

# Public opinion towards different immigrant groups<sup>1</sup>

Didier Ruedin  
University of Neuchâtel  
didier.ruedin@wolfson.oxon.org

Draft of 15 August 2013

Paper presented at the *IMISCOE Annual Conference*, Malmö, 27 August 2013

## Abstract

Immigration to most European countries has increased over time. Some individuals regard these developments with unease. Political scientists and sociologists alike have identified a series of correlates for attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. This paper uses a new survey to examine to what extent public opinion towards different immigrant groups varies in Switzerland in 2013. Drawing on two sets of questions on potential neighbours, the characteristics of immigrants are systematically varied to isolate relevant dimensions. Here I show that public opinion is most negative towards immigrants from 'distant' cultures and towards immigrants more likely to receive welfare benefits. The patterns of opinion are alike for all groups in society, but significant differences can be discerned for education, age, ideology and values, individual anxiety, and individual motivations to control prejudice (MCP). A two-stage model indicates that these individual motivations to control prejudice are associated both with a tendency to express negative views less often, and with actually holding views that are less negative. While public opinion towards immigrants is clearly multidimensional, only few distinctions are made. This restricts the way political parties can mobilize support by politicizing immigration.

## Introduction

In recent years immigration to most Western European countries has increased. While for countries with a colonial past, immigration is long established, it now also affects countries previously considered to be emigration countries. The increase of immigrant numbers is largely attributed to economic demands in the countries of destination (Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011; Dancygier 2010), but the situation in the countries of origin also play a role (Piguët, Pécoud, and De Guchteneire 2011; Menjívar 2010), including growing capabilities to move due to economic development (De Haas 2011; de Haas 2010). There is also evidence that the economic situation in countries other than the country of origin and destination affects migration flows (Bertoli, Brücker, and Fernández-Huertas Moraga 2013). Some individuals regard the growing number of immigrants with unease or feel threatened by the presence of immigrants. To some extent, this unease with immigrants and immigration is reflected by the electoral success of political parties mobilizing with a ticket against immigration. Given that the success of parties is not only driven by demand among the voters, but also by politicization on behalf of the political elite (Berkhout 2012; Skenderovic and D'Amato 2008; Givens and McGowan 2013), and shaped the political system, attitudinal surveys are better able to capture the extent to which individuals are opposing immigration. In either case, it is apparent that not everyone in society is at ease with the presence and increase of immigrants.

Attitudes towards immigrants vary across the population, and various studies have examined which groups in society are more likely to express negative views towards immigrants and immigration. A basic premise locates negative attitudes towards immigration with unwanted

---

<sup>1</sup> The research leading to these results has received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation under grant agreement number 141551 and from the University of Neuchâtel. The survey was funded by *swissstaffing* and carried out by *gfs.Zürich*.

economic competition over scarce resources such as jobs or accommodation. Accordingly immigrants are opposed in an attempt to maintain a certain level of livelihoods. A different approach focuses on cultural differences, highlighting that the presence of immigrants can question and ostensibly threaten the local culture or way of life. Immigrants are opposed because their different lifestyle and attitudes – aspects that assimilation could overcome (Ruedin 2011a). A third approach examines individual characteristics and how these can influence attitudes towards immigration. The focus tends to be on age, the level of education, and political ideology.

Most existing studies study attitudes towards immigrants – that is a large, fuzzy, and generic groups in society (compare Blinder 2013; Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheepers 2013; Lahav 2013). Just like attitudes towards immigration vary across the population, attitudes towards different groups of immigrants are dissimilar, too. Here I argue that, given the steady inflow of immigrants, direct economic competition is unlikely to be a strong factor for opposing immigration. By contrast, immigrants are more likely to be opposed when they are seen as a potential burden to society – in terms of drawing social security benefits. This is in line with studies that highlight concerns over fiscal burdens that immigrants may cause (Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2013). In addition, immigrants are more likely to be opposed when they come from cultures that are visibly different and regarded as distant (Fetzer 2013). Blinder (2013) highlights that the immigrants people have in mind when answering surveys are not necessarily the immigrants present in society – in fact large differences can occur. Whether ‘real’ or ‘imagined’, the underlying mechanism is one of perceived threat (Newman 2013). Many existing studies asking about immigration and immigrants in general, or about a single group, in which case questions of priming are a real challenge. By contrast, in this paper, I ask about a range of specific groups: by using randomized question order and many groups, the impact of priming is reduced. In fact, the many different immigrant groups covered by this paper mean that there are multiple questions for each contrast.

## The Politicization of Immigration

Immigration invariably means that individuals from different groups come into contact. Because of the nature of immigration, the dynamics of contact are characterized by a relatively small group of newcomers. The mere arrival of immigrants – being a change to the status quo – can lead to rejection and negative attitudes. To some extent, such rejection of newcomers may be a natural tendency. In the past, the boundary between one’s own group or society may have been important for protecting one’s property, but in modern times it may be more important in terms of identity formation and maintenance: Identity is as much about whom one is as whom one is not. Such rejection of newcomers, however, is dynamic in the sense that initial rejection can give way to tolerance and acceptance (Parrillo and Donoghue 2005; White and Nevitte 2013; Ford 2008).

While migration is nothing new, the number and share of the population directly affected by migration is increasing (Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011). Immigration affects all countries in Western Europe, including countries that until recently have been regarded as emigration countries. For example in Spain and Ireland immigration has become commonplace. The immigrant population of Spain has grown from just over 1 million to nearly 6.5 million in just 15 years – between 1996 and 2009 (Ros 2011). With increasing levels of immigration, the presence of immigrants in Western European countries may be a concrete experience for a greater proportion of the population. In this regard, it needs to be borne in mind that the proportion of immigrants is generally over-estimated (Blinder 2013; Hooghe and de Vroome 2013), although the felt numbers are not totally unrelated to the actual numbers (Herda 2010; Lahav 2004).

From an economic perspective, immigration is often sought: Immigrants may have complementary skills to the mainstream workforce, or they may simply be willing to undertake work under conditions the mainstream workforce is reluctant or unwilling to do. The economic benefits of immigration, however, are unevenly spread in society. For instance, while employers

may benefit from the new workforce, employees at worst may feel increased competition. Similarly, the benefits for the private economy come with externalized costs for infrastructure that are shared by all taxpayers regardless of whether they benefit from the increased population due to immigration. Such differential benefits of immigration offer a narrative why immigrants and immigration are not universally liked in Western Europe, but observed individual attitudes do not follow this explanation to a great extent (Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, and Causey 2013).

In search of an explanation how individual attitudes differ, it is sometimes highlighted that immigration as a topic is actively politicized, including by political parties on the right (Birrell 2013). It is worth highlighting that such politicization necessitates the presence of corresponding attitudes in society at least latently. While political debates may shape and distort the picture of immigration, a certain number of immigrants are required for politicization to take place, as well as a certain degree of unease with immigration. Such unease with immigration need not be formulated beforehand, and it may to a large extent be unease with change in society more generally. In this sense, the insistence on the fact that immigration is politicized underlines that individuals differ in their propensity to oppose newcomers and social change. Individual characteristics may play an important role in this regard, such as the level of education, age, being of a fearful disposition, or one's ideology. The following section will discuss these factors in more detail.

## Theory

Many studies treat individual attitudes towards immigrants (see Ceobanu and Excandell 2010; Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, and Causey 2013 for recent reviews). The question is how individual attitudes towards immigrants – immigration, foreigners – can be explained, usually with a focus on negative attitudes or opposition. While some studies highlight contextual factors such as the extent to which immigration has affected an area in the past (Newman 2013) or the way it is politicized (Hopkins 2011; Hopkins 2010), contextual factors in their own cannot account for the variation of individual attitudes unless they consider the interaction between individual characteristics with these contextual factors. The basic premise – at times implicit – is that the mainstream society wants to protect itself from unwanted competition. Economic factors on their own, however, are a poor indication of individual attitudes (Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; but see Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2013), and other variables need to be identified. On the individual level questions of identity, prejudice, ideology and values are advocated. The extent and nature of contact with immigrants influences how these factors are translated into attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

Negative attitudes towards immigrants need not be universal, and indeed levels of opposition may distinguish between different immigrant groups. Assuming that unwanted competition with immigrants is at the root of negative attitudes, it can be postulated that groups who compete more directly with members of the mainstream society are opposed to a greater extent. Competition can be understood in economic and cultural terms. Economic aspects include competition in the labour market, on the housing market, or access to material and immaterial goods such as space on roads, in public transport, or in recreational areas. Cultural aspects include religion, but primarily concern a fear of value change. Competition is shaped by the number of immigrants and their composition and individual characteristics. This means that a large number of immigrants is generally opposed more strongly than a small number of immigrants (Semyonov, Rajzman, and Gorodzeisky 2006).

Members of the mainstream society tend to be particular as to which immigrant groups they prefer or which they oppose less. Immigrants with similar characteristics may be opposed, because they are perceived as unwanted economic competition (compare Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Pecoraro and Ruedin 2013). It seems, however, that highly qualified immigrants are preferred more generally (Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013), despite the fact that they do not compete economically with all groups in society in an equal manner. To some extent this can be

explained by the generally more open attitudes among those with higher levels of education (Ceobanu and Excandell 2010), but it may also be a reflection of economic reasoning: Highly-skilled immigrants are seen as less likely to draw social benefits. In this sense, a (relative) preference for highly-skilled immigrants may be an expression of protecting the welfare state from what are seen as undeserved redistribution towards immigrants. In a similar way, immigrants with low skills may be opposed less for the lack of skills, but because they tend to come from countries seen as culturally distant. Here a real or imagined difference on the level of values and behaviour is seen as a cultural threat, so to speak. Factors such as language, religion, but also visible markers such as skin colour and dress can act as signals of cultural distance (Fetzer 2013). These reactions are a case of social distance, where different groups are generally opposed or cause unease (Parrillo and Donoghue 2005). Whatever the reason to oppose immigrants, such opposition comes in degrees: strong or weak opposition.

Particular with regard to cultural differences and perceptions of cultural threats, it appears that time plays an important role. Groups that are initially opposed for their being different tend to gradually be accepted as time passes and as new immigrant groups arrive. The degree of opposition also depends on the contact individuals have with immigrants. Generally speaking, contact can reduce prejudice and opposition (Allport 1954; Ford 2008; DeSipio 2013). The nature of this contact, however, also plays an important role (Allport 1954; White and Nevitte 2013). For instance, if contact with immigrants is too sudden, or takes place in areas where hitherto immigrants were uncommon – the ethnic heterogeneity of the area –, opposition can be stronger (Newman 2013; Hopkins 2011; Hopkins 2010). In these cases, too, opposition may decrease over time.

Factors at the individual level determine to what extent negative attitudes are voiced. It is generally noted that opposition to immigrants tends to be stronger among older individuals, although the mechanism for this is rarely specified. Indeed, age and cohort effects may be confounded, and the size of the immigrant population in early adulthood may be determining. This means that the difference in immigrant stocks at the age of 18 (entry into labour force) or earlier (pre-teen socialization) on the one hand, and the immigrant stock at present on the other may be the underlying reason. With the cross-sectional design in this paper, it is difficult to disentangle such cohort effects from the influence of age as such.

Another factor generally noted is the level of education, with higher levels of education linked to lower opposition. Different mechanisms may be at play here: On the one hand, immigrants are often manual workers with low levels of education – and for that reason less likely to compete economically with individuals with high levels of education. In this case, however, education is really a proxy of labour market competition, and skills levels may be more appropriate as a variable (compare Pecoraro and Ruedin 2013). On the other hand, the liberalizing tendencies of education are sometimes noted. Education seems to lead to more liberal attitudes (Voss, Kehrberg, and Butz 2013). Here the causal order can be difficult, since individuals with liberal attitudes may be more likely to stay in education because the educational system is more rewarding for them. Rather than addressing this issue, looking at individual ideology can be used to side-step questions of causality. Looking at the broad difference between political left and right or a focus on one's nation and tradition, it is possible to capture tendencies to be open to change or preferring the status quo more generally (Amodio et al. 2007). In this sense, immigration may simply be opposed because the individual in question is uneasy with change in general, a reflection of conservatism. In the same sense, individuals who are of a fearful disposition may be opposing immigration because they fear change more than immigration as such (Hatemi et al. 2013). In terms of causality, both ideology and fearfulness can be problematic as variables because it is conceivable that immigrants are opposed first, and the stated ideology or fearfulness are then adjusted to bring them into line with one's opposition to immigration. With a high salience of immigration this alternative reading cannot be ruled out, but the cross-sectional design is

ill-equipped to address it adequately. To further complicate matters, individuals with higher levels of education tend to have more contact with immigrants, which can lead to lower opposition.

Recent scholarship also highlights a different factor that is to some extent linked to the level of education: one's motivation to control prejudice (MCP). Of interest is the norm not to be prejudiced towards others (Iverson, Blinder, and Ford 2010; Blinder, Ford, and Iverson 2013). It is a social norm that discourages to appear racist or prejudiced towards others – both in the view of others and in the view of oneself. This norm is not evenly distributed among the population, and it influences the degree to which opposition to immigration is voiced. In this sense, the motivation to control prejudice can lead to social desirability biases in studies on attitudes towards immigrants. Put differently, one's motivation to control prejudice describes that when asked some individuals are less likely to declare opposition to immigration. At the same time, the variables available to capture one's motivation to control prejudice (compare Iverson, Blinder, and Ford 2010) cannot disentangle individuals who are prejudiced but do not express it, and individuals who are simply less prejudiced.

## Methods & Data

This paper makes use of novel data on the opposition to different immigrant groups in Switzerland in May 2013. Switzerland is a country with a high proportion of immigrants among the population. Immigration is highly politicized, and the composition of the immigrant population has undergone important changes in recent years (Ruedin 2011b). Whereas guestworker-based immigration dominated in the past, refugees played an important role in the 1990s, and since the early 2000s, immigration from the European Union has come to dominate the picture. The change has been so noticeable that policy-makers have begun speaking of new immigration (Müller-Jentsch 2008). The survey was designed to capture opposition to different immigrant groups, and for that reason differentiates different characteristics of immigrant groups.

At its core, the new survey uses a classic question from social psychology that asks what groups of people respondents would not like to have as neighbours, capturing social distance. The question is adapted in two forms to ask about different immigrant groups in a realistic manner and to cover attitudes towards a wide range of immigrants. The first variant asks about people moving to the neighbourhood, the second variant asks about people sitting next to the respondents on the bus (refer to the appendix for full question wording). The question on the bus was necessary to ask about additional groups that are unlikely neighbours, such as tourists from various countries. For both questions a range of different immigrants are offered as potential neighbours, with carefully chosen characteristics to isolate relevant influences that shape attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents were asked to express their unease, apprehension or fear for each potential immigrant on a scale 1 to 10, leading to a more fine-grained picture than is possible with for example the World Value Survey (2009) where the response variable is binary for each group asked.

The distribution of the responses looks like typical count data, with many respondents expressing no or very little unease or fear. If we regard the degree of stated unease as the propensity to oppose an immigrant of a certain type, the data can indeed be thought of as count data. Put differently, according to this logic, a value of 7 would mean that the respondent would oppose an average 6.4 out of 10 immigrants of this type as neighbours. More conventionally, the responses can be regarded as the degree to which different immigrant groups are opposed. Put differently, in this paper I treat unease with immigrants as a case of opposition. Scale analysis suggests that the different questions all tap into the concept (see appendix for full details). There is variation in that some immigrant groups are more likely to be opposed and in that some individuals are more likely to express such opposition. It is this combined scale – drawing on all types of neighbours – that is used as the dependent variable in the statistical analysis.

The explanatory variables follow closely the theoretical discussion above. The survey covered residents in Switzerland aged 18 and over. Age is measured in a continuous way; education is captured in a quasi-continuous way, distinguishing 7 categories between no education and university education. Individual ideology was approached using party identification. The categorical party labels were then replaced with the party's position on immigration in the Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al. 2012). These positions are more directly relevant for the question in this paper, although in Switzerland positions on immigration largely coincide with more generic left-right positions which could be said to capture ideology – liberalism, conservatism – more universally (Ruedin 2013). Individual motivation to control prejudice (MCP) was measured using a single question whether the respondents try to approach others without prejudice because this is important to them. Please refer to the appendix for full details on the explanatory variables.

In terms of statistical models, this paper follows different strategies. The central model is a zero-inflated negative binomial model (Zeileis, Kleiber, and Jackman 2008). This two-stage model allows taking serious the influence of individual's motivation to control prejudice. In the first stage, it accounts for the propensity to state unease at all: the individuals who do not mention any inquietude because of the norm to control prejudice. In the second stage, the question on the motivation to control prejudice accounts for the fact that not all individuals are equally prejudiced. Other models were used to ascertain the robustness of the reported findings, namely ordinary least squares (OLS), logistic regression, tobit (Therneau and Grambsch 2000; Therneau 2013) to consider the fact that no values smaller than 0 can occur in the dependent variable, as well as negative-binomial models (Venables and Ripley 2002) that treat the dependent variable as if it was count data, to cater for the many occurrences where no unease was expressed. With a variance-to-mean ratio of 34 there is clear indication of over-dispersion, in which case a negative binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson model.

An important aspect of the reported models concerns the variable on individual ideology, in which case the causal order could be reversed, respectively it could be argued that it measures the same construct as the dependent variable. The first concern is that individuals have anti-immigrant sentiments first, and then bring in line their ideological position. With the cross-sectional data in this paper and the close association between positions on immigration and left-right positions, this argument cannot be addressed adequately. The second concern stipulates that the ideological variable is causally so close to the dependent variable that it is not conceptually distinct enough to merit inclusion as an explanatory variable. Put differently, a close association can be expected by design. To address these concerns and ascertain the robustness of the results, models without ideology are included. Moreover, the fact that variables other than ideology remain statistically significant covariates in the regression models suggests that the variable in question is sufficiently distinct from the dependent variable.

## Findings

### *Cultural Distance and Risk of Welfare Receipt*

There are many immigrant groups in contemporary Switzerland, and the first section examines which of these groups are opposed more than others. As further outlined in the appendix, the different questions on neighbours all capture the same concept. This gives some credence to studies asking about immigration in general, but there are clear differences between groups, as outlined in the following. Put differently, a question on immigration in general will capture an average response, so to speak, asking about a specific group may lead to different results. Given that unease with people from a different region of Switzerland are associated with the questions on immigrants suggests that the survey is successful in measuring social distance. The reliability of the scale – its internal consistency – is very high ( $\alpha=0.96$ ) (Cronbach 1951; Revelle 2013). Cronbach's alpha cannot be improved by removing any of the items. Similar values for  $\alpha$  could be obtained for the items on new neighbours ( $\alpha=0.92$ ) and the bus ( $\alpha=0.95$ ); neither of them could be

improved by removing a single item. Principal component analysis was undertaken to identify a single dimension. When two factors are forced, the new neighbours from neighbouring cantons and from Western European countries are separated from new neighbours from South-Eastern Europe and neighbours on the bus (table 1). When three factors are forced, new neighbours from South-Eastern Europe are separated from neighbours on the bus, but the passengers from Turkey, India, Ghana, with a headscarf, with dark skin, and the Roma beggar load with the new neighbours from South-Eastern Europe. Put differently, cultural distance is picked up. Overall, however, a single scale seems to be sufficient.

*Table 1: Principal Component Analysis*


<b>Variable</b>	<b>RC1</b>	<b>RC2</b>
Swiss, high	0.095	0.838
Swiss, low	0.214	0.844
Swiss, benefit	0.382	0.68
EU, high	0.161	0.849
EU, low	0.214	0.809
EU, benefit	0.445	0.621
SEE, high	0.558	0.428
SEE, low	0.534	0.464
SEE, benefit	0.558	0.421
Business, EU	0.597	0.39
Business, Far East	0.649	0.319
Business, X-border	0.625	0.323
Craftsman, broken German	0.751	0.232
Craftsman, incomprehensible	0.795	0.195
Tourist, EU	0.554	0.392
Tourist, Far East	0.782	0.219
SEE, job-seeker	0.823	0.189
India, job-seeker	0.794	0.25
EU, job-seeker	0.611	0.393
Africa, job-seeker	0.843	0.143
Headscarf	0.692	0.152
Dark skin	0.804	0.191
Portugal	0.698	0.33
Italy	0.631	0.352
Roma beggar	0.632	0.084

Notes: standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based on correlation matrix. Data: gfs.Zürich/swisstaffing 2013

Around a third of the respondents expressed no unease or fear. Around another third of the population expressed a limited degree of unease with immigrants, with the remaining third expressing higher levels of unease or fear. For those who do express unease or fear, there are certain immigrant groups that evoke a higher degree of opposition. On a scale from 1 to 10, the mean score across all immigrant groups asked is 1.8. Figure 1 highlights that the responses vary

between immigrant groups. Specifically, it makes apparent that opposition to immigrants increases with cultural distance. As expected, unease and fear are lowest for new neighbours from a neighbouring canton. This is true for new neighbours with high and low levels of education, as well as for those who have received welfare benefits in the past. Interestingly, considering the distribution across the figure, immigrants from Western Europe lead to a similar degree of unease or fear. It is the immigrants from South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Kosovo, Turkey) that stand out causing the highest levels of unease.


Figure 1: Mean Scores by Cultural Distance and Risk of Welfare Benefit



Notes: mean values of the degree of unease or fear specific immigrant groups cause, measured on a scale from 1 (no unease) to 10 (great unease). Shades of red highlight greater unease. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

The first two rows in figure 1 illustrate how the level of education of new neighbours affects unease. Across all groups, immigrants with higher levels of education cause less unease than immigrants with lower levels of education. This is true for all respondents, irrespective of their own level of education. The preference for highly educated immigrants has been noted before (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Helbling and Kriesi 2013), but here I interpret this preferences in terms of perceived risk of receiving welfare benefits. Following this logic, immigrants who have previously received welfare benefits are included in the bottom row. The scores suggest that previous benefits are seen as a clear indication of a risk future receipt of welfare benefits – causing unease and opposition. The difference between immigrants with high and low levels of education is far less marked than the difference between immigrants who have received welfare benefits in the past and those who have not. Recall that the level of education in the case of welfare recipients was set to a medium level.

Figure 2: Mean Unease by Specific Immigrant Groups



Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

Figure 2 shows how different immigrant groups evoke different levels of unease, drawing on a question of neighbours sitting next to the respondents on the bus. As above, the importance of cultural distance can be observed, although a more nuanced picture emerges. While in the context of figure 1 on new neighbours immigrants from Western European countries evoked little unease, figure 2 demonstrates that there are exceptions. For example, among businessmen, cross-border commuters cause more unease than a businessman from Western Europe (Belgium). Interestingly, a businessman from the Far East (Japan) evokes about the same level of unease than one from Western Europe. These differences highlight that generally businesspeople are not opposed among immigrants, but there are specific reasons why cross-border commuters are unpopular. Although not the subject of this paper, it can be speculated that the underlying mechanism is the same as that related to welfare benefits: cross-border commuters are seen as benefiting from the economy without paying their fair share. The lack of substantive difference between the unease caused by the businessman from Western Europe and from the Far East may tempt the speculation that immigrants from the Far East are not perceived as culturally different. The questions on tourists, however, clearly contradicts this conjecture: Tourists from the Far East (Vietnam) clearly evoke more unease than tourists from Western Europe (Netherlands). In most cases, questions of perceived cultural distance seem to be reducible to a binary contrast, as highlighted in figure 1 or by the question on job-seekers where immigrants from outside Western Europe lead to similar levels of unease.

With regard to cultural distance, a woman with a headscarf evokes similar unease than a person with dark skin. By contrast, immigrants from Portugal and Italy seem to be perceived as (Western) European immigrants and not opposed a great deal. Put differently, despite their generally lower

qualifications, immigrants from Southern Europe do not cause more unease than immigrants from Northern Europe (compare Fetzer 2013). The question on the Roma beggar highlights that this general acceptance of European immigrants is not linked to citizenship: The Roma beggar is the incorporation of the characteristics that can be expected to cause unease – cultural distance, low levels of education (implicit), and lack of employment suggesting a risk to receive welfare benefits.


Figure 1 suggests that both cultural distance and perceived risk of receiving welfare benefits increase the unease immigrants evoke. The questions on businessmen suggests that there are some contexts where cultural distance fades into the background, but generally perceived cultural differences seem to be on par with visual differences such as wearing a headscarf or having dark skin. The two tendencies are cumulative; there is no apparent interaction where the combination of cultural difference and perceived risk of receiving welfare benefit triggered a particularly strong response. The question on cross-border commuters suggests that there is nothing particular about welfare benefits, but that what matters is the perception that someone takes something without contributing – undeservingly receiving benefits. Although speculative in nature, the responses to the questions on language skills seem to fit this pattern. A craftsman speaking broken German evokes less unease than one speaking an incomprehensible one. It is possible that the broken German is seen as an attempt to integrate, although the available data cannot confirm this. By attempting to integrate, immigrants seem to gain entitlements towards benefits otherwise reserved for members of society.

### *Opposition to Immigration*

Having established that the different questions capture the same underlying concept, in this section the focus is on who opposes immigrants more. Whereas in the preceding section I demonstrated that different groups evoke different levels of unease and fear, the scale analysis suggests that the same immigrant groups tend to evoke unease and fear for all respondents – provided that they express any unease at all. Multivariate regression analyses will be used, with a combined scale of all questions as the dependent variable. The dependent variable was adjusted to set the minimum to zero – recall the survey questions used a scale from 1 to 10. This means that the theoretical range is from 0 to 225; while the actual range in the data set is from 0 to 144. To ascertain the robustness of the findings, different regression models will be used.

Older individuals tend to express unease more often than younger individuals ( $r=0.18$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Similarly, there is a clear negative association between levels of education and the expression of unease ( $r=-0.12$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), and between conservative ideology and the expression of unease ( $r=0.32$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). The association between ideology and the expression of unease merits closer examination. Like for age and the level of education, there is much variation in the degrees of unease expressed. However, unlike in the case of the other two variables, for the association between ideology and unease with immigrants it could be argued that the dependent variable and the explanatory variable actually capture the same concept. However, figure 3 highlights the variation, and that party ideology on its own may be insufficient to capture unease with immigrants. Focusing on respondents who place themselves closest to the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the Swiss Democrats (SD) at the bottom-right of the figure, it is clear that many express no unease at all. This may be a reflection of individual motivation to control prejudice. At the same time, some respondents close to the classic left parties express relatively high levels of unease – parties generally associated with liberal immigration policies (Bakker et al. 2012).

Figure 3: Unease and Individual Ideology




Notes: Bivariate association between individual ideology (horizontal axis) and unease with immigrants (vertical axis). The ideology is derived from the respondents' closest party. The straight line is the regression line (OLS); no other variables were considered. Data: gfs.Zürich/swisstaffing 2013

A further factor influencing whether individuals express unease with immigrants is the degree to which they are generally of a fearful disposition ( $r = \text{round}(\text{cor}(\text{com}, \text{fear}, \text{use} = \text{"pairwise.complete"}), 2)$ ,  $\text{plevel}(\text{cor.test}(\text{com}, \text{fear})\$p.value)$ ). As with the other variables considered, it is striking that even among the most generally fearful individuals there are some who do not express any unease with or fear of immigrants. Once again, this may be a reflection of individual motivation to control prejudice.

The individual motivation to control prejudice is an important factor in its own right, as visible in figure 4. Respondents who try harder to approach others without prejudice are less likely to express unease with immigrants ( $r = \text{round}(\text{cor}(\text{com}, \text{mcp}, \text{use} = \text{"pairwise.complete"}), 2)$ ,  $\text{plevel}(\text{cor.test}(\text{com}, \text{mcp})\$p.value)$ ). Similar to what we observed for ideology, there are many respondents who express no unease with immigrants, yet make no attempt to appear unprejudiced. Put differently, it does not appear that the expression of unease with immigrants is solely a reflection of individual motivation to control prejudice.

Figure 4: Unease and Individual Motivation to Control Prejudice




Notes: Bivariate association between individual motivation to control prejudice (horizontal axis) and unease with immigrants (vertical axis). The straight line is the regression line (OLS); no other variables were considered. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

### Multivariate Models

Given the many possible explanations for differences in the degree to which unease with immigrants is expressed, it makes sense to consider a multivariate model to capture the influence of the different variables concurrently. I will present the results of linear regressions (OLS) and a zero-inflated negative-binomial (ZINB) model. The appendix considers additional models to ascertain the robustness of the results presented.

Figure 5: Regression Coefficients: Unease with Immigrants (OLS)



Notes: Dependent variable: unease with immigrants, combined scale, N=1008. Given is the coefficient (Beta) and two standard deviations for the predicted values. The constant is set to zero. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

Figure 5 presents the regression coefficients of a linear model. The coefficient for age is relatively small; it stands for a difference of one year. It suggests that a 80-year old person feels around 0.5 points more unease for each of the immigrants considered than a 30-year old person. The coefficient for education is negative, indicating that higher levels of education are associated with lower unease with immigrants. It indicates that a person with tertiary education feels around 0.3 points less unease for each of the immigrants considered than a person without formal education. Fearful individuals are more likely to express unease with immigrants. Substantively, the coefficient suggests that person who is generally very fearful feels around 1.5 points more unease with each of the immigrants than a person who generally is not fearful at all. One's sympathy with a particular party can be regarded as an expression of individual ideology. Translated into party positions, the model suggests that individuals close to a party on the right are more likely to express unease with immigrants. The difference between a sympathizer of the socialists and one of an anti-immigrant party translates into around 0.5 points more unease. The larger coefficient for individual motivation to control prejudice reflects a shorter scale. It suggests that individuals who strongly agree that they try to approach others without prejudice feel around 1.1 points less unease than a person that does not attempt to control prejudice.


Not included in the model visualized in figure 5 are variables that were statistically insignificant in all the multivariate models considered: sex, the number of children, religion as a categorical variable, whether one's religion is hierarchical (compare Norris and Inglehart 2004), the level of religiosity (compare Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheepers 2013), whether the person is active in the labour market, whether he or she works part-time, the marital status, or income. The appendix

includes regression tables of models that consider some of these variables. Interesting is in particular that the variables on labour-market participation are not significant. This suggests that unease with immigrants is not a direct reflection of unwanted competition in the labour market, but that other factors are dominant, such as age, education, or one's motivation to control prejudice.

*A Two-Step Model: Motivation to Control Prejudice*

The dual nature of the variable on individual motivation to control prejudice calls for further attention. In the following, a two-step model will be used to capture the the fact that the question on individual motivation to control prejudice cannot distinguish between the propensity to declare an opposition to immigrants – the motivation to control prejudice – and individuals actually being non-prejudiced. In the first step of the two-step model, the focus is on whether any unease with immigrants is expressed at all. It deals with individuals who do not express any unease because of the norm to control prejudice. This way, in the second stage the variable describes the fact that not all individuals are equally prejudiced.

*Figure 6: unease with Immigrants: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model (ZINB)*



Notes: Dependent variable: unease with immigrants, combined scale, N=1008. Shown are the partial residuals and the prediction line. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

Figure 6 shows that the level of education has a significant impact on the expression of unease with immigrants. People with tertiary education score around 6 points lower than people with no formal education (top-left panel). Individuals with more conservative ideology tend to express more unease with immigrants than others (top-centre panel), while individuals who attempt to control prejudice tend to express less unease with immigrants (top-right panel). This is an important finding, given that the first step of the model explicitly considered this factor and its

impact on expressing any unease at all. Put differently, the intuition was correct that the variable on controlling prejudice captures both the tendency not to express any unease with immigrants (first step of the model), as well as the tendency to be less at unease with immigrants (second step of the model).

At the bottom of figure 6, the impact of age (bottom-left panel) and being of a fearful disposition (bottom-centre panel) are shown. As expected, older individuals are more likely to express unease with immigration, and individuals generally more fearful are more likely to express unease with immigration. All the statistical effects shown in figure 6 are statistically and substantially significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). The figure shows the predicted effects once both the propensity to express any unease at all and the other variables in the model have been taken into account.

Of the models considered, those that consider ideology – approached through party sympathy – are generally able to explain a greater part of the variance in the dependent variable. Given the causal closeness to the dependent variable, this is not entirely surprising, but models that exclude individual ideology are also able to explain a substantial part of the variance in the dependent variable (compare appendix). This is important, because it could be argued that both party sympathy – used to measure individual ideology – and unease with immigrants are directly influenced by the same underlying variable. In the context of figure 3 I have highlighted the variation in responses by ideology, suggesting that the stipulated association is not direct or mechanical. By highlighting the variance within partisans, the results of the multivariate regression analyses are not questioned. The closest party – capturing individual ideology – is an important factor for the unease with immigrants.

With age, fearfulness, and motivation to control prejudice, there are three other individual characteristics that are associated with unease with immigrants. Perhaps interestingly, of the socio-economic variables, only the level of education was a significant covariate in the model (also compare appendix). On the one hand, this indicates that direct competition in the labour market does not seem to shape unease with immigrants directly, as reflected by purely economic variables like income or being active in the labour market which remained statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the results on the level of education underline this. Respondents with high levels of education express less unease with immigrants, despite increasing competition through immigrants from the European Union (Müller-Jentsch 2008). Those with higher levels of education tend to be more open towards immigrants, regardless of whether the question was about highly-qualified or low-qualified immigrants. This is still the case once the motivation to control prejudice is accounted for – a factor that can influence the degree to which unease is expressed (Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten 2013; compare Holbrook and Krosnick 2010).

## Discussion

This paper examined how different immigrant groups evoke different responses among the mainstream society. There is a clear and strong tendency to express more unease with or fear of certain groups. By using different groups it was possible to vary characteristics, and it transpired that both economic and cultural reasons are important. The responses indicate that the two effects are cumulative in nature, and there is no indication that opposition on economic and cultural grounds interact – such as by leading to even greater opposition. In terms of economic reasons, the results suggest that people cause unease if there is an increased risk that they depend on social security. I have suggested that this is a reflection of people's unwillingness to accept others benefiting from a social security system to which they do not appear to have contributed. In terms of cultural reasons, cultures that can be regarded as distant cultures led to stronger expressions of unease. There were only a few exceptions to this pattern, notably the responses to the Japanese businessman – where opposition was unexpectedly low – and cross-border commuters, in which case the perceptions of undeservedly benefiting may be trumping aspects of cultural distance.

Immigrants from other Western European countries evoke responses that are barely distinguishable from internal migrants – people who have moved to a different canton within Switzerland. This indicates that the increased mobility within the European Union and associated countries is largely seen positively by the population (compare Fetzter 2013). Despite this, immigration seems to be an important source for identification: against the ‘other’. Rather than immigrants as such, the focus is on immigrants from a culture perceived as distant, notably Islam (compare Ruedin and Berkhout 2012). Just like only some immigrant groups tend to be opposed, the responses to immigrants with high and low levels of education are barely distinguishable. This does not mean that the population was not concerned about the impact of immigration on social welfare systems, but only the more specific instance of previous welfare benefit receipt led to clearly more negative responses. Put together, this means that the population is not generally opposed to immigration, but feels at unease with specific characteristics: cultural distance and a threat to the social welfare system.

Interestingly, this differential response to the different immigrant groups is reflected by the politicization of immigration in news. Indeed immigrants from other Western European countries are not generally politicized (Berkhout 2012; Ruedin 2012), and the results of this paper suggest that this is unlikely to happen, simply because the population is generally at ease with Western European immigrants.

While the same groups evoke unease across the population, groups in society differ in their propensity to express such unease. The usual suspects – age, education, fearfulness – proved significant in this paper, but interestingly there was little evidence of direct competition in the labour market leading to opposition to immigrants. To some extent this may simply reflect the largely complimentary nature of immigrants in Switzerland’s labour market (Müller-Jentsch 2008). At the same time, individuals most likely to be in competition with recent immigrants – highly qualified workers – showed no greater propensity to oppose immigrants than others clearly not competing with immigrants – skilled craftsmen who work in well protected professions. The models also include a question on individual motivation to control prejudice, a significant covariate, although it did not ‘explain away’ the other factors. This suggests that the reported findings are real differences rather than merely propensities to declare unease with immigrants. This conclusion applies to models that included the motivation to control prejudice as a control, as well as to the two-step model that catered for the different aspects the variable captures: not declaring unease, and not being prejudiced.

There are other factors that could influence the felt unease with immigrants, such as the composition of the population, notably recent and rapid changes in the composition (Newman 2013; Hopkins 2010; Schneider 2008). Another factor is the degree to which individuals have direct contact with immigrants, notably positive and non-fleeting contact (White and Nevitte 2013). Political parties and formal institutions may also play a role, given that they can politicize immigration or facilitate the politicization of immigration respectively (Schildkraut 2013; Lahav 2013). In this regard, a cross-level interaction between the actions and success of anti-immigrant parties and individual characteristics is likely to shape the level of unease with immigrant. Given the clear indication that the different questions capture the same concept, it seems unlikely that these additional variables will reveal completely different immigrant groups that are disliked, or different groups in society at unease with immigrants.

## Conclusion

This paper has examined attitudes towards immigration by considering responses to different immigrant groups. Although there are clear differences in the degree to which different individuals express unease with immigrants, the same immigrant groups are opposed across society. Immigrants that are perceived as culturally different, and immigrants regarded as (potentially) undeservedly benefiting from the welfare system evoked greater unease than others. Notably immigrants from other Western European countries caused little unease, including

immigrants from Portugal and Italy who tend to be lower-educated and lower-skilled immigrants. The degree to which immigrants are disliked can be explained by individual-level variables, notably age, education, ideology, fearfulness, and the motivation to control prejudice. Direct competition in the labour market, by contrast, is not significantly associated with greater unease with immigrants.

While a significant part of the indicated no unease when immigrants move next door or sit down next to one on the bus, the results clearly indicate that immigration is an issue perceived as a (potential) threat to society. This threat is not a result of direct competition in the labour market, but with concerns over the welfare system economic factors clearly play a role. By contrast, the opposition to culturally distant immigrants regardless of their skills suggests that non-economic arguments play a central role in understanding opposition to immigrants and immigration. In this regard, the positive response towards Portuguese and Italian immigrants suggests that time and integration can lower the impact of the non-economic variables. This said, given that 'othering' plays an important role in identity building, it is plausible that perceived cultural differences are merely a replacement for other differences previously highlighted. Interestingly the education level of potential neighbours had little effect on the unease reported, suggesting that questions of immigration have come to replace questions of class. While the politicization of 'others' is likely here to stay, the question arises how this could be done without serious impact on the livelihoods of those singled out as being different.

## References

- Allport, G. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.
- Amodio, D., J. Jost, S. Master, and C. Yee. 2007. "Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism." *Nature Neuroscience* 10: 1246–7. doi:10.1038/nn1979.
- Bakker, R., C. De Vries, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenbergen, and M. Vachudova. 2012. "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2010."
- Benoit, K., and M. Laver. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Berkhout, Joost. 2012. "Changing Claims and Changing Frames in the Politics of Migration in Western Europe, 1995-2009." *SOM Working Paper* 9: 1–31.
- Bertoli, Simone, Herbert Brücker, and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga. 2013. "The European crisis and migration to Germany: Expectations and the diversion of migration flows." *IZA Discussion Paper* 2013 (7170): 1–56.
- Birrell, Bob. 2013. "Media effects and immigration policy in Australia." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Blinder, Scott. 2013. "Imagined Immigration: The Impact of Different Meanings of 'Immigrants' in Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain." *Political Studies*. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12053. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9248.12053/abstract>.
- Blinder, Scott, Robert Ford, and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. 2013. "The Better Angels of Our Nature: How the Antiprejudice Norm Affects Policy and Party Preferences in Great Britain and Germany." *American Journal of Political Science*: n/a–n/a. doi:10.1111/ajps.12030.
- Ceobanu, A., and X. Excandell. 2010. "Comparative analyses of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration using multinational survey data: A review of theories and research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (15). doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102651.
- Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers, and Peer Scheepers. 2013. "Resistance to immigrants and asylum seekers in the European union: Cross-national comparisons of public opinion." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Cronbach, Lee J. 1951. "Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests." *Psychometrika* 16 (3): 297–334. doi:10.1007/BF02310555.

- Dancygier, R. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Haas, Hein. 2010. "Migration transitions: A theoretical and empirical inquiry into the developmental drivers of international migration." *IMI Working Papers* 24: 1–49.
- . 2011. "The determinants of international migration: Conceptualizing policy, origin and destination effects." *IMI Working Papers* 32: 1–35.
- DeSipio, Louis. 2013. "Immigration reforms from the perspective of the target of the reform: Immigrant generation and latino policy preferences on immigration reform." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda, and Riccardo Puglisi. 2013. "Individual attitudes towards immigration: Economic vs. non-economic determinants." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Fetzer, Joel S. 2013. "The paradox of immigration attitudes in Luxembourg: A pan-European comparison." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Foddy, W. 1993. *Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires: Theory and Practice in Social Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ford, R. 2008. "Is Racial Prejudice Declining in Britain?" *British Journal of Sociology* 59 (4): 609–36.
- Givens, Terri E., and Ernest McGowan. 2013. "Party politics and public opinion on immigration and antidiscrimination policy." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Goldin, I., G. Cameron, and M. Balarajan. 2011. *Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Hainmueller, J., and M. Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 61–84. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990372.
- Hatemi, P., R. McDermott, L. Eaves, K. Kendler, and M. Neale. 2013. "Fear as a Disposition and an Emotional State: A Genetic and Environmental Approach to Out-Group Political Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science*. doi:10.1111/ajps.12016. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12016/abstract>.
- Helbling, Marc, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2013. "Opposing low-skilled immigrants: Labour market competition, welfare state and deservingness" presented at the Annual Conference of the Swiss Political Science Association, January 31, Zürich.
- Herda, D. 2010. "How many immigrants?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74 (4): 674–695. doi:10.1093/poq/nfq013.
- Holbrook, A., and J. Krosnick. 2010. "Social desirability bias in voter turnout reports: Tests using the item count technique." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74 (1): 37–67. doi:10.1093/poq/nfp065.
- Hooghe, Marc, and Thomas de Vroome. 2013. "The perception of ethnic diversity and anti-immigrant sentiments: a multilevel analysis of local communities in Belgium." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*: 1–21. doi:10.1080/01419870.2013.800572.
- Hopkins, Daniel J. 2010. "Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 40–60. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990360.
- . 2011. "National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern about Immigration in Britain and the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (3): 499–524. doi:10.1017/S0007123410000414.
- Ivaresflaten, Elisabeth, Scott Blinder, and Robert Ford. 2010. "The Anti-Prejudice Norm in Britain: Effects on Policy Positions, Party Choice, and Campaign Support." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 20 (4): 421–445. doi:10.1080/17457289.2010.511805.
- Lahav, Gallya. 2004. "Public opinion toward immigration in the European Union: Does it matter?" *Comparative Political Studies* 37: 1151–83.

- . 2013. "Threat and immigration attitudes in liberal democracies: The role of framing in structuring public opinion." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Malhotra, N., Y. Margalit, and C. Mo. 2013. "Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact." *American Journal of Political Science*. doi:10.1111/ajps.12012.  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12012/abstract>.
- Menjívar, C. 2010. "Immigrants, Immigration, and Sociology: Reflecting on the State of the Discipline." *Sociological Inquiry* 80 (1): 3–27. doi:10.1111/j.1475-682X.2009.00313.x.
- Müller-Jentsch, Daniel. 2008. *Die Neue Zuwanderung: Die Schweiz zwischen Brain-Gain und Überfremdungsangst*. 1., Aufl. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
- Newman, Benjamin J. 2013. "Acculturating Contexts and Anglo Opposition to Immigration in the United States." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (2): 374–390.  
 doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00632.x.
- Norris, P., and R. Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Parrillo, Vincent N., and Christopher Donoghue. 2005. "Updating the Bogardus social distance studies: a new national survey." *The Social Science Journal* 42 (2): 257–271.  
 doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2005.03.011.
- Pecoraro, Marco, and Didier Ruedin. 2013. "A good foreigner is a foreigner who doesn't steal my job: The attitudinal role of skills, unemployment risk and values." *FORS Working Paper Series* 2013 (5): 1–37.
- Piguet, Etienne, Antoine Pécout, and Paul de Guchteneire. 2011. "Migration and Climate Change: An Overview." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 30 (3): 1–23. doi:10.1093/rsq/hdr006.
- R Core Team. 2013. *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing*. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. <http://www.R-project.org>.
- Revelle, William. 2013. *Psych: Procedures for Psychological, Psychometric, and Personality Research*. Evanston, Illinois. <http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=psych>.
- Ros, Virginia. 2011. "Demographics of immigration: Spain." *SOM Working Paper* 8: 1–25.
- Ruedin, Didier. 2011a. "Conceptualizing the integration of immigrants and other groups." *COMPAS Working Paper* 89.
- . 2011b. "Demographics of immigration: Switzerland." *SOM Working Paper* 9: 1–19.
- . 2012. "Contentious Groups in the Politicization of Immigration" presented at the Jahrestagung Migrationsforschung in Österreich, September 19, Wien.
- . 2013. "Obtaining Party Positions on Immigration in Switzerland: Comparing Different Methods." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19 (1): 84–105. doi:10.1111/spsr.12018.
- Ruedin, Didier, and Joost Berkhout. 2012. "Patterns of claims-making on civic integration and migration in Europe: Are Muslims different?" *SOM Working Paper* 8: 1–30.

- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2013. "Amnesty, guest workers, fences! Oh my! PPublic opinion about 'comprehensive immigration reform'." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- Schneider, S. 2008. "Anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe: Outgroup size and perceived ethnic threat." *European Sociological Review* 24 (1): 53–67. doi:10.1093/esr/jcm034.
- Semyonov, M., R. Rajzman, and A. Gorodzeisky. 2006. "The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988–2000." *American Sociological Review* 71 (3): 426–49.
- Skenderovic, Damir, and Gianni D'Amato. 2008. *Mit Dem Fremden Politisieren Rechtspopulistische Parteien Und Migrationspolitik in Der Schweiz Seit Den 1960er Jahren*. Zürich: Chronos.
- Therneau, Terry M. 2013. *A Package for Survival Analysis in S: R Package Version* (version 2.37-4). <http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=survival>.
- Therneau, Terry M., and Patricia M. Grambsch. 2000. *Modeling Survival Data: Extending the Cox Model*. New York: Springer.
- Venables, W. N., and B. D. Ripley. 2002. *Modern Applied Statistics with S*. Fourth. New York: Springer. <http://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/pub/MASS4>.
- Voss, D. Stephen, Jason E. Kehrberg, and Adam M. Butz. 2013. "The structure of self-interest(s): Applying comparative theory to U.S. immigration attitudes." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- White, Stephen, and Neil Nevitte. 2013. "Native-born and foreign-born attitudes towards receptivity and conformity: The dynamics of opinion change in Canada." In *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, edited by Gary P. Freeman, Randall Hansen, and David L. Leal. Routledge.
- World Values Survey Association. 2009. *World Value Survey (Release 20090901)*. Institute for Social Research. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>.

- Zamora-Kapoor, Anna, Petar Kovincic, and Charles Causey. 2013. "Anti-foreigner Sentiment: State of the Art." *Sociology Compass* 7 (4): 303–314. doi:10.1111/soc4.12027.
- Zeileis, Achim, Christian Kleiber, and Simon Jackman. 2008. "Regression Models for Count Data in R." *Journal of Statistical Software* 27 (8). <http://www.jstatsoft.org/v27/i08/>.

## Appendix

### *Question Wording: Dependent Variable*

The survey was carried out by *gfs.Zürich* in May 2013, using telephone interviews (N=1008). For age and sex a quota sample was used, based on data from the *Swiss Federal Statistical Office* (BFS). Two blocks of questions on potential neighbours and a question on prejudice form the core of the survey. The order of the question blocks was randomized, and the order of the questions within each block was also randomized. The question on prejudice was randomly asked before or after the two blocks of questions on potential neighbours, but not in between. This procedure was chosen in an attempt to minimize the impact of question order on responses (Foddy 1993; compare Schildkraut 2013).

Introduction to the survey: "We take a short survey on sympathies and fears of the population in relation to people from their neighborhood or from more distant areas."<sup>2</sup>

Question block on neighbours: "Suppose in your neighborhood an apartment becomes vacant. In the following, several families are mentioned as possible neighbors. Tell me for each family how concerned or threatened you feel. [10 represents a major threat, 5-6 is a medium-sized threat and 1 means no or almost no threat. With the numbers in between you can grade your answers.]"<sup>3</sup>

The following items were asked: (1) A family from a neighbouring canton, occupation: architect, (2) a family from a neighbouring canton, occupation: cleaner, (3) a family from a neighbouring canton, occupation medical staff, in the past received welfare benefits, (4) a family from Denmark, occupation IT specialist, (5) a family from Austria, occupation: lorry driver, (6) a family from France, occupation: office worker, in the past received welfare benefits, (7) a family from Albania, occupation: chemical engineer, (8) a family from Turkey, occupation: kitchen aid, (9) a family from Kosovo, occupation: works at the local administration, in the past received welfare benefits.<sup>4</sup>

The items were created as follows: Each family came either from a neighbouring canton, a country from Western Europe, or a country from South-Eastern Europe and Turkey. The neighbouring canton was not specified, and the three countries were randomly drawn from a list of countries. Similarly, an occupation was chosen on the basis of the ISCO list: a random occupation with high and low skill levels respectively. For the condition of past welfare benefits,

---

2 Author's translation from German: "Wir machen eine kurze Umfrage zu Sympathien und Ängsten der Bevölkerung in Zusammenhang mit Personen aus der näheren Umgebung oder aus entfernteren Gebieten."; the French translations used are available from the author.

3 Author's translation from German: "Nehmen wir an, in ihrer Nachbarschaft wird eine Wohnung frei. Im Folgenden werden verschiedene Familien als mögliche Nachbarn genannt. Sagen Sie mir bitte zu jeder Familie, wie beunruhigt oder bedroht Sie sich fühlen. [10 bedeutet eine grosse Bedrohung, 5-6 bedeutet eine mittelgrosse Bedrohung und 1 bedeutet keine oder fast keine Bedrohung. Mit den Zahlen dazwischen können Sie Ihre Antworten abstufen.]"

4 Author's translation from German: "(1) Eine Familie aus einem Nachbarkanton, Beruf: Architekt, (2) eine Familie aus einem Nachbarkanton, Beruf: Reinigungskraft, (3) eine Familie aus einem Nachbarkanton, Beruf: Ärztliche Angestellte, war in der Vergangenheit von der Sozialhilfe unterstützt worden, (4) eine Familie aus Dänemark, Beruf: Informatikspezialist, (5) eine Familie aus Österreich, Beruf: Lastwagenfahrer, (6) eine Familie aus Frankreich, Beruf: Büroangestellter, war in der Vergangenheit von der Sozialhilfe unterstützt worden, (7) eine Familie aus Albanien, Beruf: Chemischer Ingenieur, (8) eine Familie aus der Türkei, Beruf: Hilfskoch, (9) eine Familie aus Kosovo, arbeitet bei der Gemeindeverwaltung, war in der Vergangenheit von der Sozialhilfe unterstützt worden."

an occupation with medium skill levels was chosen at random. Once created, the items were not changed, although the order was randomized during the telephone interview.

Question block on bus: “Imagine you take the bus and someone sits down next to you. In the following, different people are mentioned. Tell me for each person how concerned or threatened you feel.”<sup>5</sup>

The following items were asked: (1) a businessman from Belgium, (2) a businessman from Japan, (3) a businessman who is obviously a cross-border commuter, (4) a craftsman who speaks broken German, (5) a craftsman who speaks a language you cannot understand, (6) a tourist from the Netherlands, (7) a tourist from Vietnam, (8) a young man from Turkey, obviously looking for work, (9) a young man from India, obviously looking for work, (10) a young man from Austria, obviously looking for work, (11) a young man from Ghana, obviously looking for work, (12) a woman wearing a headscarf, (13) a person with dark skin, (14) a person from Portugal, (15) a person from Italy, (16) a Roma beggar [female].<sup>6</sup>

In the second question block, items (1) to (11) deliberately used the male form to reduce the number of dimensions to consider in the analysis (removing variance in terms of gender). The question block on neighbours leaves the gender dimension open by referring to families; in the second question block it was inevitable to identify the gender. As in the first question block, countries were chosen randomly from a list of countries fulfilling certain criteria. The criteria were for item (1) a country from Western Europe, and for item (2) a country from the Far East. Items (6) and (7) repeat this for tourists. For item (8) the criterion was a country from South-Eastern Europe and Turkey; for item (10) Western Europe. For item (11) the criterion was a country from sub-Saharan Africa. For item (9) India was set; and items (14) and (15) ask about the two most significant countries of origin from Southern Europe.

#### *Question Wording: Explanatory Variables*

Question on prejudice: “I try to approach others without prejudice, because this is important to me personally. [strongly agree / agree to / neither / disagree / strongly disagree]”<sup>7</sup>

Question on closest party: “Which party corresponds most – in its objectives and demands – with your own views and wishes?”<sup>8</sup>

On the basis of the party mentioned, the party positions on immigration and integration were allocated. They party positions were taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES; Bakker et al. 2012), and for the Swiss Democrats from Benoit & Laver (Benoit and Laver 2006), because this party was not included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.

#### *Additional Models*

All models were run in R version 3.0.1 (R Core Team 2013). To ascertain the robustness of the findings, in the following a range of models are presented, namely ordinary least squares (OLS),

---

5 Author’s translation from German: “Stellen Sie sich vor, sie fahren Bus, und jemand setzt sich neben Sie. Im Folgenden werden verschiedene Personen genannt. Sagen Sie mir bitte zu jeder Person, wie beunruhigt oder bedroht Sie sich fühlen.”

6 Author’s translation from German: “(1) ein Geschäftsmann aus Belgien, (2) ein Geschäftsmann aus Japan, (3) ein Geschäftsmann, der offensichtlich ein Grenzgänger ist, (4) ein Handwerker, der gebrochen Deutsch spricht, (5) ein Handwerker, der eine Ihnen unverständliche Sprache spricht, (6) ein Tourist aus den Niederlanden, (7) ein Tourist aus Vietnam, (8) ein junger Mann aus der Türkei, offenbar auf Stellensuche, (9) ein junger Mann aus Indien, offenbar auf Stellensuche, (10) ein junger Mann aus Österreich, offenbar auf Stellensuche, (11) ein junger Mann aus Ghana, offenbar auf Stellensuche, (12) eine Frau mit Kopftuch, (13) eine Person mit dunkler Haut, (14) eine Person aus Portugal, (15) eine Person aus Italien, (16) eine Roma Bettlerin.”

7 Author’s translation from German: “Ich versuche ohne Vorurteile auf andere zuzugehen, weil es mir persönlich wichtig ist. [stimme voll und ganz zu/stimme zu/weder noch/stimme nicht zu/stimme überhaupt nicht zu]”

8 Author’s translation from German: “Welche Partei entspricht in den Zielen und Forderungen am ehesten Ihren eigenen Ansichten und Wünschen?”

tobit (Therneau and Grambsch 2000; Therneau 2013) to cater for the fact that the dependent variable cannot have values smaller than 0, negative binomial (Venables and Ripley 2002) treating the dependent variable as if it were count data, catering for the many cases where no unease is expressed, logistic regression where the dependent variable is collapsed into a binary contrast, and additional zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models (Zeileis, Kleiber, and Jackman 2008).

### OLS

Table 2 shows that the same substantive results can be obtained with different dependent variables. This follows the principal component analysis in table 1. Because of the different number of indicators combined in each dependent variable, the coefficients have different sizes.

Table 2: OLS Models with Different Dependent Variables

Calls:

combi: `lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + party + mcp + age + fear)`

bus: `lm(formula = cbus ~ edu + party + mcp + age + fear)`

neigh: `lm(formula = cbar ~ edu + party + mcp + age + fear)`

```
=====
              combi      bus      neigh
-----
(Intercept)  15.689*   10.909*    4.331
              (6.759)  (4.808)   (2.743)
edu           -1.003    -0.677   -0.383
              (0.570)  (0.405)  (0.229)
party         1.514***   0.938***  0.553***
              (0.266)  (0.189)  (0.107)
mcp          -5.432***  -3.432*** -1.901***
              (1.061)  (0.752)  (0.432)
age           0.271***   0.153***  0.119***
              (0.054)  (0.038)  (0.021)
fear          3.689***   2.496***  1.348***
              (0.521)  (0.370)  (0.210)
-----
R-squared     0.277     0.234     0.247
N             566     569     577
=====
```

Notes: unease with immigrants (combined scale, neighbours only, bus only) as dependent variables, OLS models, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.01. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

Table 3 includes models with different types of explanatory variables. Model 1 includes only economic variables; model 2 is restricted to individual characteristics and world views. The presence of children is thought to capture a changed outlook due to the role of responsibility. Model 3 only includes demographic variables, while model 4 extends these and includes fearfulness alongside. Model 5 includes all variables at once, ignoring concerns of multicollinearity.

Table 3: Extended OLS Models I

Calls:

m1: `lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + active + income)`

m2: `lm(formula = ccom ~ party + children + hier.religion + religiosity + mcp)`

m3: `lm(formula = ccom ~ sex + age)`

m4: `lm(formula = ccom ~ sex + age + fear + married)`

m5: `lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + active + income + party + children + hier.religion + religiosity + mcp + sex + age + fear + married)`

```
=====
              m1      m2      m3      m4      m5
-----
```

(Intercept)	30.200***	39.519***	5.289*	-8.962***	9.389
	(2.783)	(5.740)	(2.528)	(2.659)	(7.957)
edu	-1.479*				-0.516
	(0.589)				(0.659)
active: 1/0	-5.909**				0.558
	(1.870)				(2.313)
income	-0.593				0.124
	(1.068)				(1.295)
party		1.733***			1.586***
		(0.282)			(0.287)
children: 1/0		-6.500**			-5.520*
		(1.969)			(2.519)
hier.religion		-0.084			-0.259
		(2.027)			(2.012)
religiosity		3.461**			1.567
		(1.166)			(1.194)
mcp		-7.687***			-5.651***
		(1.104)			(1.146)
sex: 1/0			1.560	-1.829	3.858
			(1.593)	(1.501)	(2.014)
age			0.260***	0.258***	0.279***
			(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.067)
fear				5.359***	3.729***
				(0.415)	(0.584)
married: 1/0				0.024	2.032
				(1.540)	(2.571)
R-squared	0.027	0.200	0.033	0.175	0.309
N	866	563	974	962	511

Notes: unease with immigrants (combined scale) as dependent variable, OLS models, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.01. Active indicates whether the person is active on the labour market, children indicates whether the person has children. Religion is a binary variable that combines religions with a tendency of hierarchical world views, namely Catholicism and Islam (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

Model 6 in table 4 includes all factors except for ideology (party); the subsequent models remove some of the variables to demonstrate how much (little) they contribute to the variance explained.

Table 4: Extended OLS Models II

Calls:

```
m6: lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + hier.religion + religiosity + children +
      mcp + age + sex + fear + married)
m7: lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + mcp + age + sex + fear + married +
      party)
m8: lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + mcp + age + sex + fear + party)
m9: lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + mcp + age + fear + party)
m10: lm(formula = ccom ~ mcp + age + fear + party)
m11: lm(formula = ccom ~ mcp + age + party)
m12: lm(formula = ccom ~ edu + mcp + age + fear)
```

	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
(Intercept)	16.060**	14.673*	14.535*	15.689*	11.193	28.010***
	(5.428)	(6.818)	(6.787)	(6.759)	(6.269)	(6.090)
edu	-1.027*	-0.923	-0.971	-1.003		
	(1.207)**					

	(0.469)	(0.578)	(0.569)	(0.570)		
(0.455)						
hier.religion	1.048					
	(1.534)					
religiosity	0.794					
	(0.895)					
children: 1/0	-5.426**					
	(1.868)					
mcp	-3.925***	-5.456***	-5.445***	-5.432***	-5.427***	-7.138***
-4.239***						
	(0.817)	(1.063)	(1.060)	(1.061)	(1.063)	(1.093)
(0.807)						
age	0.181***	0.273***	0.270***	0.271***	0.261***	0.278***
0.230***						
	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.056)
(0.042)						
sex: 1/0	-1.341	3.081	2.991			
	(1.506)	(1.874)	(1.856)			
fear	4.665***	3.566***	3.540***	3.689***	3.764***	
4.651***						
	(0.431)	(0.532)	(0.528)	(0.521)	(0.520)	
(0.416)						
married: 1/0	2.798	-1.022				
	(1.843)	(1.928)				
party		1.582***	1.571***	1.514***	1.600***	1.872***
		(0.269)	(0.268)	(0.266)	(0.262)	(0.273)

```
-----
----
R-squared      0.211      0.280      0.281      0.277      0.273      0.209
0.205
N              948       564       566       566       566       570       962
=====
=====
```

Notes: unease with immigrants (combined scale) as dependent variable, OLS models, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.01. Active indicates whether the person is active on the labour market, children indicates whether the person has children. Religion is a binary variable that combines religions with a tendency of hierarchical world views, namely Catholicism and Islam (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

### Tobit Model

Table 5: Tobit Model

Call:

```
"survreg"(formula = formula, dist = "gaussian", data = data,
  robust = robust)
```

	Value	Std. Error	z	p
(Intercept)	12.987	8.0930	1.60	1.09e-01
edu	-1.031	0.6875	-1.50	1.34e-01
party	1.811	0.3223	5.62	1.92e-08
mcp	-6.526	1.2699	-5.14	2.76e-07
age	0.272	0.0643	4.23	2.38e-05
fear	4.490	0.6248	7.19	6.68e-13
Log(scale)	3.220	0.0343	93.78	0.00e+00

Scale= 25

Gaussian distribution

Loglik(model)= -2174.2 Loglik(intercept only)= -2262.5

Chisq= 176.54 on 5 degrees of freedom, p= 0

Number of Newton-Raphson Iterations: 4

n=566 (442 observations deleted due to missingness)

Notes: unease with immigrants (combined scale) as dependent variables, tobit model. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

## Logit Model

Table 6: Logistical Model

Call:  
glm(formula = bbcom ~ edu + party + mcp + age + fear, family = binomial)

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.6866	-0.8199	0.2636	0.8327	2.1536

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z )	
(Intercept)	0.050771	1.175247	0.043	0.965542	
edu	-0.065946	0.097790	-0.674	0.500080	
party	0.145021	0.041679	3.479	0.000502	***
mcp	-0.649929	0.187762	-3.461	0.000537	***
age	0.021773	0.009476	2.298	0.021575	*
fear	0.506886	0.098888	5.126	2.96e-07	***

---

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 364.19 on 264 degrees of freedom  
Residual deviance: 268.18 on 259 degrees of freedom  
(743 observations deleted due to missingness)  
AIC: 280.18

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 5

Notes: much unease with immigrants as dependent variables (i.e. values greater than 25 on the combined scale – as opposed to no or little unease), logit model. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

## Negative Binomial

Table 7: Negative Binomial Model

Call:  
glm.nb(formula = ccom ~ edu + party + mcp + age + fear, init.theta =  
0.5805579308,  
link = log)

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.3923	-1.1431	-0.3839	0.3251	1.9932

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z )	
(Intercept)	2.433566	0.420737	5.784	7.29e-09	***
edu	-0.076632	0.035718	-2.145	0.031918	*
party	0.077005	0.016611	4.636	3.55e-06	***
mcp	-0.226277	0.065867	-3.435	0.000592	***
age	0.013335	0.003346	3.986	6.73e-05	***
fear	0.199660	0.032387	6.165	7.05e-10	***

---

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for Negative Binomial(0.5806) family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 803.46 on 565 degrees of freedom  
Residual deviance: 663.84 on 560 degrees of freedom  
(442 observations deleted due to missingness)

AIC: 4192.5

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 1

Theta: 0.5806  
Std. Err.: 0.0373

2 x log-likelihood: -4178.4620

Notes: unease with immigrants (combined scale) as dependent variable, negative binomial model. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

### Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB)

The ZINB model is a two-stage model that caters for different reasons why a person may not express any unease with immigrants. The model recognizes that a 0 can be due to having no unease, but also due to the motivation to control prejudice.

Table 8: Model for Figure 14

Call:

```
zeroinfl(formula = ccom ~ edu + party + mcp + age + fear | mcp, data = angst,  
          dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)
```

Pearson residuals:

	Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
	-0.9566	-0.7256	-0.3562	0.3930	4.0890

Count model coefficients (negbin with log link):

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z )	
(Intercept)	2.183269	0.368223	5.929	3.04e-09	***
edu	-0.076046	0.030889	-2.462	0.0138	*
party	0.076897	0.014576	5.276	1.32e-07	***
mcp	-0.117542	0.057021	-2.061	0.0393	*
age	0.013975	0.002907	4.807	1.53e-06	***
fear	0.168801	0.028956	5.830	5.55e-09	***
Log(theta)	-0.040490	0.093190	-0.434	0.6639	

Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link):

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z )	
(Intercept)	-10.6902	3.2970	-3.242	0.00119	**
mcp	1.9060	0.6621	2.879	0.00399	**

---

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Theta = 0.9603

Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 1

Log-likelihood: -2060 on 9 Df

Notes: unease with immigrants as dependent variable, ZINB model, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.01. Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013

Table 9: Full ZINB Model

Call:

```
zeroinfl(formula = ccom ~ edu + active + income + party + children +  
          hier.religion + religiosity + mcp + sex + age + fear + married |  
          mcp, data = angst, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)
```

Pearson residuals:

	Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
	-0.9726	-0.7334	-0.3580	0.3839	4.3201

Count model coefficients (negbin with log link):

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z )	
(Intercept)	1.803708	0.405601	4.447	8.71e-06	***
edu	-0.048729	0.035817	-1.361	0.173666	
active1	-0.150148	0.118268	-1.270	0.204244	
income	0.065899	0.074625	0.883	0.377201	
party	0.081502	0.015454	5.274	1.34e-07	***
children1	-0.215109	0.137535	-1.564	0.117811	
hier.religion	0.055995	0.108067	0.518	0.604355	
religiosity	0.112895	0.065431	1.725	0.084451	.
mcp	-0.121906	0.059599	-2.045	0.040812	*
sex1	0.124990	0.108011	1.157	0.247195	
age	0.013029	0.003623	3.596	0.000323	***
fear	0.161783	0.032050	5.048	4.47e-07	***
married1	0.014748	0.137224	0.107	0.914415	
Log(theta)	-0.009171	0.095711	-0.096	0.923666	

Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link):

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z )	
(Intercept)	-11.3604	3.6101	-3.147	0.00165	**
mcp	2.0371	0.7245	2.812	0.00493	**

---

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Theta = 0.9909

Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 1

Log-likelihood: -1859 on 16 Df

Notes: unease with immigrants as dependent variable, ZINB model, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.01. Religion is a binary variable that combines religions with a tendency of hierarchical world views, namely Catholicism and Islam (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Data: gfs.Zürich/swissstaffing 2013