

# Contentious Groups in the Politicization of Immigration<sup>1</sup>

Didier Ruedin, Sarah Meyer, Teresa Peintinger, Sieglinde Rosenberger  
University of Neuchâtel & University of Vienna  
[didier.ruedin@unine.ch](mailto:didier.ruedin@unine.ch)

Paper prepared for the *Jahrestagung Migrationsforschung in Österreich*  
Vienna, 19 September 2012

Draft version

## Abstract

The politics of immigration figures prominently in European societies, dealing with challenges posed by growing diversity. Increasingly, immigration policies are regulated at the European level, and it can be expected that the politicization of immigrant groups reflects this trend toward Europeanization. This paper is interested in which groups are addressed by which actors and how are the groups portrayed. It asks in what ways these groups would be affected by the claims raised in the debate. To do so, we use a comparative perspective, drawing on a large-scale claims analysis of newspapers from 1995 to 2009. The results indicate that there are significant differences across countries and time, both in the positions and the frames used to refer to immigrant groups. Despite similar pressures and demographic changes, we find no evidence for an Europeanization of the debate on immigration. It seems difficult to generalize on the politicization of immigration without taking into account the local context and developments over time.

## Introduction

The politics of immigration figure prominently in most European societies, dealing with challenges posed by increasing diversity. Politicians and common-sense narratives alike have linked the increase of immigrants in Western societies with issues as wide as pressure on the welfare state, growing competition in the job market, challenges to key social values, or a decline in social capital (Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011; Kymlicka 2011; Vasta 2010). More than any other political domain, the politics of immigration entails the discursive construction and maintenance of in-groups and out-groups, not only concerning boundaries between immigrants and non-immigrants, but also between different immigrant groups. These boundaries of social groups are reflected in political debates over the distribution of rights for individuals as well as groups, following competing definitions of membership in culturally diversified but territorially bounded societies. Such contestation is reflected

---

<sup>1</sup> The research leading to these results was carried out as part of the project SOM (*Support and Opposition to Migration*). The project has received funding from the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n°225522.

in the politicization of immigration by rhetorical reference to different groups of immigrants and by claims in support or opposition to their equal treatment compared to the non-immigrant majority population. For instance, asylum seekers are a relatively small group among the many immigrant groups in most Western European countries. Yet, when it comes to political debates, asylum seekers as an immigrant group are highly politicized in many countries. By contrast, the many immigrants from European countries are rarely mentioned in political debates on immigration.

The debate on immigration principally takes place on the national level, although there is increasing regulation at the European level. Not all countries in Europe are exposed to immigration to the same extent. In recent years, however, pressures across Western Europe seem increasingly similar. Countries with previously few immigrants have attracted unprecedented shares of immigrants, such as in Spain or Ireland. In Spain, the proportion of foreigners has increased drastically in just a decade, from 2 per cent in 2000 to 12 per cent in 2009. Similarly, immigrants in countries across Western Europe come from increasingly different backgrounds (Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011; Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011). Combined with the trends in regulation toward Europeanization, a debate at the European level is indeed conceivable.

This paper is interested in the politicization of different immigrant groups and how the way immigrant groups are portrayed varies. The approach of this paper means that groups are defined by claims in the news media. This means that politics rather than public discourse is seen as constituting group boundaries. For instance, political actors may define immigrant groups based on the legal status such as being third-country nationals or seasonal workers, or highlight their religion. This is a process of social categorization whereby the political categorization in immigration produces different groups (Koopmans et al. 2005). This is not to say that discourses were irrelevant to segmenting society into different groups, and it is conceivable that discourses disagree or cut across immigrant groups based on regulation. To some degree, the paper caters for this difference by paying attention to the frames used in the claims made: how a claim is justified.

We begin with an outline of demographic developments in the seven countries under study. This provides an overview of who is there, without delving into politicization. The politicization of immigrant groups is treated in a separate section. We address politicization both through salience – a group is referred to more frequently in news media – and polarization – actors make both positive and negative claims about a group. We then pay close attention to the way claims in newspapers are justified, addressing so-called frames. Distinct patterns emerge in the way different immigrant groups are addressed.

To address the politicization of immigrant groups, we analyse claims in the media in seven European countries in a comparative perspective, 1995-2009. In order to explain differences between countries and over time, we focus on factors relating to the numerical and structural composition of the immigrant population, the distribution of political rights, and on contextual factors: the political opportunity structure. The paper adds significantly to the study of the politicization of immigration by focusing on the content of the debate vis-à-vis different groups in culturally diverse societies. Put differently, the definition of immigrant groups is seen as actively constructed by the various political actors referring to these groups in the debate about immigration and integration.

Once defined in a certain way, immigrant groups can be politicized, just like political issues. In both cases, an issue or group is politicized if they are talked about, if political actors and ordinary people

take positions. Put differently, politicization entails an element of frequency: many occurrences in political debates. At the same time, politicization entails an element of disagreement: not everyone taking the exact same position. In the case of issues, this means that people disagree on how to tackle environmental issues, for example. In the case of immigrant groups, this means that these groups may be actively welcomed or opposed. We approach politicization through competitive claims-making in the public sphere by all sorts of political and collective actors, including organized immigrant and minority groups. Focusing on the media, the paper includes a public and the focus on claims ensures competitions: two integral parts of politicization. At the same time, it is clear that claims-making in the media does not capture the political discourse in its entirety. Political claims are made by what we call subject actors (claimants), and would affect a particular immigrant group: the object actors. Although claims can be about individuals, in the context of immigration and integration most claims are indeed about groups.

A claim can refer to a particular frame, the way the problem is presented and justified by the subject actor. For instance, an anti-immigrant group may oppose immigrant groups because of unwelcome competition in the labour market. In this case, the justification given is economic, and indeed refers to an instrumental frame. A civil society organization, by contrast, may highlight human rights when discussing asylum seekers from a politically unstable country. In this case, moral principles are invoked. Such political claims can be made in many different contexts, and this paper focuses on claims that are made in newspapers, or claims that are reported in newspapers. Groups are considered politicized if there are many claims about a group (salience), and if the positions about a specific group differs significantly (polarization).

The rich literature on the politics of immigration in Europe offers different theoretical perspectives and leading to competing expectations as to how the politicization of immigration will be shaped in different countries and over time. In this paper, we contrast two competing approaches derived from the literature, which differ significantly in the importance they (still) ascribe to national and country-specific contexts for shaping the politics of immigration—and thus lead to different hypotheses about the politicization of the immigration issue: the Europeanization and trans-nationalism perspective on the one hand, and approaches stressing the importance of national context and opportunity structure on the other hand. Though often expressed with a broader focus on the politics of immigration, the theoretical arguments grounded in these two scholarly views can likewise be applied to the narrower research question of this paper, namely the politicization of immigrant groups.

The last two decades have witnessed a growing number of scholars questioning the adequacy of nation-state-centred approaches in studying the politics of migration (Favell 2003). Though related to broader phenomena such as globalization and transnationalism, this verdict seems to be of particular relevance in the European context, where the process of European integration established a multilevel system of governance characterized by cooperation between member states of the European Union, as well as supranational decision-making in a growing number of policy fields. While up to the 1980s, immigration and integration policies were clearly viewed to be within the realm of member states' sovereignty, attempts for joint policy goals and measures in this field established at the European level have steadily increased since then. Examples in agreements in Amsterdam, Tampere (1999), and the Hague programme (2004), or the directives captures by MIPEX (Huddleston and Niessen 2011; Niessen et al. 2007). It can indeed be argued that a European migration regime is

under way, with a growing number of regulations and directives affecting/limiting member states' scope and capacity to regulate immigration and integration autonomously (Boswell 2007). This is of course not to say that (nation-)state specific differences in the politics of immigration and integration have disappeared, since member states of the European Union still have ample room to manoeuvre, develop and implement their own policy objectives. Still, the developments at the European level suggest that the politicization of immigration will become increasingly similar across member states, as the politics and policies of immigration and integration are increasingly embedded in a European policy framework. These trends also apply to the non-member Switzerland, which is closely associated with the European Union, notably through the bilateral agreements and as a member of the Schengen and Dublin frameworks (Wichmann 2009). Moreover, Western European countries have witnessed similar demographic changes and challenges resulting from international immigration and mobility in the last decades (Berkhout and Sudulich 2011b; Cunningham 2011; Peintinger 2011; Ros 2011; Ruedin 2011a; Wunderlich 2011). Assuming that politicization follows the Europeanization trend observable in immigration policy, we can expect that the politicization of immigration reflects similar patterns in the different member states of the European Union.

Indeed, if the politicization of issues corresponds with actual competences in the field, this should also be reflected in the focus on particular immigrant groups and the type of actors raising claims affecting these groups. Hence, the expectation of a Europeanization in the politicization of immigration may be applicable particularly for certain groups, namely groups that are regulated on the European level, such as family reunion or asylum seekers. By contrast, other groups such as labour immigrants remain legislated at the national level. We therefore expect similarities mostly in groups that are regulated at the European level. The explicit link to regulation at the European level is likely to manifest itself in an increase of European actors as claims-makers and a withdrawal of domestic actors from the debate over time.

Unlike the above cited literature, a number of scholars have argued that country-specific factors still play a decisive role in shaping the politics of immigration—and in particular the politicization of the immigration issue. Such factors may include historical factors (like a history of colonial power), objective conditions (like current immigration numbers and the composition of the immigrant population), and factors related to the political system and environment, as argued by scholars applying a political opportunity structure (POS) approach (Brockett 1994; Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans 1999; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1991). The concept of POS points to the importance of the political environment and context in shaping the success of various political and collective actors in mobilizing support for their demands in public contention of an issue. In that sense, POS facilitates or hampers whether and to what extent different actors can engage in public claims-making. Applying a POS perspective, one would thus expect variation in the politicization of immigration/integration in different countries due to the specific national POS structuring public contention over the issue. A variety of factors are considered being constitutive of POS according to the literature (Ruedin 2011b). These include general characteristics of the political system as well as issue-specific conditions that provide a framework for public contestation in a particular policy field, like the constellation of relevant actors in the field.

Other scholars have focused on other nation-specific aspects. Vliegthart and Boomgaarden (2007), for instance, explore the importance of “real-world developments” by looking at immigration

numbers as well as political key events such as 9/11 or institutional events like national elections; Koopmans et al. (2005) claim that configurations of citizenship and prevailing conceptions of nation can explain variation in the patterns of claims-making on immigration across countries; and a number of scholars argue that the politicization of immigration is strongly related to the presence and strength of anti-immigrant, radical-right parties. While the first of these would suggest strong similarities in claims-making between countries (or at least tendencies towards convergence over time) due to the establishing of a European immigration policy framework, the latter would lead us to expect significant cross-country and cross-temporal variation resulting from the different national context and political environment within which the politicization of immigrant groups takes place. Our exploratory findings clearly indicate that the politicization of immigrant groups differs from one country to another and we are unable to detect clear trends towards convergence over time. In this sense, the paper finds no support for the Europeanization argument.

Combining insights from research stressing the importance of national context and opportunity structures, we will look at three factors that may account for variation in the politicization of immigrant groups in our seven countries. First, we consider the composition of the immigrant population and the size of different immigrant groups immigrating or residing in each country. Second, we focus on the rights granted to different groups according to their legal status. Finally, we look at the actor constellation, and the strength of anti-immigrant parties, in particular.

**Table 1: Expectations for the Politicization of Immigrant Groups in Different Theoretical Approaches**

<i>Research question</i>	<i>Europeanization</i>	<i>National Context &amp; POS</i>
Which groups are politicized?	Increasingly similar across countries	Cross-country variation depending on composition of immigrant population and important (in terms of quantity) immigration categories Generally more politicization where there are strong anti-immigrant parties.
Which actors politicize immigrant groups?	Increasingly similar across countries More EU actors over time, especially on groups subject to regulation at EU level (e.g. family reunion, asylum seekers)	Predominantly domestic actors; cross-country variation according to the importance of particular actor types in countries (e.g. interest groups in corporatist systems)
What is the effect of claims on immigrant groups?	Increasingly similar across countries	More politicization against immigrants where there are strong anti-immigrant parties and organizations More politicization in support of immigrants where there are strong left-wing parties and solidarity movements
What kind of justification is used?	Increasingly similar across countries	Significant differences across countries: political actors use whatever works for mobilizing support.

## Data and Methodology

This paper draws on a new large-scale media analysis, covering newspapers in seven European countries 1995 to 2009. Aggregate statistical analyses of the patterns of claims-making are made on the basis of over 10,000 articles from both quality and tabloid newspapers, as outlined in table 2 (Berkhout and Sudulich 2011a). With a focus on claims making, the use of media analysis can be justified as capturing politicization. We do not stop at the mention of immigration and integration in the news, but only count instances where the issue or groups are within the realm of politics.

Specifically, in every recorded instance a political actor – be this a governmental office, a party spokesperson, or an immigrant group – makes a statement that suggests some aspect of immigrant policy is changed. We use a broad understanding of policy to include topics as wide as border controls, acquisition of citizenship, family reunion, anti-social behaviour of immigrants, political rights, discrimination, or xenophobia.

Two aspects of politicization are covered: salience and polarization. An issue or immigrant groups is considered salient where there are many claims about this issue or group. This can be understood in absolute terms – the number of claims recorded in a given period of time –, or in relative terms – the proportion of claims that refer to a specific issue or group. In this paper we generally focus on relative salience. The second aspect of politicization is polarization. An issue or group is polarized if the actors making claims cannot agree how to portray this issue or group. With the focus on groups, we focus on a variable that captures the effect of the claim on an immigrant group – would the claim become reality. Formally, polarization scores (P) are based on the measure of agreement “A” introduced by van der Eijk (2001). Specifically, they are calculated by taking  $(1 - \text{agreement “A”})/2$ . The range of possible values is 0...1. Three ideal-typical values help understand polarization scores. A value of 0 indicates that all positions agree, that is, all positions are the same. A value of 0.5 reflects a uniform distribution. This means that negative, positive, and neutral claims are in balance. A value of 1 suggests the highest possible degree of polarization. It is achieved when half the claims are negative, and half the claims are positive, with no neutral claims. In this paper, we are interested in tendencies, and values greater than 0.5 are an indication of polarization. Greater values denote greater polarization.

In all countries under study, we covered the most important papers in the sense that they can be expected to reflect the immigration debate and the public sphere. We took care to capture both tabloids and broadsheets because for various reasons the news coverage can be expected to differ between the two, although in most countries we do not find many differences.

**Table 2: Newspapers Covered by Country**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Broadsheet</i>	<i>Tabloid</i>
Austria	Der Standard	Neue Kronen Zeitung
Belgium	De Standaard Le Soir	Het Laatste Nieuws La Dernière Heure
Ireland	The Irish Times	Irish Daily Star
Netherlands	Volkscrant	Telegraaf
Spain	El Pais	La Vanguardia
Switzerland	Neue Zürcher Zeitung Le Temps/Tribune de Genève	Blick Le Matin
United Kingdom	The Guardian	Daily Mail

*Notes: This table presents the newspapers covered in each country. In Switzerland, the Tribune de Genève is treated as the predecessor of Le Temps, in Spain, La Vanguardia is not a tabloid in the same sense as in the other countries.*

The rich data set allows for descriptions such as the number of claims made, but also the topics addressed and arguments used. The cross-country comparison compares the situation in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The key variables are described in table 3.

**Table 3: Key Variables**

Subject actor	The subject actor of a claim is person or organization making the claim, also referred to as a claim-maker or claimant. Without a subject actor, a claim could not exist. Coded is the functional type of the subject actor, such as whether they are a political party, government, or part of civil society. Both subject actors and object actors are predetermined by the research design, and they are mostly status groups. In this paper, we refer to subject actors simply as “actors.”
Object actor	The object actor of a claim is the person or group that would be affected if the claim becomes reality. Those (potentially) affected by the claim are referred to as object actors. The claim constructs a relationship between the subject actor and the object actor. Object actors can be organized groups, or unorganized sections of society (e.g. illegal immigrants). In this paper, we refer to object actor simply as “immigrant groups.”
Frame	The frame of a claim is the justification or argument given or implied by the (subject) actor with respect to the claim.
Tabloid	The newspaper in which a claim is made can be distinguished in terms of its quality. We draw a distinction between quality papers (broadsheet) and popular papers (tabloid). See table 2 for a full list of papers and their classification.
Effect of claim	If a claim is made about an object actor, there is an explicit or implicit effect of claim on the object actor – should the claim become reality. The effect can be positive, neutral, or negative.

## Immigrant Population, Policy, and Anti-Immigrant Movements

In this section, we describe trends in the development and composition of the immigrant population for the period 1990 to 2009. Immigrants were identified on the basis of foreign nationality, although the same trends can be established with foreign country of birth where data are available. In all countries, a clear trend of a growing immigrant population can be established (table 4). Whereas most countries experienced gradual growth, Spain underwent a drastic increase in foreign residents after 2000: from about 2 per cent of the total population to 8 per cent in 2005 and 12 per cent in 2009. Comparatively Switzerland has – with over a fifth – the highest share of foreign nationals in relation to the total general population, followed by Belgium and Austria. The Netherlands and UK rank lower with regard to foreign nationals (between 3 and 6 per cent of the total general population). Spain and Ireland are both recent immigrant countries with only a recent rise in its foreign national population share<sup>2</sup>. When considering the foreign born population the share is considerably higher in some countries (UK, Netherlands, Austria) respectively grows at slightly different speed (Belgium). This can be ascribed to differences with regard to naturalization policies respectively earlier waves of immigration that continually became eligible for acquisition of citizenship. In this respect, Belgium has developed the most liberal citizenship regime in the countries under study, followed by Ireland and the Netherlands. Austria has by far the most restrictive policies with regard to access to nationality (Peintinger 2012).

**Table 4: Trends in Immigrant Population**

		1990	%	1995	%	2000	%	2005	%	2009	%
AT	Foreign National	517 690 *	7	673 792	8	68 649	9	774 401	9	870 704	10
BE	Foreign National	878 633	9	920 175	9	973 118	9	962 277	9	1 066 742	10
CH	Foreign National	1 245 432	18	1 462 881	20	1 527 017	21	1 655 483	22	1 791 378	23
ES	Foreign National	390 380 *	1			923 879	2	3 730 610	8	5 648 671	12
IE	Foreign Born		6 *					406 004	10		
NL	Foreign National	641 900	4	757 100	5	651 532	4	699 351	4	719 494	4
UK	Foreign National	1 908 445	3	1 753 537	3	2 272 690	4	2 715 705	5	3 570 687	6

Notes: \* Minor data issues. Percentages are as part of the general total population. For Ireland data on foreign-born residents are used because no adequate data are available for foreign nationals. Obviously these numbers cannot be directly compared to the other countries, where data on foreign nationals are used.

<sup>2</sup> In Ireland, many immigrants arrived during the 1990s, but they were mostly returning Irish emigrants (Cunningham 2011).

Looking at the composition of the immigrant population of each country more closely, immigration from the “old” EU member states plays a significant role, especially in Belgium and Switzerland. Both countries display comparatively high shares of foreign nationals, yet more than half of their foreign national population originates from an “old” EU member state (on average around 59 per cent, respectively 57 per cent). In the other countries, the share of EU nationals ranges about one third (UK: 34 per cent, NL: 30 per cent, ES: 27 per cent) to one fifth of the immigrant population in general. Immigration from the EU15 has increased over the years only in Austria (15 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent in 2009) and very recently in Switzerland, while in the other countries a downward trend can be noticed. The relative decrease of EU15 immigrants is particularly noteworthy in Spain. This indicates growing importance of other immigrant groups, especially from third countries, outside the EU. These demographic trends can be referred to as diversification and internationalization of immigration.

Considering immigrants from the new member states who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, all countries register a considerable increase from 1990 to 2009, especially after 2000. Spain, the UK and Austria have the largest shares of foreign nationals from a new EU member states. In Switzerland, the share of immigrants from the new EU27 is comparatively low, albeit increasing slightly. Ireland plays an outstanding role: although data availability is limited, from 2002 to 2008 a considerable increase in immigrants from all EU27 can be noted, amounting to 71 per cent of the Irish immigrant population in 2008. Indeed, for Ireland immigration from the new EU member state has been particularly important in recent years, increasing 43 per cent between 2004 and 2006. This happened especially in the context of labour migration as Ireland did not restrict access to its labour market after the two enlargement rounds (Cunningham 2011). A significant proportion of these immigrants came from Poland.

Immigrant groups can also be differentiated on the basis of legal status rather than nationality. Data on the number of residents with asylum seekers status are patchy and unavailable in most countries. We instead focus on national asylum applications to describe trends in the development of this status group. The actual number of asylum seekers residing in the countries can be assumed to be considerably higher, given that asylum procedures usually take more than a few months. Where available, data on refugees residing in the country, that is residents who have been granted asylum, are based on UNHCR statistics in most of the cases, and are more complete. The UK and the Netherlands feature prominently in terms of total numbers of residents with refugee status, with outstanding peaks in 2000 and 2005. Austria and Switzerland register much lower numbers with less variation over time. In relation to the proportion of population with foreign nationality, the refugees do not constitute a large part of the immigrant population, perhaps with the exception of the Netherlands. This pattern is reflected in the total numbers of asylum applications. In absolute terms, the UK is ranked first among the countries considered, followed by the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium. Spain and Ireland received comparatively small numbers of asylum applications. In relation to the general population, the shares of new asylum seekers per year are mostly negligible. Measured against the immigrant population, the Netherlands display the highest shares, closely followed by Austria, the UK and Belgium. For Ireland and Spain the proportions are again relatively small. Yet Ireland experienced somewhat of a peak in asylum applications in the late 1990s, respectively in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on asylum seekers given their politicization.

Rather than focus on their legal status, immigrant groups can also be identified on the basis of religion. We consider immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries separately, as this group can be politicized because of its specific religious and cultural background. It is often alleged that their culture is very different from Western European cultures, and therefore can be perceived as a threat

to local values and culture (see Green, Fasel, and Sarrasin 2010; Morgan and Poynting 2012). The share of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries is relatively small but non-negligible in all countries under study. Over time, their share of the total immigrant population was largely stable, with slightly declining trends over time in most countries. An exception are Austria and the UK, where the share of immigrants born in a predominantly Muslim country is increasing. The Netherlands register the largest proportion of Muslim-origin immigrants in terms of foreign nationals (on average 34 per cent), followed by Austria with little less than one third of its immigrant population. In Switzerland, the proportion is comparatively small, ranging around 7 per cent of its total immigrant population, and with little variation over time.

Just like immigrant populations vary across countries and time, so does the success of anti-immigrant movements. We focus on anti-immigrant parties as it is relatively easy to enumerate their success. Anti-immigrant parties were identified on the basis of expert surveys and their positions in party manifestos. The success of anti-immigrant parties varies significantly in the seven countries. There is a gradual increase of anti-immigrant parties in the Swiss parliament – notably the Swiss People’s party (SVP), although it did not increase its vote share of around one third significantly in the most recent 2011 election. In Austria there are significant fluctuations over time, with support for the Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) varying significantly over time. In Belgium, there is a small increase over time, but in the most recent years the seat share of anti-immigrant parties has somewhat receded. In the Netherlands, anti-immigrant parties appeared suddenly in 2002, but their share in parliament has since more than halved. In the remaining countries, anti-immigrant parties have no seats in parliament, although we note particularly the British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom with some success at the local level.

## The Politicization of Groups

Immigrant groups can be referred to according to their legal status, in terms of racial groups, religious appurtenance, or country of origin. Table 5 outlines the percentage of claims in each country that refer to immigrants in one of these categories. In all countries, categories of legal status are most common: immigrants referred to as asylum seekers, as labour immigrants, as family reunion, and so on. The percentages, however, differ significantly across countries, as do the percentages for the other three categories.

**Table 5: Immigrant Categorization**

	<i>All</i>	<i>AT</i>	<i>BE</i>	<i>IE</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>ES</i>	<i>CH</i>	<i>UK</i>
Legal status	84.1	91.0	81.1	98.0	80.2	95.1	81.0	60.7
Racial groups	4.1	0.6	2.1	1.3	0.6	1.7	1.0	25.0
Religion	9.3	7.4	15.1	0.2	9.8	0.4	17.5	13.3
Country of origin	2.5	1.0	1.7	0.5	9.4	2.8	0.5	1.0

*Notes: Percentage of claims about specific sections of society (as opposed to general categories) in each country according to type. Calculated according to Ruedin and Berkhout (2012).*

Looking at the categorization in more detail, the most common way to refer to immigrants in claims in the news is in the generic sense, that is simply as immigrants, foreigners, foreign citizens, and so on. This is followed by claims on asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and Muslims. Noticeably fewer claims are made about the groups that follow: refugees, labour immigrants and seasonal workers, minority organizations, and so-called new immigration from EU and EEA countries. It is indeed striking to see that immigration from (old) EU countries does not appear to be much politicized: there are few claims, despite residents from EU-15 countries being a significant part of the immigrant population in the countries under study. Similarly, immigration from new EU member states are not among the ten most common group addressed (with 1.2 per cent of claims), and there are almost no

claims concerning family reunion (0.6 per cent of claims). This relative absence of claims about family reunion is surprising given that this constitutes one of the most significant immigrant groups (in terms of size) in Western Europe.

If we look at the situation in each country, some significant differences can be determined: the groups about which claims are made differ (**Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.**). Common across countries is that there are many claims about immigrants as a generic group, and asylum seekers are politicized in all countries. The dominance of these two groups is shared across countries. Despite these commonalities, there are many differences between countries. These differences not only exist in which other groups are politicized, but crucially in the proportion of claims about immigrants and asylum seekers. Whereas in Spain nearly half of the claims are about this generic group of immigrants, only 11 per cent of claims in the United Kingdom fall into this category.

**Table 6: Most Common Object Actors by Country**

	<i>Biggest group</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Second</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Third</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Fourth</i>	<i>%</i>
Austria	Immigrants	28	Asylum	24	Refugees	10	Muslims	6
Belgium	Immigrants	25	Illegal	14	Asylum	11	Muslims	9
Switzerland	Immigrants	23	Asylum	20	Muslims	11	Illegal	9
Spain	Immigrants	48	Illegal	27	Labour	4	Minorities	4
Ireland	Asylum	37	Immigrants	23	Labour	10	Illegal	8
Netherlands	Immigrants	24	Asylum	17	Illegal	9	Muslim	7
United Kingdom	Asylum	17	Immigrants	11	Racial minorities	11	Muslim	9

*Notes: Given is the percentage of claims about the four largest groups (by the number of claims) in each country. All years are combined. Racial groups if referred to collectively.*

Other country specificities include the extent to which refugees are politicized in Austria – in addition to asylum seekers. This may simply be a reflection of the public discourse, not the legal status of groups. Notable is also the extent to which new immigrants – that is immigrants from EU countries – are politicized in Switzerland. This may largely reflect the politicization of Germans in the German-speaking area, and the politicization of the French in the Geneva area. Whereas the politicization of these immigrant groups is noticeably higher than in the other countries, it is still relatively low considering the number of immigrants from EU countries in Switzerland. In Spain, there are many claims about illegal immigrants, a group that does not get nearly as much attention in other countries. This may to some degree be a reflection of the situation on the ground. Asylum seekers are more politicized in Ireland than the average country. Ireland is also particular in that labour immigrants – especially from new EU member states – are a political issue more than in other countries. This probably reflects the unprecedented influx of Eastern European immigrants during the economic boom. In the Netherlands there more claims about specific minority groups than in other countries, especially Moroccans. In the United Kingdom, there are many claims made about racial groups, particularly blacks. Given its share of Muslims in the population, it is striking to see comparatively few claims about Muslims in the UK, suggesting that immigrant groups are more commonly seen through the lens of race and ethnicity than in the other countries under study (Koopmans et al. 2005). Particularly in the countries on the continent, historical reasons may avert claims being made about immigrants as racial groups.

As a group increasingly regulated at the European level, asylum seekers are of interest when it comes to understanding the politicization of immigrant groups. Table 7 gives the proportion of claims in each country that is about asylum seekers. The first column combines all years, whereas the other columns distinguish five periods of three years to outline developments over time. We note

significant differences across countries and time. In fact, when looking at all countries jointly, in the late 1990s, asylum seekers were the group about which most claims were made. Particularly after 2004, however, there proportion of claims about asylum seekers declined. Around the same time the number of claims about refugees dwindles drastically: Judging by the claims in the news, it could be argued that refugees (as opposed to asylum seekers) have largely ceased to be politicized. The opposite change can be observed for Muslims who became more visible in political claims in the early 2000s. This increasing politicization of Muslims can be observed in four of the countries under study, notably Switzerland. By contrast, in Spain and Ireland, the number of claims about Muslims is consistently low, or in the Netherlands where the presence of claims about Muslims is relatively permanent but relatively low.

**Table 7: Proportion of Claims about Asylum Seekers**

Country	All	1995-7	1998-2000	2001-03	2004-06	2007-09
Austria	22.9	13.7	15.5	22.3	26.0	27.3
Belgium	9.1	11.5	11.6	10.5	4.1	9.1
Switzerland	19.2	10.8	19.2	27.0	32.8	8.9
Spain	1.1	13.2	0.5	1.1	0.3	0.6
Ireland	35.7	41.2	52.2	39.7	19.7	27.0
Netherlands	12.7	17.8	17.4	12.7	11.5	6.6
United Kingdom	13.7	19.4	16.3	26.8	9.6	2.2

*Notes: Proportion of all claims in each country that is about asylum seekers.*

The politicization of immigrant groups is not only determined by salience – that is the number of claims made –, but also by the degree to which views on groups are polarized. We observe a tendency toward polarization in four of the countries – Austria ( $P=0.63$ ), Belgium ( $P=0.56$ ), Switzerland ( $P=0.64$ ), and particularly the United Kingdom ( $P=0.82$ ) –, and overall across countries ( $P=0.60$ ). This tendency for the debate on immigration and integration to polarize is indicated by values greater than 0.5. An apparent outlier is Ireland ( $P=0.30$ ), where there is quite some agreement on how immigrants are portrayed, largely in a positive light. The claims in the news are more balanced in the Netherlands ( $P=0.45$ ) and Spain ( $P=0.53$ ). When we look at all countries jointly, we can determine obvious changes over time, but no overall trend. With the exception of 1999, all years indicate some degree of polarization, but generally the debate on immigration and integration does not appear to be strongly polarized.

## Arguments and Justifications: Portraying Groups

So far we have examined which groups are politicized, but there are also differences in how they are seen or presented in claims in the news. In this section, we look at the frames used in claims about groups. Looking at countries jointly, instrumental frames are the most common ones. Such instrumental frames include (in order of occurrence) the general or public interest, questions of state efficiency and cost, domestic crime and security, and economic interests. The most common non-instrumental frames are notions of equal treatment, as well as human rights. Identity-based frames are used much less frequently. Whereas instrumental frames dominate in all countries, there are significant differences between countries in which more specific frames are used most commonly (table 8). Two common frames are human rights and instrumental frames where it is difficult to determine what aspect of human rights or instrumentality is most important. There are no apparent trends over time: The dominant frames in one period differ significantly from other periods, with no apparent connection between periods and countries. We were unable to determine an obvious covariate to explain the predominance of certain frames in a period.

**Table 8: The Four Most Commonly Used Frames in Each Country**

Country	Most common	%	Second	%	Third	%	Fourth	%
Austria	Human rights	18.9	Instrumental	17.4	Security	12.1	Moral principles	8.6
Belgium	Human rights	23.6	Moral principles	14.4	Public interest	13.8	Instrumental	8.6
Switzerland	Human rights	18.8	Public interest	18.1	Moral principles	15.4	Good governance	14.9
Spain	Instrumental	22.6	Security	12.9	Human rights	9.0	Moral principles	7.5
Ireland	Instrumental	14.5	Human rights	12.6	Moral principles	12.3	Public interest	12.0
Netherlands	Security	13.6	Efficiency	12.8	Human rights	10.6	No policy alternative	8.8
UK	Human rights	16.1	Moral principles	9.9	Social security	9.6	National identity	9.2
All countries	Human rights	15.6	Instrumental	11.3	Economic	9.6	Moral principles	9.2

Notes: The four most common frames used in claims (in order) in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. All years are combined.

There are not only differences across time and across countries how immigrant groups are addressed in claims in the media, but we can determine significant differences in the claims used for different groups. Claims about the generic group of immigrants most commonly make reference to instrumental frames. In addition, common frames include crime but also equal treatment. Over time, the equal treatment has become less common, and recently seems to be disappearing. Instead, instrumental frames have become dominant.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, asylum seekers are most commonly addressed with references to state efficiency, although human rights frames are also common. Instrumental frames also play a significant role, and there are no significant changes over time in the frames being used. There are also differences in the frames used predominantly when referring to asylum seekers in the different countries. Human rights frames are most common in Austria and Spain, and possibly Switzerland. In other countries, questions of state efficiency and good governance along with instrumental frames are dominant.<sup>4</sup> This may suggest that asylum seekers in many contexts are regarded as an (unwanted) immigrant group the countries have to deal with in some way or another.

Looking more closely at asylum seekers as a group increasingly regulated at the European level, we note differences in the frames used to address this particular immigrant group. For table 9, we have summarized frames into more generic categories, focusing on all claims invoking moral principles. These can refer to ideas of equality, human rights, or solidarity to name just three possibilities. These frames are contrasted with instrumental frames and identity frames. In all countries instrumental frames are dominant, but the extent to which moral principles are invoked varies noticeably. It ranges from 20 per cent in the Netherlands to 50 per cent in Austria. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, we observe significant changes over time, in most countries there are significant changes over time in the extent to which moral principles are invoked in claims about asylum seekers (table

<sup>3</sup> For Muslims, the most common frames are (in order) religious rights, religious identity, terrorism, public interest, and domestic security. Most of these frames are visibly different from those used for the other object actors. It appears that Muslims may be primarily perceived as a religious group rather than a cultural one. See Ruedin and Berkhout (2012) for a detailed treatment of Muslim groups.

<sup>4</sup> An interesting distinction exists in terms of frames used between asylum seekers and refugees. For refugees the most common frames are human rights, moral principle, solidarity, followed by frames of public interest and efficiency. Whereas we have seen little difference in the positions about the two groups, there is a clear distinction in terms of frames. Put differently, the frames used do not appear to affect the positions taken toward the two groups in question. Over time, the solidarity frame has been invoked less frequently, and instead a human rights frame appears to be used. Since about 2005, normative frames appear more important than instrumental frames, a change that suggests a qualitative shift in the debate. It seems worth highlighting that solidarity is something we choose, whereas in terms of frames, human rights are something external. In contrast to asylum seekers, the frames used for refugees seem to change over time. It should be borne in mind, however, that the distinction between asylum seekers and refugees in claims in the news is likely not to reflect legal status accurately, and the terms chosen also reflect aspects of discourse.

9). No clear is apparent, and the values for the most recent period are not any more similar to the ones in the first period, casting doubt on the suggestion that European policies have directly influenced the way asylum seekers are portrayed in claims in the news.

**Table 9: Proportion of Claims about Asylum Seekers Invoking Moral Principles**

Country	All years	1995-7	1998-2000	2001-03	2004-06	2007-09
Austria	50.5	71.4	30.8	61.9	40.0	53.1
Belgium	42.9	64.3	34.8	46.2	33.3	36.8
Switzerland	35.2	37.5	38.1	17.6	43.8	30.0
Spain	(75.0)					
Ireland	38.9	50.0	37.0	41.7	33.3	38.7
Netherlands	19.8	22.2	16.1	26.9	19.2	10.0
United Kingdom	34.3	62.5	22.2	28.9	39.1	60.0

Notes: Proportion of all claims in each country that are about asylum seekers and use moral principles as justification. No detailed numbers are given for Spain, because of the small number of claims about asylum seekers for which a frame was recorded (N=12).

Although they are increasingly regulated at the European level, asylum seekers seem to polarize debates on immigration and integration to a different degree in the countries under study (table 10). This is apparent in the first column where all years are combined. We observe a range from a strong tendency to agree in Ireland (P=0.33) to clear polarization in Switzerland and the United Kingdom (P=0.62). Significant changes are also apparent across time, although there is no clear pattern.

**Table 10: Polarization of Asylum Seekers**

Country	All	1995-7	1998-2000	2001-03	2004-06	2007-09
Austria	0.56	0.69	0.44	0.41	0.57	0.58
Belgium	0.45	0.26	0.67	0.44		0.16
Switzerland	0.62	0.38	0.48	0.50	0.76	0.70
Spain						
Ireland	0.33		0.36	0.46	0.29	0.31
Netherlands	0.50	0.45	0.41	0.41	0.24	0.32
United Kingdom	0.62		0.70	0.62	0.38	

Notes: Polarization of asylum seekers. Values greater than 0.5 indicate a tendency toward polarization. Empty cells indicate too few cases to determine polarization.

In the following, we look at the effect of a claim by actor (claimant) and group affected. Table 11 presents this relationship in graphical form, giving frequency distributions. In some cases, there are too few claims recorded, indicating that actors tend not to make claims about a particular group of immigrants. Of the many relationships apparent in table 11, there are a number of interesting contrasts. We note the many positive claims about immigrants in general, but also that actors differ significantly in this regard. Governments and the media include all kinds of claims, whereas of the political parties positive claims seem to find more resonance in the media. Across countries, government actors make positive claims about Muslims, but are (understandably) negative about illegal immigrants. Political parties seem to take clearer stances on illegal immigrants (negative), Muslims (negative), refugees (positive), and labour immigrants (positive).

**Table 11: Effect of Claim by Object Actor and Actor**

Actor ↓ Group →	Immigrants	Asylum	Illegal	Muslims	Refugees	Labour	Minorities
Government	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■
Parties/ legislative	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■
Media	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■
Civil society	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■
Religious groups	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■
Unions	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■
Minority organization	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■	■ ■ ■

Notes: This table gives the frequency distributions of the effect of claims, divided by claims makes (actor, left) and immigrant group (across). In each histogram, negative claims are on the left, neutral claims in the centre, and positive claims on the right. Empty cells indicate too few cases.

The media appear as an important claims maker in the sense that they make many claims, but at the aggregate level it is an actor without a clear profile. Worth highlighting is that the media do not appear to be merely a platform to disseminate claims, but journalists are actively involved in claims-making. The lack of overall profile stems from the fact that multiple positions are covered in all papers, and also in tabloid and broadsheet papers. We do not observe strong tendencies toward polarization in the media – neutral claims are commonplace. Perhaps surprisingly, we observe that religious groups overall make claims that would have *positive* effects on Muslims. Civil society is divided about Muslims, while interestingly Muslim organizations make mixed claims about Muslim groups. Here it is important to remind ourselves that there are multiple Muslim organizations, some of which do not (attempt to) represent the Muslim population as a whole.

On the whole, it appears that there are two poles when it comes to claims about immigrant groups. On the one end, there are governments, party politics (legislatures), and the media; on the other end there are civil society and religious organizations. Government actors, parties, and the media cover the entire range of positions, but this also means that they are the origin of *negative* claims about immigrants. Civil society and religious organizations have a much clearer profile, and are supportive of most immigrant groups. An exception are Muslims, about which civil society organizations are divided. The two groups at either pole share many aspects of claims making, but there are important differences, such as the unlike response to Muslims between civil society and religious organizations. These differences should not distract from the overall picture. It appears that anti-immigrant claims tend to work through formal party politics; and positive claims predominantly work through civil society organizations and affiliated parties. Perhaps what is striking is that there is no equivalent to civil society organizations to oppose immigration – anti-immigrant movements are not common among claims makes in the news.

## Discussion

This paper addressed the way immigrant groups are addressed in claims in the news – an important aspect of the public debate on immigration and integration. Looking at broad discursive categories of immigrant groups, we find that immigrant groups are most commonly referred to according to their legal status. Notwithstanding changes over time, most claimants address immigrant groups with reference to their legal status, not with reference to their religion, race/ethnicity, or country of origin. This is the same for all the countries under study, despite significant differences in immigrant stock, or differences in the political system. The most common group addressed in claims in the news are immigrants without clear specification, such as immigrants or foreigners. This broad category is

dominant in most of the countries, and seems to shape the way the debate on immigrant groups is led. As a broad and fuzzy category, immigrants in the generic sense can act as a catch-call reference for many different aspects of the debate in immigration and integration.

That is not to say that no specific groups were addressed in claims in the news. Of the immigrant groups that are addressed more specifically, asylum seekers are the predominant group in most countries. They are the group about which most claims are made in Ireland and the United Kingdom – ahead of the generic immigrant group. In the other countries – with the exception of Spain – asylum seekers are among the most common group addressed in claims in the news. Having said this, the proportion of claims about asylum seekers differs significantly across countries, but we cannot discern a clear association with the number of asylum seekers present in the country. Illegal immigrants are politicized in many countries, but do not appear among the immigrant groups most commonly referred to in all the countries under study. There are particularly many claims about illegal immigrants in Belgium and Spain, and to a lesser extent in Switzerland and the Netherlands. More recently, in most countries Muslims have become politicized. The exceptions are Spain and Ireland. Across countries, the extent to which claims are made about Muslims does not seem to correlate with the number or proportion of Muslims as part of the population. In Switzerland, the rise of anti-immigrant parties may be an explanation, but the same explanation does not apply to Austria.

Across countries and years, most claims concern just four groups: immigrants in the generic sense, asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and Muslims. This stands in stark contrast with immigrants from European countries who are barely politicized, despite constituting a significant part of the immigrant population. Of course, many of the claims about the generic immigrant group may also refer to European immigrants, but this paper finds that they are rarely singled out – in stark contrast to asylum seekers or Muslims. With government actors a dominant subject actor, it is not surprising that instrumental arguments are the most common justifications in claims in the news. The frames used to describe immigrant groups vary significantly across countries and across time. This is also the case for asylum seekers, a group where we could expect some degree of convergence due to increased legislation at the European level. Indeed, it is not only the case that the frames used vary between countries, but also that there is no apparent continuation across time. Put differently, within countries the debate on immigration and integration seems to be such that different frames are used at different points in time.

Rather than patterns of Europeanization or steady influences from national context, we seem to observe a debate on immigration and integration that is influenced by specific (national) events. Despite the emergence of a European framework, we found no evidence for convergence – not even for asylum seekers where legislation at the European level seems relatively developed. This may be because the main actors need to legitimize their actions at the national level, given that there is no real European public sphere. To some degree, the lack of convergence underlines the importance of nation-states and historic differences (Favell 2003). At the same time, however, the debate on immigration and integration seems inherently dynamic, with the way groups are portrayed changing over time. Having said this, there are also patterns of continuity, such as the common use of instrumental frames, or the increasing politicization of Muslims in most of the countries covered.

It seems warranted to further study the influence of endogenous and exogenous influences on the way immigrant groups are portrayed in claims in the mean. For instance, election campaigns may be an endogenous factor shaping the debate on immigration and integration. What is more, a more systematic analysis on the combination of demographic changes and policy changes on the one hand, and the actions of political actors on the other, may be a fruitful way forward. Here it seems warranted to highlight the dynamic nature of the debate on immigration and integration, requiring analysis of changes over time. While changes in the demographic composition of the immigrant population as such do not seem to affect the way immigrant groups are addressed in claims directly, they may be a necessary (but not sufficient) criterion.

## Conclusion

Immigration and integration is a prominent topic in politics in most European societies. Increased numbers of immigrants and growing diversity are seen as challenges that require political solutions. More than any other political domain, the politics of immigration entails the discursive construction and maintenance of in-groups and out-groups, including differences among immigrant groups. We find that the number of claims about specific immigrant groups bears no relation to their proportion in the population. For instance, there are many claims about asylum seekers and Muslims, whereas the more numerous European immigrants and family reunion are barely politicized. Despite increasing regulation at the European level, we find no evidence that the politicization of immigrant groups would converge across countries.

The results of this paper indicate that there are significant differences across countries and time, both in the positions and the frames used to refer to immigrant groups. Many groups polarize actors making claims in the news, but there is no apparent increase of polarization over time. Despite similar pressures and demographic changes, we find no evidence for an Europeanization of the debate on immigration, neither for immigrant groups overall, nor for asylum seekers in particular, despite relatively developed European legislation in this case. Future research should address endogenous and exogenous factors that can shape the politicization of immigrant groups. Instead, it appears that country-specific differences dominate – largely independent of the composition of the immigrant population.

## References

- Berkhout, J., and L. Sudulich. 2011a. "Codebook for political claims analysis." *SOM Working Paper 2*: 1–37.
- . 2011b. "Demographics of immigration: The Netherlands." *SOM Working Paper 7*: 1–19.
- Boswell, Christina. 2007. "Theorizing migration policy: Is there a third way?" *International Migration Review* 41(1): 75–100.
- Brockett, C. 1994. "The structure of political opportunities and peasant mobilization in Central America." In *Social Movements in Latin America: The Experience of Peasants, Workers, Women, the Urban Poor, and the Middle Sectors*, Essays in Mexico, Central and South America: Scholarly Debates from the 1950s to the 1990s, ed. J. Domínguez. New York: Garland Publishing, p. 333–354.
- Cunningham, K. 2011. "Demographics of immigration: Ireland." *SOM Working Paper 6*: 1–24.

- Van der Eijk, C. 2001. "Measuring agreement in ordered rating scales." *Quality and Quantity* 35(3): 325–341.
- Favell, A. 2003. "Integration nations: The nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe." *Comparative Social Research* 22: 13–42.
- Goldin, Ian, Geoffrey Cameron, and Meera Balarajan. 2011. *Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Green, E., N. Fasel, and O. Sarrasin. 2010. "The more the merrier? The effects of type of cultural diversity on exclusionary immigration attitudes in Switzerland." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4(2): 177–90.
- Huddleston, T., and J. Niessen. 2011. *Migrant Integration Policy Index*. Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group. <http://www.integrationindex.eu>.
- Kitschelt, H. 1986. "Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies." *British journal of political science* 16: 57–85.
- Koopmans, R. et al. 2005. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
- Koopmans, R. 1999. "Political. Opportunity. Structure: Some splitting to balance the lumping." *Sociological Forum* 14(1): 93–105.
- Kriesi, H. 1995. "The political opportunity structure of new social movements: Its impact on their mobilization." In *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, Social Movements, Protest, and Contention*, eds. J. Jenkins and B. Klandermans. London: UCL Press, p. 167–198.
- Kymlicka, W. 2011. "Multicultural citizenship within multination states." *Ethnicities* 11(3): 281–302.
- Morgan, G., and S. Poynting, eds. 2012. *Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Niessen, J. et al. 2007. *Migrant Integration Policy Index*. Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group. <http://www.integrationindex.eu>.
- Peintinger, T. 2011. "Demographics of immigration: Austria." *SOM Working Paper* 4: 1–28.
- . 2012. "Legal and Policy Situation of Immigrants: Austria." *SOM Working Paper* 1: 1–27.
- Ros, V. 2011. "Demographics of immigration: Spain." *SOM Working Paper* 8: 1–25.
- Ruedin, D. 2011a. "Demographics of immigration: Switzerland." *SOM Working Paper* 9: 1–19.
- . 2011b. "Indicators of the political opportunity structure (POS)." *SOM Working Paper* 1: 1–19.
- Ruedin, D., and J. Berkhout. 2012. "Patterns of Claims-Making on Civic Integration and Migration in Europe: Are Muslims Different?" *SOM Working Paper* 8: 1–30.
- Tarrow, S. 1991. "Collective action and political opportunity structure in waves of mobilization - some theoretical perspectives." *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 43(4): 647–70.

- Vasta, E. 2010. "The controllability of difference: Social cohesion and the new politics of solidarity." *Ethnicities* 10(4): 503–521.
- Vliegenthart, R., and H. Boomgaarden. 2007. "Real-world indicators and the coverage of immigration and the integration of minorities in Dutch newspapers." *European Journal of Communication* 22(3): 293–314.
- Wichmann, N. 2009. "More in than out – the Schengen Association of Switzerland." *Swiss Political Science Review* 15: 653–82.
- Wunderlich, D. 2011. "Demographics of immigration: The United Kingdom." *SOM Working Paper* 10: 1–24.
- Zincone, G., R. Penninx, and M. Borkert, eds. 2011. *Migratory Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.