Immigration in the Party Political Agenda: A Comparative Analysis of Party Manifestos in Six European Countries[1]

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Abstract

This paper analyses the politicization of immigration in the party political agenda through a comparative analysis of electoral party manifestos since the 1990s in Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, Spain and Switzerland. Previous research suggests that the immigration issue is quite volatile in the party political agenda, that parties will only talk about immigration when it is in their electoral advantage, and more generally the 'policy agendas' literature suggests that friction will condition the slow response by parties to any change in the public opinion mood. Hence, the paper examines first, across these six countries, the changing dynamics of electoral competition around the issue of immigration – when and how parties discuss immigration in their electoral manifestos – and whether this conforms to spatial or issue-ownership patterns of competition. The paper examines how well a number of factors account for the fluctuations and cross-national variations in the party political agenda, paying special attention to the national context (presence of anti-immigration parties, state of the economy) as well as to the ideological nature of the parties.

Introduction

Over the past three decades, the number of immigrants has grown noticeably in all Western European countries. Considerable immigration flows have taken place in all countries, including countries without a colonial past and others that were until recently generally regarded as emigration countries. While immigrants may be welcomed for their contributions to the economy, their presence is politicized and statements abound that link immigration with social woes and threats to social cohesion (see Ceobanu and Excandell 2010 for a review on attitudes towards immigration; Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan 2011). Indeed, for a large proportion of the general public, immigration and its consequences have become a major issue of concern. The politicization of immigration has ceased to be only the pet issue for parties at the extreme right, and has indeed come to dominate the mainstream political debate in many countries. At the same time, with an eye on party competition, new parties mobilizing against immigration have

established themselves as significant challengers that may shape the political system despite often being relatively small parties in size (e.g. Ellinas 2010).

In this paper we find inspiration in the classical models of party competition around political issues in order to shed light on the politicization of immigration in six European countries (Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, Spain and Switzerland). The competition among parties on a number of issues plays a central role in the study of politics, and accordingly has seen much attention in the literature (Benoit and Laver 2006; Laver and Sergenti 2011; Downs 1957; Stokes 1963; Budge and Farlie 1983). More recently, scholars have applied these various models of party competition to the specific issue of immigration (Pellikaan, de Lange, and Van der Meer 2007; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Odmalm 2011; Morales, Pardos-Prado, and Ros 2013). Broadly speaking, we can identify two strands in the literature: spatial competition theories that argue that parties will converge towards the position of the median voter in order to maximize the number of votes they receive, and directional competition models that expect parties not to compete on the basis of their position on all issues but by selectively emphasizing only those issues they most care about and on which they have a competitive advantage (i.e. issue ownership). In the latter models, parties will strategically reflect on how salient the issue is for them and how credible they appear to voters to take care of the issue. We consider both models to understand to what extent and in what way parties in European countries refer to immigration in their manifestos. We begin by studying the link between the salience of the issue among the public on the one hand, and the extent to which parties incorporate the issue in their electoral manifestos. In a second stage, we explore how the national context (e.g. the strength of anti-immigration parties, and the situation of the economy) and the ideological nature of the parties may affect the dynamics of party competition on immigration.

In some way, this paper can be situated alongside the work of several scholars who have worked on how the success of anti-immigration parties has affected other parties (e.g. Aichholzer et al. 2013; Norris 2005; Van Spanje 2011; Harmel and Svåsand 1997; Schain 2002). The main contribution of this paper, however, is that we do not consider the strength of anti-immigration parties the only or main driving factor, but consider it as an important moderating factor. The goal is to assess to what extent demand- and supply-side factors, as well as competition dynamics, shape how parties position themselves on the issue of immigration. For this purpose we take an agnostic view on the relevance of each type of factor and examine empirically how each of them contributes to our understanding of how parties compete on the immigration issue.

Party Competition over Immigration

In recent years, the number of immigrants has increased in many countries, including the six under study in this paper (Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, Spain and Switzerland). Given the colonial past or established guest-worker programmes, immigration is not a new phenomenon in most of Western Europe, but the scale of inflows and the diversity of immigrant groups have changed in the past three decades. Of the countries studied, Spain in particular has experienced the greatest increase in immigrant numbers, more than quadrupling foreign citizens between 1996 and 2009 (Ros 2011). At the same time, like in the other countries under examination, the diversity of immigrants has greatly increased in the past three decades. Equally, in most European

countries, the way the public perceives immigration has evolved. The issue has often become more salient and in favour of more restrictive[2] policies (e.g. Ceobanu and Excandell 2010).

Despite these somewhat similar developments in terms of demographics and public attitudes, the politicization of immigration varies notably across Western Europe, and in particular among the countries covered here (compare Berkhout 2012; SOM 2012). In some instances, parties of the radical right and anti-immigrant parties have grown considerably (e.g. France, Switzerland, Flanders in Belgium), although not always in a steady manner (e.g. Austria), while in other countries none of the parties has steadily devoted almost exclusive attention to immigration and integration (e.g. Spain and, to a certain extent, Britain). Moreover, irrespective of the presence or absence of anti-immigration parties, the way mainstream parties have dealt with the issue varies considerably across countries. There are three common strategies for mainstream parties to deal with new niche parties prompting new issues: joining, opposing, or ignoring/isolating the newcomer and the new issue (see Meguid 2005; Bale et al. 2010). All strategies seem to be found in the countries we cover in this paper.

In Switzerland, the party that can be regarded as the central player in the politicization of immigration, the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC) has – in the course of its growth and adoption of anti-immigration policies – remained incorporated both in parliament and government. During its growth period, the SVP/UDC has all but incorporated the parties further to the right, moving the party towards even more outspoken anti-immigrant positions (Kriesi et al. 2005; Ruedin 2013). In the United Kingdom, by contrast the increasing popularity of the BNP and UKIP initially led the mainstream parties to distance themselves from the former parties, but more recently the competitive pressure from UKIP has led both the Conservatives and Labour to become tougher on immigration, at least from a rhetorical point of view. A similar evolution of party strategies can be found in France as a reaction to the increasing popularity of the FN, though in the French case the Socialist party (PS) has not reacted in the same way as the Labour Party in the UK with a strengthened anti-immigrant rhetoric at the national level. In Belgium, finally, the success of the Vlaams Block and the Front National was opposed with a *cordon sanitaire*: the mainstream parties would refuse to govern with the anti-immigrant parties.

With these different strategies it is unsurprising that there are contradictory findings in the literature as to how much attention parties devote to immigration and integration, or indeed when parties pay attention to immigration. In order to address this puzzle, we examine in a comparative manner how models of party competition help understanding to what extent parties incorporate the issues of immigration and integration in their party manifestos. Six countries are compared over a period of nearly two decades (1992 to 2012).

The theoretical grounding of this paper lies with models of party competition, and in particular in both theories of spatial and directional competition. These two broad theoretical approaches to party competition often produce different expectations about how parties will behave to maximize their competitive position. On the one hand, parties are seen as competing spatially. The assumption is that voters choose the party that is ideologically closest to their own position

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[2] We follow Givens and Luedtke (2004) by referring to restrictive vs. expansive immigration policies. Restrictive policies refer to strict entry control mechanisms as well as to limited rights and social benefits legally guaranteed to migrants already settled in the country. Expansive immigration policies refer to legal frameworks with few entry barriers as well as to legal norms guaranteeing multiple rights to migrants and giving them access to welfare benefits under the same conditions than country nationals.

(Sanders et al. 2013; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Enelow and Hinich 1990; compare Black 1948; Downs 1957). With a single dimension, finding one's closest party seems relatively straightforward, but in multidimensional spaces, minimizing one's 'average' distance to different parties can be a cognitively difficult task, although voters seem to compensate for this challenge by using heuristics or short-cuts (Baldassarri 2012; Goldstein 2011; Kam and Zechmeister 2013).

If we apply this to the issue of immigration, the expectation is that parties will try to converge towards the most preferred position of the public on the issue, and in most cases that would mean that they tend to favour more restrictive immigration policies. The first set of hypotheses derived from spatial competition premises are:

> H1: All parties will pay more attention to immigration as the issue becomes more salient for the public.

> H2: All parties will introduce more restrictive immigration policies in their manifestos as the issue becomes more salient *and* is more negatively perceived among the population (interaction effect).

The adoption of more restrictive immigration policies is not without limits, however. With a strong norm not to appear prejudiced (Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten 2013; Ivarsflaten, Blinder, and Ford 2010; Wetsin 2003) and the history of World War II, there are limits to spatial competition – but we expect spatial competition to take place within these limits.

Theories of issue ownership and valence voting highlight that spatial competition in its pure sense may be rare. Many issues are valence issues, namely issues on which voters do not disagree: There are no pro- and anti- camps. Most (if not all) voters share the same preference on the direction of policy on the issue (Stokes 1963). Therefore, what makes the issue decisive (or not) in determining voting behaviour is, first, the salience of the issue for the voter, and second, which party is identified as the owner of the issue, the most credible for the public (Petrocik 1989; Petrocik 1996), or the one voters most naturally associate with the issue (Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012). Party competition is therefore not only about positioning the party closer to voters but about becoming the owner of the relevant issues (Green 2007; Green and Hobolt 2008). Even though patterns of issue ownership tend to be stable over time, parties compete to gain credibility on issues that are salient to voters by adapting their party manifesto and their message in the media (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Walgrave, Lefevere, and Nuytemans 2009). On this basis we can formulate the following hypothesis:

> H3: Parties will devote more space to immigration in their manifestos when the issue is salient among the population *and* they are seen by the public as more competent on the issue (interaction effect).

These three first hypotheses assume that models of party competition, be they based on spatial theory or valence issues/issue ownership, apply uniformly to all parties and in all circumstances. Several scholars have argued that this will not be the case and that models of party competition should take into consideration the national context in order to understand how party competition on emerging issues occurs. Moreover, not all parties should react similarly to the emergence of a new issue, possibly associated with the emergence of a new party. The context matters in how parties compete on new issues – in this paper, immigration – in three ways. First, the strength of

the new party that tries to politicize the issue is crucial. The stronger the new party is, the more likely are the other parties to react. In this case, the expectation is that the issue of immigration will become more salient where there are strong anti-immigration parties. Additionally, anti-immigrant parties' strength is expected to foster the convergence of mainstream parties towards more restrictive positions towards immigration and immigrants (e.g. Aichholzer et al. 2013; Schain 2006).

> H4: The stronger anti-immigration parties are, the more salient the issue is in party manifestos.

> H5: The stronger anti-immigration parties are, the more parties move towards restrictive views on immigration.

Second, the economic situation of the country is also said to play a central role in how parties deal with the issue of immigration. Immigration is more likely to be perceived as a problem when the economy is going well. In these circumstances migrants are more likely to be seen as a threat by voters (Citrin et al. 1997; Anderson 1996). Therefore, we should also expect that bad economic performance in the country increases the salience of immigration and the preference for restrictive immigration policies in party manifestos.

> H6: There is a negative association between the state of the economy and the salience of immigration in party manifestos.

> H7: There is a negative association between the state of the economy and movement towards more restrictive positions on immigration in party manifestos.

Finally, the nature of the party system is also likely to affect party competition. In more fragmented party systems, party competition is more volatile and parties should react more rapidly to changes in public opinion. We could therefore expect that this would apply to the issue of immigration in line with the following two hypotheses:

> H8: The more fragmented the party system, the greater the effect of changes in the salience of immigration among the public on the salience of the issue in party manifestos (interaction effect).

> H9: The more fragmented the party system, the greater the effect of negative views of immigration among the public on parties' movement towards restrictive views on immigration (interaction effect).

In addition to these contextual variables, another refinement to our two initial hypotheses (H1 and H2) could be made by differentiating our expectations depending on the ideological position of the parties. More specifically, whether the parties are direct competitors of anti-immigrant parties is thought to be relevant. This distinction is central in Meguid's (2005) work on how parties react to the emergence of niche parties, such as anti-immigration parties or Green parties. One element of her model is that it is more complicated for centre and centre-right parties to ignore the issue of immigration and anti-immigration parties, especially when the latter are gaining support (see also Bale 2003; Bale 2008). On the contrary, it is easier for centre-left and left-wing parties to remain silent on the issue (but see Bale et al. 2010 for a different perspective). Silence is also the

best strategy for them since the population tends to prefer stricter immigration policies, which are at odds with common left-wing and social democratic immigration policies. By keeping immigration and integration off the agenda, these parties would maximize their chances at elections. Following that line of reasoning we can derive our last hypotheses derived from the existing scholarship:

> H10: The issue of immigration will be more salient in the party manifestos of centre-right and right-wing parties.

> H11: Restrictive immigration policies will be more frequent in the party manifestos of centre-right and right-wing parties

Yet, and this is a new hypothesis that we would like to contribute to the scholarship in this area, there are limits to the capacity of left and centre parties to ignore the issue of immigration. If the issue reaches too high levels of salience and if anti-immigration parties are too strong, silence is no longer a viable strategy. This is due to the fact that anti-immigrant sentiments in the population are not perfectly aligned with left-right positions: it is not uncommon for supporters of left-wing parties to harbour anti-immigrant sentiments, or for supporters of right-wing parties to prefer liberal immigration policies. It follows that for most parties keeping silent increases the risk of losing voters. This is particularly the case in contexts where a high proportion of the population consider immigration one of the most pressing issues facing the country. We therefore expect a moderating effect of these contextual aspects on party ideology and, hence, that H10 will be rejected whenever:

> H12: The issue is very salient among the public (i.e. more than 50 per cent of respondents place it among their top priorities), or

> H13: If the support for anti-immigration parties is very high (i.e. more than 10 per cent).

By highlighting the importance of "silence", we argue that the valence/issue ownership account needs to be modified to take into consideration that parties cannot keep silent even if this might be the best they could do from an issue ownership perspective. If immigration is discussed a great deal in the year before elections by other parties or in the media because it is a major concern of the public, they will have to discuss immigration in their manifestos even if they are reluctant to do so.

Data

The data in this paper come from multiple sources. On the one hand, 193 manifestos of parties in the six countries were coded manually.[3] An exhaustive dictionary of keywords was used to help coders identify the parts of the manifesto that are about immigration (see Appendix 2).[4] The coders then manually selected the relevant sections, filtering out false positives, and producing a corpus text of immigration-related statements that was used for coding. The analyses reported in

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[3] The list of parties is shown in Appendix 1.

[4] The dictionary was piloted on British, Spanish and Swiss-German manifestos to ensure that the keywords did not miss potentially relevant sections. More information is available in Ruedin and Morales (2012).

this paper use these selections of text to code, among other dimensions, the position on immigration. We used natural sentences as our unit of analysis.[5] For each sentence, we coded the position towards immigration (negative, somewhat negative, neutral, somewhat positive, and positive). These positions per sentence were aggregated to derive at the overall party position. Both the mean and the interpolated median were calculated to provide two different means of aggregation and check the robustness of the findings. Standard deviations are also available. For measuring salience, we compared the number of words in the sentences that are about immigration and integration with the number of words in the whole manifesto (expressed as a proportion). We also coded, for each sentence, whether it is about the management of immigration of new migrants, or whether it focuses on integration of immigrants already present, and what justification is given for the statement (framing), if any.[6] Given that we coded manifestos for the elections in the period 1992–2012, we have 193 manifestos for 35 elections in our dataset for analyses.

The left-right positions of parties were taken from expert surveys, pooled, and averaged using a moving average to derive a complete time series. Taking the position closest to the election, or the mean between the closest value before and after an election leads to no substantial differences (Ruedin 2013).

To capture the support of anti-immigrant parties, we considered both the vote share and the vote intention before elections. We generally took the vote intention 6 months before the elections using primarily survey reports published in national newspapers or national news agencies newswires, but the availability of data forced us to also consider data closer and further away from the day of the election. Following van Spanje (2011), we explicitly acknowledge that parties of the radical right need not be anti-immigrant. To identify anti-immigrant parties, we followed two strategies and compared their results. On the one hand, we followed Mudde's (2012) list of parties as anti-immigrant, complemented by the authors' own expertise. On the other hand, we followed van Spanje's (2011) approach, and defined parties as anti-immigrant on their position in the party manifesto. In the latter case, parties with a position lower than -0.6 on a scale -1 to 1 were counted as anti-immigrant. In both cases, parties were classified dynamically, with changes over time possible. There is high agreement between the methods (96.5% agreement).

To capture demand-side factors relating to public opinion, we use two variables. On the one hand, we consider whether immigration is mentioned among the three most important issues facing the country. The data were extracted from the relevant survey items of the European Elections Studies (1989–2009) and complemented with national data for Austria and Belgium (election studies), Spain (CIS), Switzerland (Sorgenbarometer), and the UK (Ipsos-Mori Issues Index). On the other hand, we consider the proportion of the population who regard immigration as something bad for the economy, using responses extracted from relevant survey items in the ISSP and ESS surveys. These two indicators allow the best possible comparison over time and across countries of salience and directional preferences on immigration.

We measure issue ownership of immigration with an indicator that provides the percentage of individuals who consider each party the best at handling the immigration issue among those

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[5] There is evidence that the additional effort of dividing (some) sentences into quasi-sentences is not necessary, since natural sentences also lead to valid estimates (Däubler et al. 2012).

[6] The relevant sections of the codebook can be found in Appendix 3.

respondents who mentioned immigration as the most important issue/problem. The data were obtained from the European Elections Studies (1989–2009) and complemented with national data for Switzerland (SELECTS). To capture the context, we consider the fractionalization of the party system (the effective number of parties, taken from Michael Gallagher's *Election Indices*), and unemployment figures (yearly averages) from Eurostat and BFS (for Switzerland). Right-wing parties were defined on the basis of pooled expert surveys, with a position to the right of the midpoint considered centre-right/right parties. Anti-immigrant parties were excluded from this definition of centre-right/right parties.

Findings

Salience and Positions on Immigration in Party Manifestos: A Descriptive Overview

In a first step, we examine whether there is an apparent association between the salience in public opinion (most important problem facing the country, immigration regarded as bad for the economy) and the salience of immigration in the party manifestos. In most of the cases, concerns about immigration among the public changes before parties give more salience to immigration and integration in their manifestos (Figure 1). In fact, it seems that parties react to public opinion by giving more attention to immigration in the party manifestos of the elections immediately posterior to the highest spikes in public concern. This pattern can be observed in Spain, the UK, probably in Switzerland, in France for some parties and in Belgium for the Front National (FN). With the data available it is difficult to determine whether Austria also falls into this group, or whether in Austria public opinion and party salience change concurrently. In Austria, all parties increased their attention to immigration for the 2006 elections. This is also the first year we observe an increase in public concern expressed in surveys (53%).[7] Unfortunately we lack sufficiently detailed data for Austria to establish whether parties responded to changes in public opinion, or whether parties were drivers of the change. We note that the salience of the issue for the public remained high after 2006 (and even increased to 58%), even though all the parties devoted a significantly smaller portion of their manifestos to immigration and integration in the subsequent election.

In Belgium there is no significant difference in the space devoted by parties to immigration and integration over time. Noteworthy is the French-speaking Belgian Front National (FN) in 2003. Although the party was born as an anti-immigration party trying to import to French-speaking Belgium the model of the French Front national, it also coloured its party manifestos with strong anti-establishment claims that were balancing out the weight of anti-immigration claims in the party manifestos. The anti-system discourse of the FN was particularly strong in the 1990s when several scandals of child abuse and of food safety that had dominated the political agenda of the late 1990s (Deschouwer 2004). In Figure 1 we observe that immigration claims gained importance in the 2003 party manifesto. A careful look at the manifesto of the party shows that it is in particular at the expense of anti-establishment claims. This could be related to the fact that concerns about immigration among the Belgian electorate rose significantly in the preceding years. The FN adapted, though with some delay, its message to reflect the change among the public. In Flanders, the increase is not as strong, even for the Vlaams Blok/Belang, but partly

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[7] The value in the figure increases earlier because of the moving average.

because the party always maintained its attention on two cores issues: immigration and Flemish independence.

In Switzerland, the SVP has gradually increased its attention to immigration and integration between 1995 and 2007, by which time it had almost entirely swallowed up the parties further to the right (Swiss Democrats, Freedom Party). When these parties were still relevant fringe parties, they paid particular attention to immigration and integration, such as the 22% by the Swiss Democrats (SD) in 2003, or the astonishing 64% by the Freedom Party (FP) in 2003. In the most recent election all parties devoted less space to immigration and integration, despite public attention not dropping accordingly. A case in point is the Socialist party (SPS) which did not treat immigration in its manifesto.

In Spain, there is a gradual but steep increase in public attention to immigration up to 2006; declining subsequently, especially after the beginning of the economic crisis. Most parties seem to follow a bit in the 2008 election, but subsequently also focused on other issues (like the public). In the UK, the increase in public attention was also very steep up to 2002, and parties follow suit in the 2005 election, although with reduced attention to immigration in 2010 despite the fact that citizens were not considerably less concerned about it. The UKIP is an exception with increasing attention to immigration and integration in their manifesto, as it becomes more clearly an anti-immigration party. In France, parties seem follow a gradual increase in concern about immigration visible among the public since the late 1990s.

In most countries, it seems that concerns over immigration in the population precede parties' paying more attention to the topic in their manifestos. This is in line with the parties reflecting the public mood, perhaps with some delay. With the data available, we cannot determine whether parties influence or not public opinion by other actions, such as their daily verbal statements or policy actions (but see Morales, Ruedin, and Pilet 2012 for some indications). Given the way party manifestos are launched, however, it seems unlikely that party manifestos significantly lag changes in the real party positions in a significant way.

Figure 1: Salience in Manifestos for Each Party and MIP over Time (1992 to 2012)

Notes: all variables are proportions, and plotted on the same scale (0-1); for the most important problem facing the country (MIP, black line) a moving average is used; party salience gives the proportion of the manifesto that is about immigration and integration (in words, colourful lines).

How much parties shift the attention they give to immigration and integration varies considerably across parties within countries, but also across countries.[8] Thus, at face value, the evidence in support of the simplest spatial competition proposition (H1, that all parties will pay more attention to immigration as the issue becomes more salient for the public) is limited. At a more

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[8] The same conclusions are drawn when considering the median party salience and public attention to immigration. The median party salience is the median of the salience for all the parties covered in a country and year. As a consequence, the median salience does not correspond to a single party. It summarises the overall trend of attention that parties give to immigration in their manifestos. The conclusions drawn evaluating this aggregated form reflect the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, but the trend of party attention to immigration is by necessity smoothed.

fundamental level, however, we note that during the period covered almost all parties took a position on immigration and integration in their manifestos. In fact, of the 193 manifestos included in the analysis, only 7 included no reference to immigration and integration at all, with a further 5 treating the issue in just one sentence. Of the parties taking no or only a vague position, we find many of the regional Spanish parties. This is in line with our argument that parties generally cannot afford not to have a position on immigration and integration – regardless of whether they own the issue or not –; although they may not make it a central concern of their manifesto.

Figure 2 looks, instead, at the policy positions each party took on immigration in each election manifesto – with positions closer to +1 meaning expansive views, and those closer to −1 meaning a more restrictive position – and plots them against the trends in concern about immigration (MIP, straight black line) and of negative views about immigration (immigration is bad for the economy, dashed black line).

Figure 2: Position in Manifesto for Each Party and MIP over Time (1992 to 2012)

Notes: Most important problem (solid black line, left scale), and views that immigration is bad for the economy (Economy, dashed black line, left scale), compared to party positions on immigration (colourful lines, right scale)

First of all, we observe a considerable volatility in the average positions that political parties take on immigration over time in most of the countries, except France. In Austria, the three main parties (SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ) moved simultaneously towards more restrictive positions in the 2006 elections, following a spike of concern about immigration and increasingly negative attitudes towards its effect among the public, and a previous restrictive move of the Liberal Forum (LIF) in the 2002 elections. Interestingly, the Green party also moves slightly towards more restrictive positions, but they do so one election later (in 2008). The 2006 elections saw the ÖVP-BZÖ coalition lose their majority in parliament and led to the SPÖ-ÖVP grand coalition. In the 2008 elections most parties continued with their movement towards more restrictive positions – with the exception of the SPÖ that essentially remained in the same position, and of the FPÖ that moderated its platform back to their 2002 positions. These movements in Austria are

consistent with the sharp increase in both the concern for immigration and the negative attitudes about it among the public.

The case of Belgium provides a more complex picture, combining both stability in positions – for those in both extremes of the anti- and pro-immigration spectrum: VB, FN, Agalev/Groen!, Ecolo, and PS – and considerable fluctuation for the parties that take centre-of-the-spectrum positions (MR, CD&V, VLD, NVA, PSC-CDH). In either case, there is not much evidence that the movements (or lack thereof) in the position of the parties on immigration is following the concern and preferences of the public, as we see a move towards more expansive positions in the 2007 elections despite stability in concern about immigration and in the negative views about its economic effects. One interesting case in this respect are the Francophone Christian-democrats (PSC-CDH) that shifted gradually towards less restrictive positions on the issue since the mid-2000s although during the same period there were slightly more voters considering that immigration was not good for the Belgian economy.

A similar pattern of greater stability at the two opposite poles and greater movement in the centre of the scale is also visible for Switzerland, the other fragmented party system of those studied. The most striking movement is that of the liberal FDP, which gradually leapfrogs the Christian-Democrat CVP in their movement from relatively restrictive positions to relatively expansive ones. This movement is all the more notorious because it seems to ignore completely the public mood, which remains very concerned about immigration (even if decreasingly so). The FDP has a reputation for being business friendly and has historically been an elite party. The described movement may reflect clear support for immigration from EU countries and an attempt to distinguish itself from the SVP, although it does not appear to have affected the declining vote share of the FDP over time. In contrast, the SVP and the CVP become increasingly restrictive in their positions about immigration throughout the period. The SVP are widely regarded as setting the anti-immigrant agenda, mobilizing new voters on the issue (Kriesi et al. 2005). The CVP's position may be more reactive, trying to attract some SVP voters while maintaining a distinctive profile.

The results for Spain are in contrast to those of all other countries in that parties are all bundled in relatively expansive positions around immigration. Whereas in all other countries we find parties on both sides of the spectrum, we do not find any country-wide party that is truly representing the anti-immigrant views. Only two of the regional parties (Canary Coalition and the Catalan CiU) take moderately restrictive positions on the issue. Moreover, we see relative consistency in the movement patterns and a convergence towards centrist positions at the end of the period (2011 elections). All parties, with the exception of the left-wing IU, moved towards slightly more restrictive positions in the 2008 elections, which were also those when Spanish parties paid most attention to the issue (see Figure 1). However, most parties went back to their pre-2008 more moderate tone once the attention to immigration had waned. All in all, most parties seem to react to the concerned and negative public mood with a slight turn towards restrictive positions, but this movement fails to represent fully the opinions of the public, as no party takes a clearly restrictive overall position and all remain quite centrist or even expansive.

France provides a case of relative stability in the positions of almost all parties with a moderate restrictive turn that affects most of them, with the exception of the Communists and the Green party. The French situation provides the neatest example of a competition space on immigration that is perfectly ordered and driven by the traditional left-right spatial competition. There are no relevant overlaps, no leapfrogging and when parties move they tend to move all in the same

direction hence keeping their pre-existing distances. All the movements in position around immigration for the PS and the Gaullist parties match very well the movement in public opinion: as the public becomes less concerned about immigration between the mid-1990s and 2002, the PS takes a somewhat more expansive position; and as the concern and negative views about immigration increase between 2002 and 2007 most parties become more restrictive.

Finally, the British case shows a very strong competition around the issue of immigration, which results in a sharp convergence of most parties around relatively restrictive positions on the issue. All parties start to move towards more restrictive positions as the public becomes increasingly concerned and negative about immigration. Yet, the timing of the movements differ, with the Conservatives taking an early move towards restrictive positions already in the 2001 elections, while the other three parties (Labour, LibDems and UKIP) follow suit in the 2005 manifestos. The BNP remains in a relatively stable position in the most restrictive side of the spectrum. Most of the time, the distribution of positions across parties corresponds to the spatial expectations following the traditional left-right dimension competition. However, on some occasions (1997 and 2010), Labour and Tories converge to almost identical positions.

Overall, these descriptive findings lend mixed support to spatial theories of party competition for the immigration issue. In a number of cases (Austria, Spain, France and the UK) we see that parties shift – to a greater or lesser extent – their positions as the salience and negativity of the issue increases among the public. Yet, in other cases (Belgium and Switzerland) not all parties behave in the way spatial theories would predict. Therefore, in the next sections we examine more systematically all the hypotheses outlined before with a multivariate analysis of our pooled dataset of party manifestos. We look first in detail to the salience of immigration in party manifestos and then turn to the positions parties take in their platforms.

Modelling the Salience of Immigration in Party Manifestos

In this section, we analyse the factors that appear to affect the salience of immigration in party manifestos. We start, in Model 1, with the most straightforward expectations and look in particular at how the salience of the issue among the public, issue ownership and its interaction may explain issue salience. Model 1 adopts the following specification:

Model 1: SiM = MIP + competence + MIP*competence + aint + unemp + neff + anti.immigrant + right

Where, SiM is the salience of immigration in the party manifestos, MIP is the salience for the public, competence reflects issue ownership, aint is the vote intention of anti-immigrant parties, unemp is the unemployment indicator, neff is the party fragmentation indicator, anti.immigrant is a dummy for these parties, and right is a dummy indicating that the party is a centre-right/right-wing one. Figure 3 plots the results of an OLS regression with this specification with the coefficients and two standard deviations (one standard deviation as thick line). This model allows assessing hypotheses H1, H3, H4, H6 and H10.

Figure 3: Issue Ownership and Salience (Model 1)

Figure 4: Party Fragmentation and Salience (Model 2)

Notes: Dependent variable = salience of immigration in party manifesto; given are the coefficients (dots) and two standard deviations (thin line), with one standard deviation as thick line.

The first observation from Model 1 is the strong and positive effect of both demand-side (public opinion) and supply-side (strength of anti-immigrant parties) factors, though the latter is not statistically significant at the 95% level. This provides clear support for H1 (salience among the public drives attention by parties) and findings in the direction of H4 (the strength of anti-immigrant parties drives attention to the issue) that are too uncertain to be conclusive. The second observation is that we do not find any support for the relevance of issue ownership (H3), as neither the main nor the interaction effects of competence attribution are significant or different to zero. Thus, we cannot find evidence of directional competition in our data, and – as suggested by some of the findings in Figure 1 and Figure 2 – parties seem to give attention or shift their positions on immigration without much regard to their ownership of the issue and the competitive advantage that they win by discussing or keeping silent about the matter. Finally, the results of model 1 also lend no support to some established hypotheses in the literature. We do not see any relation between the state of the economy and attention to immigration (H6), and there seems to be no difference between centre-right and right-wing parties and the rest of the non-anti-immigrant parties in the attention they afford to immigration (H10).

Model 2 goes a step further and examines whether party fragmentation, which in itself does not have a direct effect on the attention paid to immigration in party manifestos as shown in Model 1, makes parties more sensitive to the concerns of the public (H8). Figure 4, thus, presents the results of the following model:

Model 2: SiM = MIP + competence + MIP*competence + aint + unemp + neff + anti.immigrant + right + MIP*neff

The findings suggest that greater party system fragmentation (such as in the Belgian and the Swiss cases in our study) produces, if anything, less – not more – sensitivity to the concerns of the public. In other words, once we control for the other factors included in Model 2, fragmentation reduces the responsiveness of political parties to citizens' concerns on immigration; however, the coefficient is on the fringes of statistical significance. In this regard, our findings are in contrast to those provided by Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008), who suggest that proportional electoral systems foster responsiveness. Nevertheless, the interaction coefficient is significant only at the 95% confidence level and is, admittedly, small; so we need to be cautious.

Model 3 analyses whether extreme salience reduces the differences between centre-right and right-wing parties and other mainstream parties in sensitivity (Figure 5), and is specified as follows:

> Model 3: SiM = MIP + competence + MIP*competence + aint + unemp + neff + anti.immigrant + right + MIP50dummy;

where the MIP50dummy indicates that 50 per cent or more of the respondents in survey considered immigration as one of the most important problems, and the party is right-wing.

The fourth model (Figure 6) examines, instead, whether a very high electoral support for anti-immigrant parties reduces the differences in salience between right-wing parties and other mainstream parties to the changes in the public mood (H12). The model specification is as follows:

> Model 4: SiM = MIP + competence + MIP*competence + aint + unemp + neff + anti.immigrant + right + aint10dummy;

where aint10dummy indicates that the electoral support of anti-immigrant parties in that country and year was 10 per cent or more, and the party is right-wing.

Figure 5: Right Parties and Salience (Model 3)   *Figure 6: Right Parties and Anti-Immigrant Challenge (Model 4)*

Notes: Dependent variable = salience of immigration in party manifesto; given are the coefficients (dots) and two standard deviations (thin line), with one standard deviation as thick line.

The results suggest with or without taking into consideration the high salience of immigration for the public or the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties, right-wing parties are no more sensitive than other mainstream parties, who cannot afford to keep silent about the issue. None of our interaction terms are statistically significant. This suggests that more research is needed to establish if there is empirical evidence supporting previous scholarship that argues that right parties are more constrained than others by the competition they face from anti-immigrant parties (Meguid 2005; Bale 2008). The also suggest that all parties are driven by similar factors, and that regardless of issue ownership they cannot afford to keep silent, or that they choose not to keep silent.

Modelling Positions on Immigration in Party Manifestos

We now turn our attention to parties' positions on immigration and the extent to which they are driven by supply- and demand-side factors, spatial or directional competition dynamics. Our results follow the same presentation and specification logic as for salience, but some of our variables reflect also direction of preferences. Model 5 (Figure 7) is specified as follows:

Model 5: Position = MIP + eco + MIP*eco + aint + unemp + neff + anti.immigrant + right;

Where 'eco' is the percentage of citizens who think that immigration is bad for the economy, as described in the data section, and all other variables are as described for Model 1. This model allows us to assess hypotheses H2, H5, H7, and H11.

Figure 7: Public opinion and positions (Model 5)　　*Figure 8: Fragmentation and Positions (Model 6)*

Notes: Dependent variable = position on immigration in party manifesto; given are the coefficients (dots) and two standard deviations (thin line), with one standard deviation as thick line.

The results of Model 5 in relation to the combined effect of high salience and high rejection of immigration among the public are very surprising. While higher salience (MIP) and negative attitudes (eco) both lead to more negative positions on immigration by parties, their combined effect seems to offset the negative main effect of both variables. In other words, with low negative attitudes towards immigration, increases in the salience of immigration lead to more restrictive positions in party manifestos; whereas with highly negative attitudes, and increasing salience of immigration, parties are not more likely to take restrictive positions on immigration. In a sense, the results suggest that when the issue of immigration has become very contentious for the public, parties restrain themselves in terms of how restrictive they become in their manifesto positions. The remaining results are in the same direction as those found for attention to immigration in party manifestos, with the exception that the electoral strength of anti-immigrant parties does not seem to drive parties to more restrictive positions (H5). As before, the state of the economy (H7) and the fragmentation of the party system do not have a direct effect on the positions parties take on immigration, whereas right-wing parties (H11) hold more restrictive views than other mainstream parties.

Model 6 (Figure 8) evaluates whether party system fragmentation interacts with the mood of the public to determine party positions on the issue of immigration.

> Model 6: Position = MIP + eco + MIP*eco + aint + unemp + neff + anti.immigrant + right + neff*eco

The results are consistent with those found for salience in Model 2: fragmented party systems are less responsive to the preferences of the public. Given that higher negative attitudes towards immigration push party positions towards more restrictive proposals, the positive coefficient for

the interaction term between attitudes (eco) and fragmentation (Neff) reduces this responsiveness in the direction of the public's wishes (see interaction plots in appendix 5). Again, our results all seem to point to the detrimental effect of party fragmentation on the reflection of the preferences of the public in the party political agenda.

Conclusion

This paper has examined party competition over immigration and integration in Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, 1992 to 2012. The starting point of this analysis was the observation that how much the issue is politicized and how parties react to the increasing salience of the issue, and to the rise of anti-immigration parties mobilizing on the issue, vary a lot from one country to the other. In order to investigate this variation, we have proposed to look at the dynamics of party competition on the issue.

Party competition is at the heart of political life in modern democracies. Two theories have been put forward as to how parties compete. On the one hand spatial competition regards the political space as a Euclidian space, where parties attempt to minimize the distance to their voters. By so doing, they can maximize support. Theories of directional competition (e.g. issue ownership), by contrast, highlight party competence. In order to maximize support, parties emphasize issues they are considered to be competent to solve issues the country faces. Immigration and integration are widely regarded issues where issue ownership plays a central role in party competition, given that there appears to be a consensus in the population that more restrictive policies are preferable. Parties thus compete by emphasizing and de-emphasizing the issue, and not by taking oppositional positions. Only the party 'owning' the issue would respond to increasing salience of immigration among the public by also increasing the salience of the issue in its manifestos. Mainstream parties would rather try to de-emphasize immigration and integration, and focus on other issues where they are considered more competent, such as the economy or welfare issues.

Our findings bring more support to spatial competition theories than to the logic of directional party competition and of issue ownership. All parties, and not only those viewed as the most credible on the issue, are reacting to the increased salience of the issue among the public. This association is particularly visible in Austria, Spain, France and the Netherlands. For the six countries covered (and the 35 elections), we clearly see that salience of immigration among the public has a positive effect on issue salience in party manifestos. This is true across the political spectrum. Moreover, parties also tend to converge to the position held by the majority of the public, and that is towards more restrictive positions towards immigration. These findings are clearly in line with one of our central claims in the introduction of this paper: silence is not a viable strategy for most parties when an issue becomes too salient. At some point, all parties appear to feel compelled to react and to respond even if they are reluctant to do it. We demonstrated that it is very uncommon for parties – with perhaps the exception of niche parties that do not compete for the median voter – not to take a position on immigration in their manifestos. Spain would be a good illustration of this dynamic. Mainstream parties have for most of the period kept immigration and integration off the agenda, de-emphasizing the issue, but they are unable to ignore it in 2008 after a spike in concern and negative opinions on the matter. But we also find consistent evidence in the other countries (Austria, France, Switzerland and the UK particularly).

The goal of this paper was not only to look at the association between public opinion and party competition on the issue of immigration. The analysis is not only looking at demand-side factors:

We have also tried to see whether the dynamics of party competition would be affected by other factors, and in particular by supply-side factors. We have therefore looked at the effect of anti-immigration parties as well as the ideological nature of political parties.

First, regarding the effect of anti-immigration parties, our findings are in line with previous scholarship (Norris 2005; Van Spanje 2011) arguing that mainstream parties are forced to react to anti-immigration parties when these become strong. We do find that the stronger anti-immigrant parties, the more likely are the others to talk about the issue in their manifestos. However, what we do not find is that mainstream parties adopt the restrictive views of anti-immigrant parties. On issue position, the strength of anti-immigration parties has no significant effect in our analysis.

Second, regarding the ideological nature of political parties, our findings are in line with previous studies that have shown only limited (and statistically non-significant) evidence that centre-right and right-wing parties are more likely to react to the increased salience of immigration among the public (Meguid 2005; Bale et al. 2010). Though there remains room for interpretation, we do see that these parties are somewhat more likely to talk more about immigration and to adopt more restrictive positions towards immigration when the public mood goes in this direction.

Finally, we have also looked at the impact of two contextual factors on the dynamics of party competition: the state of the economy and the degree of party system fragmentation. For the former, unlike hypothesized, we do not see any effect of a bad (or good) economic situation on issue salience, nor on parties' positions towards immigration. For party system fragmentation also, the findings are not in line with the general expectation that more fragmented party systems, often linked with proportional representation, will lead to more responsive political parties on the issue of immigration (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008). On the contrary, we observe that party system fragmentation renders it less likely for parties to react to an increasing salience of the issue among the public. It also reduces convergence towards more restrictive positions on the issue among parties. A possible explanation could be that in fragmented systems, many parties are focusing on a niche, on a limited group of voters and may therefore decide to ignore an issue like immigration that gains salience but perhaps not among the voters they target. That would, for example, explain why green parties in Belgium or Austria, but even Social Democrats in Belgium, are not very likely to follow the public mood on the issue of immigration. Nevertheless, this line of explanation could be one piece of the puzzle but does not provide the full picture. Our findings on the negative effect of party system fragmentation on party responsiveness should be investigated further.

Overall, we show that in line with spatial competition theories, and against issue ownership models, all parties react when an issue like immigration becomes salient. Some are more affected – in this case centre-right and right-wing parties – because they are the most exposed to the threat of anti-immigration parties. Even parties that are not direct competitors – mostly left-wing parties – have at some point to respond to changes in public mood. Silence cannot last if the issue becomes too salient; all parties seem to feel compelled to react at some point and to embrace the issue.

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Appendices

1 Manifestos Included

Country	Party	Year	Full length (words)	Parts on immigration (words)
AT	BZÖ	2006	7287	1555
AT	BZÖ	2008	3976	450
AT	FPÖ	1994	12387	994
AT	FPÖ	1995	1279	206
AT	FPÖ	1999	13415	1666

Country	Party	Year	Full length (words)	Parts on immigration (words)
AT	FPÖ	2002	27676	1832
AT	FPÖ	2006	3980	1021
AT	FPÖ	2008	4979	720
AT	Grüne	1994	11488	1526
AT	Grüne	1995	1434	0
AT	Grüne	1999	10147	1061
AT	Grüne	2002	7043	336
AT	Grüne	2006	8533	640
AT	Grüne	2008	5334	283
AT	LIF	1994	2634	163
AT	LIF	1995	1911	257
AT	LIF	1999	3029	24
AT	LIF	2002	14105	584
AT	ÖVP	1994	19111	1273
AT	ÖVP	1995	3726	0
AT	ÖVP	1999	30095	690
AT	ÖVP	2002	27734	1270
AT	ÖVP	2006	18709	1504
AT	ÖVP	2008	5847	596
AT	SPÖ	1994	10876	491
AT	SPÖ	1995	3771	270
AT	SPÖ	1999	9051	82
AT	SPÖ	2002	12078	803
AT	SPÖ	2006	7219	1107
AT	SPÖ	2008	13014	483
BE	AGALEV	1995	18025	657
BE	AGALEV	1999	52810	1306
BE	AGALEV	2003	70962	1980
BE	CDH	2003	144230	3497
BE	CDH	2007	126485	3318
BE	CDH	2010	153194	5309
BE	CDV	2003	38357	2137
BE	CDV	2007	39245	1808
BE	CDV	2010	34631	1042
BE	CVP	1995	15936	585
BE	CVP	1999	17787	336
BE	ECOLO	1995	7222	186
BE	ECOLO	1999	595932	12460

Country	Party	Year	Full length (words)	Parts on immigration (words)
BE	ECOLO	2003	414380	15826
BE	ECOLO	2010	93664	7271
BE	FN	1999	3891	373
BE	FN	2003	6651	1654
BE	FN	2007	16232	1024
BE	Groen	2007	56074	1764
BE	Groen	2010	34677	1463
BE	MR	1995	8123	974
BE	MR	2003	78363	2657
BE	MR	2007	129746	3551
BE	MR	2010	127054	5889
BE	NVA	2003	6666	363
BE	NVA	2007	18594	2019
BE	NVA	2010	24443	1666
BE	PRL	1999	64622	1162
BE	PS	1995	46881	1886
BE	PS	1999	22170	989
BE	PS	2003	86978	5538
BE	PS	2007	126613	8005
BE	PS	2010	53384	3559
BE	PSC	1995	19642	427
BE	PSC	1999	13753	115
BE	SP	1995	13603	208
BE	SP	1999	10725	51
BE	SPA	2003	6591	350
BE	SPA	2007	27046	377
BE	SPA	2010	14773	429
BE	VB	1995	25518	1438
BE	VB	1999	97683	4532
BE	VB	2003	23955	1830
BE	VB	2007	10510	1215
BE	VB	2010	5377	556
BE	VLD	1995	3694	290
BE	VLD	1999	26122	1832
BE	VLD	2003	4006	229
BE	VLD	2007	31539	2401
BE	VU	1995	30402	776
BE	VU	1999	34640	1617

Country	Party	Year	Full length (words)	Parts on immigration (words)
CH	BDP	2011	1083	107
CH	CVP	1995	1426	150
CH	CVP	1999	22721	756
CH	CVP	2003	1311	348
CH	CVP	2007	2618	220
CH	CVP	2011	2265	88
CH	FDP	1995	2771	103
CH	FDP	1999	4689	300
CH	FDP	2003	5714	688
CH	FDP	2007	5015	280
CH	FDP	2011	2952	130
CH	FPAP	2003	2453	1566
CH	GPS	1995	2526	159
CH	GPS	1999	3575	210
CH	GPS	2003	1563	188
CH	GPS	2007	13528	530
CH	GPS	2011	7533	445
CH	SD	2003	3386	748
CH	SPS	1995	3832	0
CH	SPS	1999	8280	430
CH	SPS	2003	9298	549
CH	SPS	2007	21149	392
CH	SPS	2011	1582	0
CH	SVP	1995	6699	39
CH	SVP	1999	11665	373
CH	SVP	2003	17913	2041
CH	SVP	2007	4458	1081
CH	SVP	2011	23444	2067
ES	BNG	1993	1392	0
ES	BNG	1996	3293	0
ES	BNG	2000	18087	26
ES	BNG	2004	34264	562
ES	BNG	2008	32668	404
ES	BNG	2011	15833	38
ES	CC	1993	10281	37
ES	CC	1996	8240	0
ES	CC	2000	19280	541
ES	CC	2004	21276	545

Country	Party	Year	Full length (words)	Parts on immigration (words)
ES	CC	2008	39839	1993
ES	CC	2011	24037	167
ES	CIU	1993	63341	79
ES	CIU	1996	83075	581
ES	CIU	2000	60614	718
ES	CIU	2004	126424	4165
ES	CIU	2008	5514	537
ES	CIU	2011	45360	691
ES	IU	1993	66061	3535
ES	IU	1996	157073	4862
ES	IU	2000	166750	4489
ES	IU	2004	49199	3738
ES	IU	2008	52599	2185
ES	IU	2011	44575	2340
ES	PNV	1993	64566	979
ES	PNV	1996	70654	490
ES	PNV	2000	76463	456
ES	PNV	2004	14606	117
ES	PNV	2008	26878	23
ES	PNV	2011	10497	85
ES	PP	1993	42849	803
ES	PP	1996	55058	631
ES	PP	2000	54971	1322
ES	PP	2004	88965	1630
ES	PP	2008	82096	4938
ES	PP	2011	45616	1046
ES	PSOE	1993	33470	711
ES	PSOE	1996	68817	752
ES	PSOE	2000	33418	1200
ES	PSOE	2004	88541	2376
ES	PSOE	2008	104036	6430
ES	PSOE	2011	61884	1002
FR	FDG	2012	20969	509
FR	FN	2002	33371	1758
FR	FN	2007	28529	2096
FR	FN	2012	6481	566
FR	MNR	2002	12739	890
FR	MOD	2012	9752	246

Country	Party	Year	Full length (words)	Parts on immigration (words)
FR	MPF	2002	19183	691
FR	MPF	2007	5332	557
FR	PCF	2002	2090	128
FR	PCF	2007	22584	182
FR	PS	1997	5087	264
FR	PS	2002	6594	171
FR	PS	2007	14985	493
FR	PS	2012	49712	1383
FR	RPR	1997	1879	82
FR	UDF	2002	16448	511
FR	UDF	2007	21318	280
FR	UMP	2002	2495	75
FR	UMP	2007	39434	1150
FR	UMP	2012	14886	786
FR	VG	2007	47341	653
FR	VG	2012	3138	46
UK	BNP	2001	1281	106
UK	BNP	2005	25560	1103
UK	CON	1997	21216	121
UK	CON	2001	13209	216
UK	CON	2005	7402	1187
UK	CON	2010	27562	371
UK	LAB	1997	17692	135
UK	LAB	2001	30559	94
UK	LAB	2005	24190	2014
UK	LAB	2010	29508	613
UK	LIB	1997	14351	113
UK	LIB	2001	21597	269
UK	LIB	2005	16149	587
UK	LIB	2010	18424	495
UK	UKIP	2001	13498	586
UK	UKIP	2005	8928	496
UK	UKIP	2010	7979	795

2 Dictionary

toleran	asylum*	burqa	cultur*	discriminat*
abuse	avalanche	christian	custom*	diversity
assimil*	border	citizen*	deport*	ethnic*

extremis*	immigr*	mosque	refug*	tradition*
flood	indigenous	multicultur*	refuge	traumatis*
foreign*	integrat*	muslim	religious	traumatiz*
fraud	invasion	nation*	reunion	unauthorised
halal	irregular	native	sharia	unauthorized
hallal	islam*	naturalis*	shari'a	unity
headscarf	jihad*	naturaliz*	shariah	veil
human*	migrant*	permit	shelter	xenophob*
identitiy	minaret	raci*	temple	
illegal*	minorit*	radical	terroris*	

3 Codebook for Manual Coding

What is the topic of the sentence?

Immigration → Code 1

Civic integration → Code 2

Immigration or civic integration, but unspecific and vague to the extent that it is unclassifiable → Code 9

What is the position toward the issue?

Strongly restrictive to migrants/conservative/pro-national residents/mono-cultural → Code -1

Somewhat restrictive to migrants/conservative/pro-national residents/mono-cultural → Code - 0.5

Neutral/ambivalent/technocratic/pragmatic → Code 0

Somewhat open to migrants/progressive/cosmopolitan/multi-cultural→ Code 0.5

Strongly open to migrants/progressive/cosmopolitan/multi-cultural → Code 1

Unclassifiable → Code 9

What is the justification or argument given or implied by the party with respect to the statement?

No argument provided → Code 0

Instrumental, pragmatic, utilitarian or goal-oriented arguments → Code 1

Arguments about collective *identity* (i.e. nationality), ethics, values, community, culture and appropriateness → Code 2

Arguments about universal *moral principles* and rights (including legal arguments) → Code 3

4 Regression Tables

Salience

```
Calls:
sm1: lm(formula = percentage ~ mip * competence + aint + unemp + neff +
    Anti.immigrant + right, data = parties)
sm2: lm(formula = percentage ~ mip * competence + aint + unemp + Anti.immigrant +
    right + neff * mip, data = parties)
sm3: lm(formula = percentage ~ mip * competence + aint + unemp + Anti.immigrant +
```

```
      right + mip * right, data = parties)
sm4: lm(formula = percentage ~ mip * competence + aint + unemp + Anti.immigrant +
      right + aint * right, data = parties)
```

```
=======================================================
                      sm1        sm2        sm3        sm4
-------------------------------------------------------
(Intercept)         0.013     -0.018      0.019      0.016
                   (0.018)    (0.026)    (0.018)    (0.018)
mip                 0.095**    0.223*     0.074*     0.093**
                   (0.032)    (0.086)    (0.037)    (0.032)
competence         -0.000     -0.000     -0.000     -0.000
                   (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)
aint                0.052      0.118      0.047      0.024
                   (0.047)    (0.062)    (0.044)    (0.055)
unemp              -0.000      0.000     -0.000     -0.000
                   (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)
neff                0.000      0.006
                   (0.002)    (0.004)
Anti.immigrant      0.062***   0.061***   0.062***   0.063***
                   (0.011)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.011)
right               0.007      0.008     -0.005     -0.000
                   (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.013)    (0.011)
mip x competence    0.001      0.001      0.001      0.001
                   (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)
mip x neff                    -0.034
                              (0.021)
mip x right                              0.047
                                        (0.042)
aint x right                                        0.062
                                                   (0.072)
-------------------------------------------------------
R-squared           0.412      0.424      0.418      0.415
adj. R-squared      0.374      0.382      0.380      0.377
N                   133        133        133        133
=======================================================
```

Position

```
sm5: lm(formula = Mean.POSIT ~ mip * eco + aint + unemp + neff + Anti.immigrant + right,
data = parties)
sm6: lm(formula = Mean.POSIT ~ mip * eco + aint + unemp + neff + Anti.immigrant + right
+ neff * eco, data = parties)
```

```
===================================
                   sm5        sm6
-----------------------------------
(Intercept)      1.035***   1.372***
                (0.296)    (0.345)
mip             -1.368*     0.224
                (0.647)    (1.070)
eco             -4.504     -6.594*
                (2.421)    (2.649)
aint             0.123      0.386
                (0.493)    (0.509)
unemp           -0.000     -0.000
                (0.011)    (0.011)
neff             0.054**   -0.202
                (0.020)    (0.139)
Anti.immigrant  -1.438***  -1.429***
                (0.082)    (0.082)
right           -0.619***  -0.614***
                (0.066)    (0.065)
```

```
mip x eco           9.601    -3.361
                  (5.992)   (9.162)
eco x neff                   1.799
                            (0.969)
---------------------------------
R-squared           0.737     0.744
adj. R-squared      0.720     0.725
N                    134       134
=================================
```

Model 3 and 4

```
sm3c:  lm(formula  =  percentage  ~  mip  *  competence  +  aint  +  unemp  +  neff  +
Anti.immigrant + right + mip50dummy, data = parties)
sm4c:  lm(formula  =  percentage  ~  mip  *  competence  +  aint  +  unemp  +  neff  +
Anti.immigrant + right + aint10dummy, data = parties)
```

```
=====================================
                  sm3c      sm4c
-------------------------------------
(Intercept)       0.004    -0.005
                 (0.022)   (0.021)
mip               0.116*    0.145**
                 (0.048)   (0.044)
competence       -0.001    -0.001
                 (0.001)   (0.001)
aint             -0.040    -0.038
                 (0.049)   (0.058)
unemp            -0.000    -0.000
                 (0.001)   (0.001)
neff              0.003     0.003
                 (0.002)   (0.002)
Anti.immigrant    0.062***  0.062***
                 (0.010)   (0.010)
right             0.003     0.006
                 (0.008)   (0.010)
mip50dummy        0.025
                 (0.017)
mip x competence  0.002     0.001
                 (0.002)   (0.002)
aint10dummy                 0.003
                           (0.014)
-------------------------------------
R-squared         0.438     0.429
adj. R-squared    0.397     0.387
N                  133       133
=====================================
```

5 Interaction Plots

Interaction Plot for Model 5

Interaction Plot for Model 6