politics. One consequence may be that the individuals affected become less dependent on support from the welfare state and feel part of society.

As illustrated in Figure 1, however, in many western countries, such universal approaches are limited to the mainstream society in the sense that immigrants as non-citizens of the receiving society are often unable to access the full range of programmes available. There are thus two different paths, one for the citizens of the country, and one for immigrants. The effectiveness of social cohesion programmes – be they called welfare programmes, social benefits, or something else – is relatively well established (Cholewinski and Taran 2010). Marginalized groups and individuals of the mainstream society have access to the welfare state to help them overcome this marginalization to the extent that social cohesion can be achieved.

For immigrants, in contrast, a different approach is common. For political or other reasons, immigrants are often unable to fully access welfare programmes, and the link to social cohesion is attempted through separate integration programmes. The approach in this article means that the welfare state and integration programmes can both be considered social cohesion programmes. By focusing on social cohesion, it becomes apparent how in many western societies it is attempted to manage immigrants, forcing or nudging them into successful integration without recourse to the welfare programmes that are exclusive to the mainstream society. As outlined in further detail below, however, the link between current integration policies and the outcome in terms of social cohesion is not well known, if at all. This contrasts with

---

[1] Levels refer to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

the outcomes of welfare programmes, where the outcomes in terms of social cohesion are relatively well established (Cholewinski and Taran 2010).

The argument developed goes beyond the phenomenon of dualization as it is commonly studied: the deepening of social divisions and creation of a division between insiders and outsiders (for a recent collection see Emmenegger et al. 2012b). Here we are not concerned with the consequences of deindustrialization, but with the management of a particular group in society with regard to welfare programmes. Broadly speaking, in social policy, we can discern two approaches to welfare programmes. On the one hand there are conventional transfers of resources to aid for example unemployed individuals. This approach seems to work, and is included on the left-hand side of Figure 1. On the other hand, there are labour market activation programmes (LMA), with the aim of putting (unemployed) people back into work. The effects of such activation programmes on marginalization and social cohesion are unknown or contested. Put differently, it is unclear whether providing – any kind of – paid work to marginalized individuals helps them overcome their marginalization. One reason for this uncertainly is indeed market dualization where many kinds of work lack stability (Peng 2012; Häusermann and Schwander 2012). When it comes to integration programmes for immigrants, it seems that activation programmes are adapted. As a consequence, the question mark that already exists for activation programmes for the general population is definitely a question mark for the immigrants: this is included on the right-hand side of Figure 1.


Figure 1 The welfare state and integration programmes are presented as separate paths to social cohesion for the mainstream society (left) and immigrants (right) respectively. For the mainstream society, marginalization means access to the welfare state, which helps overcoming marginalization and is thus beneficial for social cohesion. For immigrants, separate integration programmes are common. The two vertical lines between marginalization (for immigrants) and the welfare state indicate that immigrants tend not to have full access to the welfare state. The question mark on the right indicates that the link between integration programmes and social cohesion is uncertain.

Current programmes that focus on the integration of immigrants may have been instigated with social cohesion as an ultimate aim. However, the fact that programmes focus entirely on immigrants and not society as a whole indicates that the coverage of programmes is limited. What is more, their limited focus means that

there are a number of unintended consequences, as outlined in the following paragraphs.

Welfare states are based on principles of equality and inclusiveness (at least on the rhetoric level), which makes it difficult to recognize their exclusive nature. They are exclusive in that the services provided are for a clearly defined group: the citizens (Fink 2004; Lewis 2004). The boundary of the concept of citizenship becomes apparent when the difference between the mainstream society and the migrant population is considered. Migrants are portrayed as undeserving because of their status, because they are not regarded full citizens (Bauböck 1996; Castles 2008). Being considered undeserving, migrants are regarded as having no right to social benefits. In this sense, they are treated the same as any group considered undeserving, such as members of the mainstream claiming incapacity benefits despite being able to work.

As aforementioned, there is apprehension that resources might be transferred from the deserving to the undeserving, particularly from the mainstream society to the immigrant population (Emmenegger and Careja 2012; Hörisch and Weishaupt 2010). In order to prevent such transfers, access to social welfare is made more difficult for everyone, such as by extensive means testing. The aim to make access more difficult for immigrants has unintended consequences for member of the mainstream society, for whom access to the welfare state also becomes more difficult. This can lead to the exclusion from the welfare state of citizens for whom the system was set up in the first place: citizens of the mainstream society in need – deserving citizens (Emmenegger and Careja 2012). This is a direct consequence of the way welfare systems work: inclusive in rhetoric they are organized in a way that makes excluding particular groups difficult: It is difficult to exclude immigrants from a system that is based on desert rather than immigration status.

Where such differential treatment is possible, it is increasingly the case that immigrants are required to demonstrate that they are integrated into the mainstream society in order to be able to access social benefits. This means that immigrants and members of the mainstream society are treated completely differently when it comes to access to the welfare state, as illustrated in Figure 1. Welfare programmes are often in place for citizens who are *not* well integrated: marginalized individuals and groups in society, those in need of support. Access to welfare programmes thus follows a different logic for immigrants and members of the mainstream society. For immigrants, not being integrated is used as a reason to *deny* access to welfare programmes; for citizens not being integrated is used as a reason to *grant* access to welfare programmes. Here the boundaries of citizenship become visible.

Attempts to control access to welfare programmes based on citizenship add up to a defence of difference and stratification that contradicts the rhetoric of welfare programmes. By trying to prevent access to welfare programmes for some groups of the population – namely immigrants – societies are moving away from the ideas of equality to a world where differences are regarded as given and hierarchies in status defended (Cholewinski and Taran 2010; Solt 2011; Emmenegger et al. 2012a). Such differences can be in class, status, and indeed citizenship.

For groups at the fringes of society, the result can be reinforcing marginalization. Citizenship status may mean no access to welfare programmes, leading to economic positions that render individuals more prone to discrimination and exploitation. For

instance, lack of unemployment benefits may increase pressure to work in times of economic downturn, pressurizing individuals to accept exploitive employment terms and irregular work (D'Amato 2009; Rist 2010). Consequently, immigrants may make no social security payments, perpetuating the lack of access to social welfare. In this context, possible discrimination based on ethnicity, migration status, language skills, race, and status may be reinforcing. For the mainstream society, the welfare system exists exactly for such instances, attempting to break reinforcing marginalization by assisting deserving individuals (Fink 2004; Braham and Janes 2002). Without access to the welfare state and real protection under universal labour laws in irregular employment, there is no system in place to prevent such reinforcing marginalization for certain immigrants.

Limits of Policies

The picture is not all that gloomy for all immigrants, because there are also limits to making social cohesion and integration programmes more restrictive. There are many reasons why policies that limit access to welfare programmes cannot be enforced, such as where existing rights prevail. The impact of policies might also be limited because certain aspects of social cohesion may be out of the reach of policies; there may be rational reasons and identificational reasons to resist policies. Finally, some policies are too narrow in their focus to have a significant impact on social cohesion. Beginning with rights, there are established principles such as human rights, labour force standards, or constitutions that limit the extent to which individuals in need can be excluded. In other words, established principles exist to guarantee a minimum standard for the treatment of individuals, be they citizens or not.

Policies are also limited in their reach. For instance, social cohesion and integration programmes are usually unable to reach irregular and illegal immigration, and thus unable to reach individuals who might be most in need of assistance. In this regard, there are no major differences between integration programmes the conventional welfare state. Stakeholders more generally may be out of policy reach. This is the case for individuals outside the regular system such as irregular immigrants, but also actors in countries of origin, and indeed the mainstream society. Social cohesion depends on multiple actors, but existing programmes related to immigration tend to be all about immigrants and ignore the counterpart the mainstream society may have to play for successful integration and ultimately social cohesion (Joppke 2010a; Joppke 2010b; Mason 2010). These limits of policies are visible when social cohesion is taken as the starting point as in this article, but may be overlooked when the focus is fixed on integration: social cohesion entails more than the management of immigrants.

Policies are also limited in their reach in the sense that not all areas may be sufficiently manageable to enable a triple-win situation. For instance, it is unclear whether cultural integration can really be forced using policies, or how the so-called brain drain can be stopped in countries where individuals are free to leave the country and seek employment in richer countries (Düvell 2006; Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011). When it comes to the management of immigrants, it is often forgotten that immigrants are actors and not just objects (to be managed). As a consequence, the diversity in motivations and needs in immigrant groups are often overlooked in programmes that attempt to manage immigration in western societies.

Acknowledging immigrants as actors rather than objects makes it apparent that there are rational and identificational reasons why the policies in place may be actively resisted – making their implementation difficult. For example, an immigrant asked to return to his or her country of origin during an economic crisis may find it preferable to stay on in an irregular or illegal manner rather than returning to a country where the situation may be even worse (D'Amato 2009; Rist 2010). Identity may be another reason to resist policies: immigrants having established a life of some sort, especially after extensive settlement in a receiving society. Returning might mean moving to a place to which the individual has no real relation, or in the case of second-generation immigrants may be just known as a holiday destination.

Existing policies tend to be too narrow and focusing on the integration of immigrants rather than considering social cohesion as a whole. As aforementioned, for legal reasons, in Europe policies often concentrate on so-called third-country nationals, that is, individuals for whom restrictive policies are possible. With a focus on social cohesion, however, the difference between individuals based on citizenship status becomes irrelevant: social cohesion is about the welfare of individuals in general, about all citizens and inhabitants of a society. In other words, social cohesion is blind to the differences in citizenship that current policies highlight.

There are also limits to policies for political reasons, given that a backlash against multiculturalism can be observed (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Kitschelt 1997). It is not just a backlash against multiculturalism as a form of living together, but also a backlash against universal rights that protect all inhabitants of societies. To date, this backlash is largely of rhetoric nature, but the shift in rhetoric makes it more difficult to apply existing rights (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). The notion of a triple win assumes free individuals and universal rights, and where the application of universal rights is in doubt, it is less likely that triple-win situations can be achieved. In other words, a political climate that attempts to severely restrict the rights of one of the three actors of the triple win (immigrants) makes it unlikely that all actors can be considered to benefit from the situation to the same extent.

The reactions in politics and the tendency in policies that follow are defensive in character. Their rhetoric is geared toward the preservation of a state of affairs that no longer exists: clinging to an allegedly socially cohesive society of the past. In contrast, positive reactions are largely absent – answers that work toward an integrated society that can grow. This is a gap or challenge that should be addressed by political theory in future research. This gap requires more than inclusive rhetoric, but it is a gap that can be filled, because as outlined at the onset, social cohesion is possible in different kinds of society, not only in romanticized small-scale communities.

Conclusion

When looking at the practices and consequences of social cohesion and integration programmes, it is important to bear in mind that social cohesion is not limited to questions of immigration and the integration of immigrants into the mainstream society. Instead, social cohesion is about society as a whole, covering all inhabitants, be they citizens or not. It is for this reason that taking the perspective of social cohesion is useful and necessary to better understand the consequences of programmes that are in place. In advanced industrial societies in the so-called west,

welfare programmes are in place to address the needs of marginalized groups in society. An inclusive rhetoric is used in welfare systems, in principle making the receipt of help and support only conditional on desert.

The situation is different for immigrants in many receiving societies, where for political and other reasons access to welfare programmes is frequently limited or denied to non-citizens. Rather than using welfare programmes as a tool to increase social cohesion as it is done for the mainstream society, immigrants are often required to demonstrate that they are integrated before they are granted full access to welfare programmes. In other words, a different logic exists, rooted partly in fears that resources may be transferred from the mainstream society to immigrant groups, and justified with differences in citizenship. Such a justification is facilitated by the recent backlash against multiculturalism and against universal rights and equal treatment more generally.

The fear that immigrants could access the welfare state in a disproportionate manner – receiving support they allegedly do not deserve – has in many places led to access to welfare programmes being made more difficult. Means testing and other bureaucratic hurdles make it more difficult to access social benefits, a step which affects both immigrants (intended consequence of such steps) and marginalized groups and individuals of the mainstream society (unintended consequence). Put differently, the universal character of welfare programmes means that access to welfare is also made more difficult for those who are widely considered deserving support from the welfare state: citizens of the country in need of help. In terms of social cohesion, the unintended consequences of trying to protect resources from being transferred to immigrants in this case are that social cohesion more generally is undermined.

By making a distinction between deserving and undeserving beneficiaries of welfare programmes based on citizenship, the current trend is in danger of justifying differences in the society as given, and thus entrenching trends of dualization. Such differences may be based on immigration status, but can also refer to class and status. Views that differences between groups in society are inherent and given are a challenge to social cohesion, which in part relies on individuals to identify as member of a integrated whole. In this sense, policies that aim to protect the social cohesion of society by excluding individuals considered a threat to the existing cohesion (immigrants) can undermine the very social cohesion they intend to protect.

Existing policies for immigrants tend to focus on integration. As recently picked up by the political discourse, cultural integration as opposed to purely economic integration is relevant for social cohesion. However, as argued in this article, current approaches fall short of reaching such a goal for various reasons. First of all, many policies cannot reach groups and individuals targeted, such as irregular and illegal immigrants. Where integration programmes are able to reach immigrants in need of assistance, their aim is often facilitating integration. What they tend to do is to recreate a limited welfare system for immigrants: the system to which they are not granted full access otherwise.

Cultural assimilation and integration might be most relevant when it comes to social cohesion, but it is unclear how these can be forced. As in other areas of integration, there are legal limits to what can be done. Human rights provide a minimum standard, and constitutions protect individuals from arbitrariness. Legal

limits apart, it is unclear whether it is possible to force different behaviour – essentially, what we are asking immigrants to do when they are asked to integrate and assimilate before obtaining full access to welfare programmes.

Policies are also limited because they tend to ignore countries of origin, where issues such as brain drain are left unaddressed. Whilst this may not affect the social cohesion of the receiving society, it does affect the idea of the triple win: the idea that immigration can be managed in a way that is equally beneficial for the country of origin, the country of destination, as well as for the immigrants themselves. By explicitly excluding immigrants from existing social cohesion programmes – full access to welfare benefits – current policies in advanced industrial societies in the west do not appear to work for immigrants. The fact that immigrants chose to migrate, however, suggests that current arrangements are beneficial to them in some way. Looking at the receiving societies, the limited reach and focus of current programmes on integration rather than social cohesion more generally means that perhaps they are not benefiting as much from immigration as they could. This is the case because only economic integration is addressed in full, whilst cultural integration is beyond the reach of current approaches, perhaps to the detriment of the social cohesion of the receiving society. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that the limitations of current approaches outlined in this article do not mean that triple-win situations are as such unattainable. Taking social cohesion rather than integration as a starting point is the first step to identify possibilities. What is more, this article suggested that political theorists need to develop positive responses to the challenge of social cohesion by outlining how a society can grow into a cohesive whole.

Acknowledgements

References

Alboim, N. 2010. "TRIEC Intergovernmental Committee: Achievements and Lessons" presented at the Immigrant Integration in Switzerland: The Impact of Federalism, February 24, Bern.

Banting, K. 2010. "Immigrant Integration in Canada: Pressures and Policy Responses" presented at the Immigrant Integration in Switzerland: The Impact of Federalism, February 24, Bern.

Bauböck, R. 1996. "Changing the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Inclusion of Immigrants in Democratic Polities." In *Migration and Social Cohesion*, ed. S. Vertovec, 301–34. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Berkhout, J., T. Butter, and T. de Lange. 2012. "Legal and Policy Situation of Immigrants: The Netherlands." *SOM Working Paper* 6: 1–23.

Braham, P., and L. Janes, eds. 2002. *Social Differences and Divisions*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Bruquetas-Callejo, M., B. Garcés-Mascareñas, R. Penninx, and P. Scholten. 2011. "The Case of the Netherlands." In *Migratory Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*, ed. G. Zincone, R. Penninx, and M. Borkert, 129–164. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Castles, S. 2008. "The Factors That Make and Unmake Migration Policies." In *Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*, ed. A. Portes and J. DeWind. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Cholewinski, R., and P. Taran. 2010. "Migration, Governance and Human Rights: Contemporary Dilemmas in the Era of Globalization." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 28 (4): 1 –33. doi:10.1093/rsq/hdq019.

Coenders, M., and P. Scheepers. 1998. "Support for Ethnic Discrimination in the Netherlands 1979-1993: Effects of Period, Cohort, and Individual Characteristics." *European Sociological Review* 14 (4): 405–22.

Cunningham, K. 2012. "Legal and Policy Situation of Immigrants: Ireland." *SOM Working Paper* 2: 1–12.

D'Amato, G. 2009. "Auswirkungen Der Finanzkrise Auf Die Migration" presented at the AOZ, Zürich.

———. 2010. "Switzerland: A Multicultural Country Without Multicultural Policies?" In *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*, ed. S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf. London: Routledge.

Durkheim, É. 1964. *The Division of Labor in Society*. Trans. G. Simpson. New York: Free Press.

Düvell, F. 2006. *Europäische Und Internationale Migration*. Hamburg: LIT Verlag.

Eatwell, R. 2003. "Ten Theories of the Extreme Right." In *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. P. Merkl and L. Weinberg. London: Frank Cass.

Ellinas, A. 2010. *The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emmenegger, P., and R. Careja. 2010. "From Dilemma to Dualization: Social and Migration Policies in the 'Reluctant Countries of Immigration'" presented at the 17th Conference for European Studies, Montreal.

———. 2012. "From Dilemma to Dualization: Social and Migration Policies in the 'Reluctant Countries of Immigration'." In *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*, ed. P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier, and M. Seeleib-Kaiser. International Policy Exchange Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Emmenegger, P., S. Häusermann, B. Palier, and M. Seeleib-Kaiser. 2012a. "How We Grow Unequal." In *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*, ed. P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier, and M. Seeleib-Kaiser. International Policy Exchange Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Emmenegger, P., S. Häusermann, B. Palier, and M. Seeleib-Kaiser, eds. 2012b. *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*. International Policy Exchange Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ettinger, P., and K. Imhof. 2011. *Ethnisierung Des Politischen Und Problematisierung Religiöser Differenz*. Schlussbericht. Zürich: fög – Forschungsbereich Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft / Universität Zürich.

Fenna, A. 2010. "Federalism and Immigration Policy: A Comparative Overview" presented at the Immigrant Integration in Switzerland: The Impact of Federalism, February 24, Bern.

Fink, J., ed. 2004. *Care*. Bristol: The Policy Press.

Ford, R. 2008. "Is Racial Prejudice Declining in Britain?" *British Journal of Sociology* 59 (4): 609–36.

———. 2009. "Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration Is Affected by Migrants' Region of Origin."

Gerber, B. 2003. *Die Antirassistische Bewegung in Der Schweiz: Organisationen, Netzwerke Und Aktionen*. Social Cohesion and Cultural Pluralism. Zürich: Seismo Verlag.

Goldin, Ian, Geoffrey Cameron, and Meera Balarajan. 2011. *Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Hammar, T., ed. 1985. *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haug, W. 2006. "Lässt Sich Integration Messen?" *Terra Cognito* 9: 68–71.

Häusermann, S., and H. Schwander. 2012. "Varieties of Dualization? Labor Market Segmentation and Insider-outsider Divides Across Regimes." In *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*, ed. P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier, and M. Seeleib-Kaiser. International Policy Exchange Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heckmann, F., C. Köhler, M. Peucker, and S. Reiter. 2010. "Quantitative Integration Research in Europe: Data Needs and Data Availability." *PROMINSTAT Working Paper* 3. http://www.prominstat.eu/drupal/?q=system/files/Working+Paper+03+Integration.pdf.

Hellström, A., and P. Hervik. 2010. "Feeding the Beast: Nourishing Nativist Appeals in Sweden and in Denmark" presented at the IMISCOE Annual Conference, September 14, Liège.

Herda, D. 2010. "How Many Immigrants?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74 (4): 674 –695. doi:10.1093/poq/nfq013.

Hollifield, J. 2008. "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We 'Bring the State Back In'?" In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, ed. C. Brettell and J. Hollifield. 2nd ed. Abingdon: Routledge.

Home Office. 2011. "Life in the UK Test: Background to the Test." http://lifeintheuktest.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/htmlsite/background_10.html.

Hörisch, F., and T. Weishaupt. 2010. "In the Midst of the Crisis: Supporting the Unemployed Through Direct Job-Creation Schemes?" presented at the 17th Conference for European Studies, Montreal.

Ivarsflaten, E. 2005. "Threatened by Diversity: Why Restrictive Asylum and Immigration Policies Appeal to Western Europeans." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 15 (1): 21. doi:10.1080/13689880500064577.

Joppke, C. 2010a. *Citizenship and Immigration*. Cambridge: Polity.

———. 2010b. "Immigrant Integration in Western Europe: Pressures and Policy Responses" presented at the Immigrant Integration in Switzerland: The Impact of Federalism, February 24, Bern.

Kilpi, E. 2008. "Prejudice as a Response to Changes in Competitive Threat: Finnish Attitudes Towards Immigrants 1986-2006." *Sociology Working Papers* 1. http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/research/workingpapers/2008-01.pdf.

Kitschelt, H. 1997. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Koopmans, R., I. Michalowski, and S. Waibel. 2012. "Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross-national Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008." *American Journal of Sociology* 117 (4): 1202–1245. doi:10.1086/662707.

Lægaard, S. 2010. "Immigration, Social Cohesion, and Naturalization." *Ethnicities* 10 (4): 452 –469. doi:10.1177/1468796810378324.

Lahav, G. 2004. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration in the European Union: Does It Matter?" *Comparative Political Studies* 37: 1151–83.

Laitin, David. 2010. "Rational Islamophobia in Europe." *European Journal of Sociology* 51 (03): 429–447. doi:10.1017/S0003975610000202.

Lewis, G., ed. 2004. *Citizenship*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Lucassen, Leo, and Charlotte Laarman. 2009. "Immigration, Intermarriage and the Changing Face of Europe in the Post War Period." *The History of the Family* 14 (1): 52–68. doi:10.1016/j.hisfam.2008.12.001.

Mason, A. 2010. "Integration, Cohesion and National Identity: Theoretical Reflections on Recent British Policy." *British Journal of Political Science* 40 (04): 857–74. doi:10.1017/S0007123410000104.

Muttarak, Raya, and A. Heath. 2010. "Who Intermarries in Britain? Explaining Ethnic Diversity in Intermarriage Patterns." *The British Journal of Sociology* 61 (2): 275–305. doi:10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01313.x.

Norris, P. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Books/Radical%20Right.htm.

Norris, P., and R. Inglehart. 2009. *Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Books/Global%20Communications.htm.

Peng, I. 2012. "Economic Dualization in Japan and South Korea." In *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies*, ed. P. Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, B. Palier, and M. Seeleib-Kaiser. International Policy Exchange Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rist, M. 2010. "Dynamik Dank Zuwanderung: Die OCED Sieht in Der Migration Grossen Wirtschaftlichen Nutzen." *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 13, sec. Wirtschaft.

Ruedin, D. 2011. "Conceptualizing the Integration of Immigrants and Other Groups." *COMPAS Working Paper* 89.

Ruedin, D., and G. D'Amato. 2011. "Social Cohesion Challenges in Europe." *EU-US Immigration Systems* 2011 (4). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico Di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.

Schmitter Heisler, B. 2008. "The Sociology of Immigration: From Assimilation to Segmented Assimilation, from the American Experience to the Global Arena." In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, ed. C. Brettell and J. Hollifield. 2nd ed. Abingdon: Routledge.

Schnapper, D. 2007. *Qu'est-ce Que L'intégration ?* Paris: Editions Gallimard.

Solt, Frederick. 2011. "Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride." *The Journal of Politics* 73 (03): 821–830. doi:10.1017/S002238161100048X.

Song, Miri. 2009. "Is Intermarriage a Good Indicator of Integration?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35 (2): 331–48. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691830802586476.

Stolz, J. 2010. "Religion Und Integration Aus Der Perspektive Der Erklärenden Soziologie." In *Religion Und Integration Aus Der Sicht Des Rechts. Grundlagen-Problemfelder-Perspektiven*, ed. R. Pahud de Mortanges, 39–80. Freiburg: Schulthess.

Tönnies, F. 1974. *Community and Association*. London: Taylor & Francis.

Transatlantic Council on Migration. 2009. *Migration, Public Opinion, and Politics*. Gütersloh: Bertelsman Foundation. http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-D7888E31-A6D3DF3A/bst_engl/hs.xsl/publikationen_98119.htm.

Vangoidsenhoven, G. 2012. "Legal and Policy Situation of Immigrants: Belgium." *SOM Working Paper* 4: 1–15.

Vertovec, S. 1999. "Introduction." In *Migration and Social Cohesion*, ed. S. Vertovec. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Vertovec, S., and S. Wessendorf, eds. 2010. *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. London: Routledge.

Wihtol de Wenden, C. 2011. "The Case of France." In *Migratory Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*, ed. G. Zincone, R. Penninx, and M. Borkert, 61–94. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Zincone, G. 2011. "The Case of Italy." In *Migratory Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*, ed. G. Zincone, R. Penninx, and M. Borkert, 247–290. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Zincone, G., R. Penninx, and M. Borkert, eds. 2011. *Migratory Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.